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SEEING COLOR AND TELEVISION:  
WHAT DO MILLENNIALS’ TELEVISION PRACTICES TELL US ABOUT 
POST-RACIALITY? 
 
Adolfo Rafael Mora, Ph.D. 
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Supervisor:  Joseph D. Straubhaar 
 
 The demographic composition of Millennials is the most ethnoracially diverse 
generation so far, and with it, a discursive construction of them being colorblind. 
Colorblindness is also taken as reality with cultural texts that feature color, therefore one-
step closer of achieving a post-racial society: a socio-cultural environment where race 
and racism are no longer limiting factors. This dissertation was interested in examining 
the relationship between orientations of seeing color and the television practices of 
Millennials. To do so, two grand research questions were answered using survey 
methodology: One paid close attention to color-blindness while the other focused on 
color-consciousness.  
 The first research question was interested in the socializing effect of television on 
two color-blind attitudes: color-evasion and power-evasion. On one hand, it analyzed 
television programming that featured various types of color diversity: multicultural 
(heterogeneous in color), minority leading (homogeneous in color, favoring ethnoracial 
 vii 
minorities), and White-dominant (homogeneous in color, favoring the ethnoracial 
majority). On the other, it also analyzed respectable portrayals—representations 
embodying the values of mainstream culture—for four ethnoracial groups: Whites, 
Latin@s, Blacks, and Asians. Statistical results (N = 535) show that these predictors had 
no statistical significance on color-evasive but did for power-evasive racial blindness.      
 The second research question was interested in how being color-conscious across 
two orientations (color-awareness and power-awareness) predicted noticing the perceived 
sexuality, criminality, and secondary narrative treatment of ethnoracial groups on 
television – conceptualized as onscreen marginality. Statistical results suggest that 
power-awareness is more successful in predicting onscreen marginality and in manners 
consistent with its framework than its counterpart orientation.   
 Both research questions examined opposite and competing ideologies of seeing 
color, and their findings offer support to think of Millennials as a colorblind generation 
but not exclusively. This dissertation suggests that color-blind texts prompt 
colorblindness, and when television misrepresents ethnoracial groups, color-
consciousness dominates. Eventually, the Millennial generation is still sorting out the 
contradictions about the place of race(ism) in society, and even if television appears 
neutral in its inclusion of color, there are subtle differences in how Millennials interpreted 
ethnoracial groups onscreen.  
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The presidential election of Barack Obama in 2008, and his re-election in 2012, 
popularized and helped engender the image of a post-racial America (Bonilla-Silva, 
2016; Cho, 2009; Love & Tosolt, 2010; Squires, 2014). The logic is simple: if a Black 
man occupied the ultimate political position as president, then racism has ended or is 
disappearing.  The turn to a perceived colorblind society suggests that any ethnoracial 
group is welcomed into the cultural, economical, and political fabric of the United States, 
since ethnicity/race do not longer structure social outcomes and opportunities. While 
Barack Obama works as a cultural signifier for an optimistic time when we moved 
beyond race(ism), how Americans reacted to his success suggest otherwise (Hollinger, 
2011; Love & Tosolt, 2010): that a post-racial America is more of a rhetoric than a 
reality. Indeed, the Pew Research Center (2016) found that White adults (32%) were 
more likely to believe that Obama made race relations worse than the general population 
(25%) or Blacks (5%). American youth (14-24 year olds) were far optimistic about what 
a Black president meant for race relations in the United States. Close to two-thirds 
believe that his presidency demonstrated that ethnoracial minority groups have the same 
opportunities as White people (62%), or believed that race is no longer a barrier for 
accomplishments (67%) (MTV, 2014). This range of responses questions the validity of a 
post-racial society, or at the very least, it poses the inquiry: Who is likely to endorse post-
racial attitudes, and what cements them?  
Other national events additionally weaken the claim of a post-racial America. 
Most recently, the Black Lives Matter movement and the 2016 U.S. presidential election 
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are prime examples. Loosely starting with the fatal shooting of 17-year-old Trayvon 
Martin in Sanford Florida, and formalizing with that of Michael Brown in Ferguson, 
Missouri, the Black Lives Matter movement has sought public and legislative attention as 
well as sympathy toward the mistreatment of Black bodies at the expense of police 
brutality and other cultural institutions. President-elect Donald Trump grounded his 
political campaigns on racialized narratives about fearing the “Other.” Through his 
rhetoric, for example, Latin@s became a faceless ethnoracial group comprised of rapists 
and murderers; Mexico sent its worst citizens to the United States, and building a wall 
between the neighboring countries was promoted to contain the “threat.” What this small 
sample of his public discourse captures are some of the anxieties and fears attached to 
certain ethnoracial groups in dominant culture. These also paint a picture that inter–
ethnic/-racial relations in the United States are far from harmonious at the macro-level.  
On top of these public sentiments, the noticeable gaps between groups in health, 
unemployment, education, housing, income, and incarceration rates—which appear to 
widen over years, not close (Pew Research Center, 2016; State of Black America, 
2015)—again discrediting the notion of a color-neutral society. In 2014, the median 
adjusted household incomes for Whites was $71,200 and $43,300 for Blacks, and in 
2015, Blacks (26%) were twice as likely to live in poverty than White people in 2014 
(10%) (Pew Research Center, 2016). Among youth aged 18 to 24, Blacks (33%, 22%) 
and Latin@s (35%, 15%) are less likely than Asians (64%, 63%) or Whites (42%, 41%) 
to enroll in college or earn a bachelors’ degree (Krogstad, 2016). In terms of the 
incarcerated population, White people are under-represented (39%) according to US 
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Census figures (64%), while Blacks are over-represented (40%; 13%) (Wagner & Rabuy, 
2016).  
The ethnoracial inequalities carry over to the symbolic realm of media. Not only 
are ethnoracial minorities facing adversity in their numeric presence on television—in 
most cases, their visibility is less than their population figures (Negrón-Muntaner et 
Abbas, Figueroa, & Robson, 2014; Tukachinsky, Mastro, & Yarchi, 2015)—but also in 
their media depictions are also contradictory. News reports cover the hate crimes 
committed against ethnoracial minorities, and simultaneously, the same medium frames 
them as law-less or undocumented citizens, government-dependent, or here to over-
populate and drain the country’s resources (Campbell, 2016; Chavez, 2008). Fictional 
media communicates similar narratives and roles. Latin@s are typically depicted as 
gardeners or maids (Negrón-Muntaner et al., 2014). Blacks are sassy and physically  or 
sexually aggressive (Bounds Littlefield, 2008). Asians are weird, cool, or quiet (Larson, 
2006).  
Colorblind narratives in entertainment media add more contradictions to the 
already and ambivalent depictions of ethnoracial groups existing onscreen. What people 
see onscreen is ethnoracial minorities sharing screen time, with their stories interlocked 
alongside White characters; both groups interact in conflict-free households or 
workplaces and sometimes form coalitions; people can marry across cultures and 
befriend anyone without much setback. These harmonious inter-racial relations offer 
audiences symbolic proof that post-racial society is materializing (Brook, 2009; Esposito, 
2009; Squires, 2014). However, the tradeoff for this ethnoracial pluralism to exist 
   
 4 
onscreen is that characters must sanitize and de-politicize their ethnic and/or racial 
identities (Beltrán, 2010b, 2013; Bonilla-Silva & Ashe, 2014; Esposito, 2009; Molina-
Guzmán, 2010; Squires, 2014). Color1 must surrender its essence, in other words.  
These conflicting images demand more analysis as images and also as media texts 
which audiences consume. This dissertation attempts to consolidate and analyze the 
conflicted images, narratives, and myths about color on television, and how the audience 
receives and responds to them. It does so by interrogating post-raciality—the notion that 
we are moving beyond race and ethnicity (Hollinger, 2011; Nayak, 2006)—through the 
reception practices of one of the media muses of post-raciality: the multicultural, 
Millennial generation. Consequently, the guiding research question that frames this 
research is: What is post-racial about Millennials’ television experience?  And, if that 
experience is not primarily post racial, how should we understand it? 
Theoretically, this dissertation is grounded in post-racial theory (post-raciality), 
which centralizes color-blindness in its framework (Bobo, 2011; Cho, 2009; Powell, 
2008). Colorblindness is a growing paradigm in the media, starting from the industry’s 
casting practices (Warner, 2015) to the production of cultural texts that incorporate 
multiculturalism and raceless aesthetics such as employing ethnoracially ambiguous 
actors and characters (Beltrán, 2013; Beltrán & Fojas, 2008; Molina-Guzmán, 2013). 
Post-racial theory helps us understand the conditions in which color is socially and 
culturally accepted, and what must be done to overcome the bothersome ethnoracial past 
                                                
1 Color here stands for race and ethnicity. As it will be explained in Chapter 1, color is able to capture the 
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that still hunts the United States. Its proposed solution is to minimize color from identity 
politics (Squires, 2014).  
This dissertation is organized into two grand research questions that jointly 
examine and attempt to explain popular ideologies about color in media/television 
reception. Both research questions were answered through an online survey carried with 
large groups of undergraduate students at a large public university in Central Texas and 
cover a fairly broad cross-section of students. It cannot be described as a random sample, 
however. The nature of the sample is covered more in Chapters 2 and 3. Following is a 
description of the organization of the dissertation in terms of chapter content. 
Chapter 1 of this dissertation discusses why Millennials are an appropriate age 
generation to study post-raciality. It explains why color can best explain the presence of 
ethnicity and race. It also sets the dissertation’s main theoretical foundation and 
differentiates between two competing ideologies about color: color-blindness and color-
consciousness. Finally, it builds a case for studying entertainment television in relation to 
post-race and Millennials. The argument is that both television and Millennials are 
sorting through contradictions about the state of race and racism today, which results in 
ambivalent television practices and in Millennials’ agreement with the dominant 
framework in hand. So, when television content is colorblind, they are too, and when it 
mistreats ethnoracial groups, a color-conscious attitude is present. 
Chapter 2 centers on color-blindness directly and examines its relationship to the 
color-blind screen in terms of audience perceptions and attitudes. It defines color-blind 
television content in two realms: (1) entertainment programming that features ethnoracial 
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difference to various degrees (for instance, multicultural TV shows), and (2) exceptional 
portrayals of color (when ethnoracial groups reflect the values of mainstream culture). 
This chapter foregrounds the socializing effect of television in contemporary attitudes 
about race(ism). Study findings in Chapter 2 suggest that colorblind content is likely to 
influence the colorblind attitudes of Millennials, especially the ones that discredit the 
existence of ethnoracial inequalities in society.  
Chapter 3 pays attention to color-consciousness and examines its relationship to 
the onscreen marginality of ethnoracial groups. It focuses on three typical television 
depictions of ethnoracial minorities: (1) criminality, (2) sexuality, and (3) decorative 
roles. This chapter argues that the long-standing and marginal treatment of ethnoracial 
minorities on television is difficult to forget, and that audiences in turn continue to assign 
ethnoracial meanings to color. Study results in Chapter 3 indeed found that the 
marginality of ethnoracial groups varied according to the social worth assigned in 
television to their color. On this note, it is proposed that Blacks set the standard by which 
to assess cases of symbolic ethnoracial inequality and that Asians are treated as honorary 
Whites. 
The last chapter of analysis and conclusions consolidates Chapters 2 and 3. It 
teases out the tensions inherent in the idea of post-racial media and society, and the 
manner by which the television practices of Millennials diverge and match this dominant 
ethnoracial ideology. This chapter examines the conditions by which Millennials act as 
an active media audience. It also discusses the meanings assigned to the televisual 
depiction of Whiteness and Blackness in which some individuals claim post-raciality. 
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Lastly, it suggests future research and addresses the limitations of current research 
project.   
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CHAPTER 1. Research Rationale and Theoretical Framework 
 
The inclusion of color on television has been inconsistent across seasons and 
dependent on the mood of the moment (Gray, 2004).  For instance, the 2008-2009 open-
network season was particularly pale, with The Cleveland Show (2009-2013)—an adult, 
African-American animated series on FOX—supplying most of its color (Watson & 
Armstrong, 2008). This level of invisibility for ethnoracial minorities—the carriers of 
color onscreen (hooks, 1992; Shome, 2000)—seems to be norm rather than the exception 
in scripted and mainstream television. Even since the early days of television, the 
observance of ethnoracial minorities onscreen has been less than their US Census 
statistics – a trend that continues today (Tukachinsky, Mastro, & Yarchi, 2015), even in 
the film industry (Smith, Choueitim & Pieper, 2014, 2016). Seeing color onscreen is 
perhaps more optimistic at the moment, as there is a noticeable splash of color across 
broadcast and cable networks as well as streaming sites (Hunt el al., 2015, 2016).  
The optimism is not in the numbers that this surge of color on television brings 
but in the quality of its portrayals. It appears that ethnoracial minorities are able to 
embrace their social identities onscreen through complex characterizations in television 
today. This is arguably the case with Jane the Virgin (CW, 2014—) for Latin@s, Empire 
(FOX, 2015—) or Black-ish (ABC, 2014—) for Blacks, or Masters of None (Netflix, 
2015—) for South Asians (Ramanathan, 2015). How, then, can we make sense of these 
celebrated inserts of color on television when ethnoracial minorities are still the common 
deviant Other onscreen? The answer lies in how people see color and its worth in 
defining the self and social mobility, and the current societal mood pushes 
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colorblindness. Through these attitudes, ethnicity and race should only be taken at face 
value with no hierarchical meaning behind them. So, in the case of color-blind media 
reception, media depictions of ethnoracial groups should be rendered neutral regardless 
of their valence, as these part-take in a colorblind symbolic space.   
Millennials are caught in the middle of colorblind thinking. They cannot disregard 
color, as it surrounds them in an ethnoracially diverse generation. Yet, society encourages 
a mantra of sameness through colorblindness (Bobo, 2011; Hollinger, 2011), which 
arguably dissuades Millennials from differentiating on the basis of ethnicity and/or race. 
As will become apparent in the last sections of this chapter, Millennials are still sorting 
out the ideological contradictions of color in their environments. They see color, but at 
the same time, they do not want it to structure social and cultural (dis)advantage (MTV, 
2014). Such a stance is similar to the conflicting state of ethnicity and race on television: 
that which incorporates color only to discourage its ethnoracial meanings. This 
congruence between television and Millennials makes their viewing practices a suitable 
research subject through which to examine post-raciality.  
The goal of this chapter is to situate Millennials vis-à-vis post-raciality. Before 
discussing where Millennials stand in this ideological camp, we must first clarify some of 
the concepts and terms used in this dissertation, particularly its usage of color over race 
and/or ethnicity. Next, post-racial theory is formalized, as well as how media factors in. 
Then, post-racialism is discussed before shifting the focus shifts to seeing color. Two 
opposite perspectives are key here: color-blindness and color-consciousness. Lastly, the 
socio-cultural stance of Millennials is elaborated in terms of their ethnoracial attitudes 
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and television viewership. The last section argues that Millennials may swing in the 
direction media points to: whether it is ignoring the significance of ethnorace or 
recognizing its marginality.   
 
COLOR AS RACE/ETHNICITY AND TELEVISION  
Race and ethnicity are separate but associated social identities (Alcoff, 2009; 
Cokley, 2007; Phinney 1996). Race is often grounded in discourses of the body and the 
social and cultural meanings inscribed to it. Furthermore, it is an imposed social identity 
based on heritable, unchangeable, and visible psyciological characteristics that determine 
group membership. On the other hand, ethnicity is concerned with the politics of cultural 
belonging and ancestry. It is social identity that is self-chosen and nurtured, and at times, 
even considered a product of one’s socio-cultural environment. Some scholars (e.g., 
Phinney, 1996) even argue that ethnicity subsumes race, since race can determine ethnic 
affiliation and affirmation. Yet, despite their conceptual distinction, both constructs are 
conflated, undifferentiated, and used interchangeably in popular discourse, which makes 
it hard to untie them. One linguistic and conceptual that attempts to consolidate their 
embedded and messy dynamic is ethnorace. The term can be useful in describing the 
troubled histories of ethnic racialization that social groups experience as they integrate 
into dominant culture (Alcoff, 2009). Ethnorace also recognizes the racial and ethnic 
diversity within the social group, which tends to be homogenized when either term is 
used as a means of pan-identity (Alcoff, 2009). 
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However, this dissertation turns to color to discuss race and ethnicity in the 
context of television. It does so to parallel the manners by which television reduces race 
(and to an extension ethnicity) into mostly discernable signifiers that can be decoded 
through a practice of reading bodies and actions (Bounds Littlefield, 2008; Gorham, 
1999; Hall, 2001; Merskin, 2011). On television, color is arguably first experienced 
through race then (if time allows and characters elaborated) ethnicity because of its visual 
quality, which facilitates the social identification and categorization of characters. Race 
has become synonymous with physicality and looks (Alcoff, 2009), and in a medium that 
stresses visuals, this observable state of race primes mental schemas that single-out 
ethnoracial groups (Merskin, 2011). Ethnicity enters this visual process of race because 
the images in television are not just pictorials. These are connected to sounds and 
movement, which help viewers connect and imagine the body into a given culture and 
ideology (Bounds Littlefield, 2008; Gorham, 1999). To illustrate, a character can be 
coded Latin@ if s/he has brown skin, but their ethnoracial identity is further clarified and 
solidified if s/he speaks Spanish or has an accent. In discussions of television, color has 
the capacity to capture the interaction of ethnicity and race that encompass the social 
imagination of ethnoracial groups and the audio and visual elements that establish it. 
Color in television becomes evident through a process of visibility. Kaszynski 
(2016) differentiates between vision, visibility, and visuality as follows: 
Vision is about what is processed via the eyes; visuality is the process of piecing 
together the relationships between events in the world. Visibility, as a third term, 
vacillates between vision and visuality, referring either to what can be seen via 
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vision or to what can be visualized. Visibility is about the frame of the image and 
about possibility: whether or not something, or someone, can be seen or imagined 
in relationship to others (p. 62) 
This dissertation adopts the above theorization and relates it to television and color. 
Televisibility is understood here as the presence or absence of color on television. In 
other words, in what ways (i.e., representations, images, stereotypes) are ethnoracial 
groups included/excluded, available, experienced, or noticed onscreen? It attempts to 
capture the realities of color onscreen. What people derive from the televisuality of color 
will be referred to as televisuality. Televisuality speaks to what ideologies (i.e., myths, 
rhetoric, narratives) are found in images (visibility) and imaginations of color 
(visuality/visualization). In studying the televisibility of color, and how it relates to 
reception, this dissertation contributes to the televisuality of color, or how ethnoracial 
groups are given certain socio-cultural meanings.  
  
DEFINING POST-RACE AND POST-RACIALITY 
A post-racial society is a socio-cultural environment that has surpassed the 
conflicts linked to race and ethnicity as well as upended racialized hierarchies and the 
hegemony of whiteness – an American society that is free from racial preference, 
discrimination, and prejudice (Bonilla-Silva, 2016; Fritz & Stone, 2009). Under a post-
racial society, race and ethnicity no longer define the self, thus cultivating a culture of 
racelessness (Beltrán, 2005; Little, 2009). For ethnoracial minorities, racelessness is a 
strategic dissociation, or a psychological and spatial separation from their cultural 
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community and collective identities, to facilitate assimilation into the dominant culture, 
ideally making vertical mobility possible in a society that devalues non-dominant groups 
(Fordham, 1988, 1991). Scholars have argued that a post-racial society calls for racial-
amnesia (Jones, 2016), and in return, the painful, controversial, toxic, exhausting, 
redundant, and taboo conversations about ethnic, racial, and cultural marginalization in 
the U.S. would dissipate (Squires, 2014). In the case of the United States, it imagines a 
future (or present) that brushes over its ethnoracially divided past dominated by racial 
hierarchies and oppression (Bobo, 2011). Simply put, post-race is a pain-free socio-
cultural result of overcoming race(ism) and racial structuration (Gallagher, 2003).  
A post-racial society promises racial neutrality and objectivity (Hollinger, 2011). 
The trade off for dismissing race and ethnicity is fairness – a meritocratic social world 
where a populace and its institutions practice equality and impartiality. Said differently, 
race-blind egalitarianism defines post-race. Solidarities and collectives can still be built 
under a post-racial society but only through social and superordinate identities (e.g., 
nationalism, religion, humanity) that align with the interest of the nation-state as a whole 
(Squires, 2014). Idiosyncrasies should still be the main way others are evaluated and 
acknowledged, not their memberships to racial and ethnic entities. By enforcing personal 
and universal identities, a post-racial society achieves socio-cultural parity.  
One must not ignore contributing the role of media in cementing notions of post-
raciality. Squires (2014) found that the adjective post-race went from obscurity in news 
media during the 1990s to a media buzzword in mid-2000s. The news utilized post-race 
to describe it as a distant, anti-discriminatory future thanks to the introduction racial 
   
 14 
politics brought by ethnoracial minorities, plus multiculturalism was inevitable due to 
surging immigration and racial mixing. Current news media still framed post-race with 
the same rhetoric of the 1990s. The politics of Barack Obama and interracial families 
were common themes in news stories following his nomination to US president in 2008. 
The number of text mentions of post-race steadily grew from 11 in 2005, to 72 in 2007, 
and to a staggering sum of 1,475 by 2008. Between 2008 and 2009, a tone shift occurred 
in using post-race. Optimism dominated news editorials in 2008, while pessimism 
reigned in 2009. The realities of structural racism (e.g., ethno-racial discrepancies in 
employment, education, housing in the favor of whites), the unkept promises of Obama, 
and the framing of right-wing politicians as saviors were signs that America was 
prematurely considered post-racial.  
The media additionally romanticizes multiculturalism onscreen by propagating an 
egalitarian utopia where ethnoracial difference exists harmoniously (Beltrán 2010a; 
Squires, 2014; Turner, 2014). This mediated version of ethnoracial diversity borrows 
from color-blindness to cement a post-racial narrative. One based on conflict-free social 
interactions, which is possible through de-politicized racial, ethnic, or even cultural 
identities. What this means is that color is welcomed as simply color – an aesthetic, 
something that can visualize/envision difference. Scholars (Bonilla-Silva & Ashe, 2014; 
Beltrán, 2010b) caution media audiences to not just accept and praise the commercial 
inclusion of ethnoracial difference in media and instead to exercise a vigilant and critical 
outlook. One should question, for instance, the narrative conditions in which ethnic and 
racial groups are symbolically included. Through this critical reflection, people can 
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identify whose perspectives are privileged, and what kind or ethnoracial messages are 
conveyed. Even if we see ethnoracial groups co-existing onscreen, whether in the same 
narrative or not, what is being consumed is an empty color diversity that falsely 
epitomizes ethnoracial progress for media audiences. When these narratives and 
depictions are examined closely, they offer no real solution in solving race and racism 
besides befriending/marrying people with different ethnoracial backgrounds from ours. 
When ethnoracial groups extend their social and familial circles, they are taken as 
bridges, and if ethnoracial minorities commit these acts, they are taken as model 
minorities (Squires, 2014). How, then, are interpersonal relationships meant to dissolve 
social inequalities? This is the question that media tends to leave unanswered.  
Squires (2014) argues that media in a post-racial era promotes a racial citizenship 
that tells audiences how to do race (p. 167). She argues that this mediated teaching of 
doing race is based on neo-colorblindness that ignores the interests of ethnoracial 
minorities. Citizens, under a post-racial mandate, are encouraged to denounce ethnic and 
racial categories, and opt for color-blind remedies that build social and cultural 
solidarities such as focusing on common and super-ordinate social identities like religion 
or nationalism. Citizens are also expected to recreate ethnicity/race through market 
consumption practices. This includes watching television that features color prominently 
such as shows mostly comprised of ethnoracial minority actors/characters or rainbow 
casts/characters. Other expectations are in the interpersonal domain, which stress 
friending/wedding outside one’s ethnoracial in-group.    
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Post-race has been also elaborated into a theoretical framework – post-raciality 
(Ikuenobe, 2013; Nayak, 2006; Sanada, 2012). Its major tenant is color-blindness (Bobo, 
2011; Cho, 2009), which could simply be understood as perception that eliminates 
ethnorace from the equation of social inequalities and social competence (Manning, 
Hartmann, & Gerteis, 2015). Color-blindness is the current got-to (and the most 
normative) attitude for solving the anxieties and fears induced by race/ethnicity (Neville 
et al., 2013). Endorsing colorblindness means that race/ethnicity are unnecessary, 
insignificant, or secondary to move forward in society. The field of psychology identifies 
two domains of color-blindness: color-evasion (an interpersonal mantra of sameness) and 
power-evasion (an outlook dismissing ethnorace from defining outcomes).  
Color-consciousness opposes color-blindness and by extension post-racialism. It 
recognizes that ethnorace determines social and cultural opportunities and that ethnicity 
and/or race are key elements in our identity politics (Bell, 2016). Similar to color-
blindness, color-conscious has two domains, which stand in direct opposition to those of 
colorblindness: color-awareness (an interpersonal mantra of distinguishing ethnoracial 
groups) and power-awareness (a critical outlook that stresses the importance of 
ethnicity/race in defining outcomes).   
Color-blindness and color-consciousness are pictured in the figure below, 
alongside their two sub-dimensions, or shades as Doane (2014) would argue. The figure 
is meant to depict the contradictory nature between these two competing ethnoracial 
ideologies, and how post-race fits into the picture. It is a way of summarizing the 
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conceptual framework guiding this dissertation.  Both ethnoracial ideologies are 
discussed in more detail following the discussion on post-racialism. 
 
 
Figure 1. Shades of seeing color in color-blindness and 
color-consciousness  
 
DEFINING POST-RACIALISM  
Post-raciality formalizes a conceptual and theoretical framework in which to 
ground the socio-cultural environment that dismisses, de-centralizes, and distorts 
ethnorace (or color) from perception but not sight. Put simply, race does not matter and 
therefore should not be noticed, discussed, or taken into account; that we have 
transcended the color line and become a color-neutral and rainbow nation. Post-raciality 
can, however, work as a twenty-first-century ideology about race and color. When taken 
as such, it is best conceptualized as post-racialism – a system of ideas, myths, narratives, 
and symbolic configurations (or projects) that obscure the significance of race(ism) in 
society and benefits certain (elite) actors and institutions (Cho, 2009; Griffin, 2015; 
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Powell, 2008). While post-racialism (and post-raciality) share features and objectives 
with color-blindness, for Cho (2009), the latter “offers a largely normative claim for a 
retreat from race that is aspirational in nature” (p. 1598). Both, moreover, seem to 
“converge (around the retreat from race imperative and shared features) and diverge 
(around racial transcendence as descriptive trigger and marketability or branding)” (p. 
Cho, 2009, p. 1599).  
This dissertation relies on post-raciality to situate and explain the optimistic and 
salient discourse that renders race(ism) obsolete in relationships and as a pervasive 
concern for structural and institutional inequalities. Empirically, post-raciality will be 
operationalized through color-blind attitudes due to their linked rhetoric (Bobo, 2011; 
Cho, 2009; Manning, Hartmann, & Gerteis, 2015). The discussions of study findings, 
while insightful for post-raciality in general, are best contextualized through post-
racialism. One intention of this protect is to uncover patterns and meanings given to color 
in symbolic and mediated contexts like television under post-race. This is why post-
racialism seems like an appropriate interpretive device, because of the interest in 
discussing the ideological workings of post-raciality and its doctrines about race(ism). 
This study is interested in taking part of the debate about post-racial logics instead of 
laying out empirical evidence about its existence. By doing so, the discussion is not 
limited to yes/no facts about race(ism) in society (Powell, 2008), but instead, it shifts to a 
deeper debate about subtle and sophisticated ethnoracial ideologies that inform thinking, 
attitudes, and actions (Bobo, 2011; Bonilla-Silva, 2013).    
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COLOR-BLINDNESS: WHAT IS IT?  
Color-blindness is a passive yet optimistic solution to the social, cultural, and 
economic conflicts that American society experiences at the expense of ethnicity and/or 
race (Bell, 2016; Tarca, 2005). As an ideology, color-blindness cultivates a habitus of 
ethnoracial evasion, whether in the form of not seeing race as an identity component or 
dismissing its presence in shaping socio-cultural advantages, biases, and inequalities 
among other manifestations (Gallagher, 2003; Neville, Lilly, Duran, Lee, & Browne, 
2000; Neville et al., 2013; Sullivan & Tuana, 2007). One can perform colorblindness 
through a social and cultural etiquette that encourages friendships and romances with 
others who belong to ethnic and racial outgroups. By purging race and ethnicity from 
one’s identity politics, one can achieve political correctness, ethnoracial sensitivity and 
tolerance, plus interracial neutrality and fairness. Social and cultural institutions are 
perceived to follow this interpersonal rhetoric of sameness. Any biased practices or 
discrimination committed by financial, government, and education institutions are not 
ethnically or racially related, leaving room to exercise subtle forms of racism such as 
denying bank loans or restricting college admissions (Bonilla-Silva, 2016). Racial-
blindness can excuse the moral responsibility of institutions for not properly mitigating 
and securing basic human rights. Such accounts led scholars to name racial-blindness as 
an ultramodern type of racism (Neville et al., 2013), turning a blind eye (Jones, 2016), or 
engaging in strategic ignorance (Sullivan & Tuana, 2007) because it masks self-serving 
and group needs (Bell, 2016; Bonilla-Silva, 2013; Powell, 2008). Essentially, the ethos of 
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colorblindness rests in two dynamics: color-evasion and power-evasion (Neville et al., 
2013). 
Simplistically, not seeing or avoiding seeing race summarizes the color-evasion 
approach to colorblindness, but its ideological undertone is sameness – a socio-cultural 
world where skin color does not define social worth, ability, opportunity, or the self. By 
rejecting ethnoracial superiority to accommodate equality, the founding American myth 
of meritocracy persists, perpetuating the correlational notion that fairness and social 
mobility are dependent on one’s hard work instead of from being part of a collective. 
Group categorizations are discouraged, while idiosyncrasies and personality assessments 
encouraged; this way, group biases are minimized (Bonilla-Silva, 2013; Gallagher, 2003). 
Race is, however, welcomed as a pictorial component of diversity as long as no member 
in the multicultural collage is given worth at the social identity level. In other words, 
ethnoracial differences are superficial and not worthy of attention, and if they are pointed 
out, they could be equated with stereotyping (Babbitt, Toosi, & Sommers, 2016).  
Power-evasion colorblindness dismisses racism contemporarily by avoiding 
thinking about how race is tied to power. Because systematic, institutional, or structural 
biases and inequalities are a thing of the past, people feel that social activism and political 
intervention are no longer needed. Racism is neither politically correct nor socially 
acceptable, because racism is reminiscent of the old America (Neville et al., 2013). If 
racism occurs, racist acts and expressions are first treated as isolated events, and 
secondly, such cases are believed to reflect the identity politics of the perpetrator and not 
those of a political or cultural establishment. Racism acquires an interpersonal definition 
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characterized by personal and individual reasonability and culpability (Gallagher, 2003; 
Apollon, 2011; Shome, 2000). By reducing racism to interpersonal discrimination and ill 
intent, one does not critique the social and systematic forces that shape racial (White) 
privilege and socio-cultural barriers; instead, one sustains the race-based ideologies about 
domination and superiority through inaction and consent (Doane & Bonilla-Silva, 2003). 
Similarly, opportunity is seen as individually produced and awarded, not the result of 
systematic practices flawed with group-based favoritism and ideology (Rodriguez, 2000). 
Overall, three interrelated systematic disbeliefs comprise power-evasion racial-blindness, 
avoiding belief in: (1) blatant forms of racism (i.e., racism is abolished); (2) institutional 
racism (i.e., no policy or practice benefits one group over another), and (3) White racial 
privilege (i.e., whiteness and skin color dictating advantages or disadvantages) (Awad & 
Jackson, 2016; Neville et al., 2000, Neville et al., 2013).   
Racial-blindness is a malleable ideology about race, ethnicity, and cultural 
diversity that not only suits one’s needs, but it also reflects what others want to see 
(Babbitt et al., 2016; Bonilla-Silva, 2013; Bell, 2016; Jones, 2016). Whites, who 
individually exhibit low social dominance, may genuinely deem colorblindness as a 
socio-cultural method for racial harmony or as a mechanism that shields ethnoracial 
minorities from judgments (Goff, Jackson, Nichols, & DiLeone, 2013). For Whites with 
self-beneficial intentions, however, colorblindness is a form of soft power that maintains 
the status quo by allowing inequalities go unquestioned (Saguy, Dovidio, & Pratto, 
2008). Under a colorblind rhetoric of diversity and inclusion, whites who previously felt 
excluded from multiculturalism are now official members of the ethnoracial collage, 
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especially in contexts where diversity is valued (Plaut, Garnett, Buffardi, Sanchez-Burks, 
2011). Colorblindness can deflect the conflict between ethnoracial minorities and 
majorities that may arise in daily interpersonal contact (Rattan & Ambady, 2013). This 
form of colorblindness may also reduce the likelihood of offending ethnoracial groups, 
and more pertinent to whites, it reduces the risks of being perceived a racist (Apfelbaum, 
Sommers, & Norton, 2008). Colorblindness is not a self-chosen, conscious, or deliberate 
examined ideology, but one that was inherited through social norms – in others words, it 
is a default intergroup approach (Apfelbaum, Pauker, Sommers, Ambady, 2010). 
Racial-blindness has the capacity of normalizing institutional and interpersonal 
racism as blatant occurrences, excluding subtle manifestations of racism in its sanctioned 
directory of ethnoracial prejudice (Bonilla-Silva, 2013, 2016). One important question 
then becomes: What is racism in a color-blind society? Whites often continue to 
primarily see racism as the outcomes of a racial doctrine of supremacy, with verbal and 
physical actions as dominant and obvious expressions of racism (Apollon, 2011; 
Gallagher, 2003). Ethnoracial minorities, in contrast, tend to situate racism within 
broader socio-political practices and mechanisms that enable the social dominance of a 
majoritarian ethnoracial group (Apollon, 2011). Racism is either perceived an individual 
pathology, or unfair systematic treatment, depending on ethnoracial membership. The 
former reduces racism to overt personal misbehavior and uses good-bad rhetoric to 
describe actions, and the latter includes the role of nationalism in racism and situates it as 
a social, structural, and institutional problem (Bonilla-Silva & Ashe, 2014; Bonilla-Silva, 
2016; Squires, 2014). With racial-blindness entering the mix of race relations in 
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contemporary America, it makes it more difficult to detect racism in everyday life that is 
not necessarily explicit like in the Jim Crow era (Bobo, 2011; Bonilla-Silva, 2013; 
Bonilla-Silva & Ashe, 2014; Neville et al., 2013).      
 
COLOR-CONSCIOUSNESS: WHAT IS IT? 
Unlike color-blindness, color-consciousness (or racial cognizance) recognizes 
how race and ethnicity affect social, cultural, and political dynamics and opportunities 
(Appiah & Gutman, 1998). Color-consciousness fuses critical awareness, social 
responsibility, and action to address the unbalanced assignation of social status and 
opportunity across ethnoracial groups. Since color-conscious individuals are mindful of 
the policies and practices that produce and maintain power structures, both historically 
and longitudinally, this motivates them to actively challenge the injustices and abuses 
that a majoritarian (White) group implement (Bell, 2016). Color-blindness discourages 
collectivities on the basis of culture, race, and ethnicity so that a sense of objectivity is 
secured. Conversely, color-consciousness understands that only an inclusive and 
democratic community comprised of ethnoracial diversity can secure and produce multi-
group welfares (Bell, 2016). 
By definition, color-consciousness connotes an active state of ethnoracial self-
reflection that sets in motion a vigilant gaze, which is able to detect modalities of racism 
ranging from overt exhibitions (e.g., hate crimes, public segregation, marginal public and 
mediated representation) to covert manifestations (e.g., race talk, colorblind ideologies, 
gentrification). Its attention to race(ism) positions racial-consciousness as more suitable 
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solution in reducing interracial tensions than color-blindness (Bell, 2016; Jones, 2016; 
Squires, 2014). It is important to note that awareness of racism is not enough to motivate 
anti-racism. What is also needed is ethnoracial competence and sympathy, which can be 
gathered through interpersonal contact and engagement with racial Others (Jones, 2016; 
Müller, 2009). One should have a better grasp of the judgments, emotional responses, and 
experiences that inform racial discrimination and prejudice.   
Color-consciousness has also been subjected to criticism. One potent criticism is 
its treatment of race as biological and a totalizing identity. Since power and hegemony 
frame color-consciousness, race overpowers other cultural meanings and social identities 
that accompany it. Of concern here is how other axes of difference and marginality (e.g., 
gender, social class, religion, abledness) are shifted to the periphery to foreground race or 
ethnicity (Guinier & Torres, 2002). The self is reduced again to categories as opposed to 
fleshing out its complexity and intersectional identity that situates people’s social 
positions and subjectivities. Scholars suggest using contingent color consciousness (see 
Appiah & Gutmann, 1998) or race ambivalence (see Leonardo, 2013) to overcome some 
of drawbacks of racial-consciousness. The former recognizes the conditional use of race 
to discuss its sociological and political effects, while the latter encourages reflection 
about the conceptual limitations of race theory. Others propose political race (Guinier & 
Torres, 2002), where one teases the complexities of race first before building cross-
racial/ethnic relationships and subjectivities. Moreover, intersectional theory recognizes 
that the self is comprised of multiple, interconnected, and overlapping social identities 
that ultimately produce unique standpoints associated with discrimination, disadvantage, 
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and oppression or domination (see Cho, Crenshaw, & McCall, 2013). Lastly, articulation 
theory examines how different axes of identity are combined, united, and related – the 
self is not random occurrence but an entity comprised of structured relations of 
dominance and subordination (see Angus, 1992).  
This dissertation conceptualizes color-consciousness as part of critical 
consciousness. Like its parent, color-consciousness has three core components: critical 
reflection (i.e., a perceptual element), critical motivation (i.e., an agentic element), and 
critical action or activism (i.e., a behavioral element) (Diemer, McWhirter, Ozer, & Rapa, 
2015; Freire, 2002; Watts, Diemer, & Voight, 2011). Moreover, these three domains 
encapsulate overall power-awareness as they critique racial oppression and marginality in 
society. Specifically, ethnoracial critical reflection describes the process by which people 
see and read their existence in a stratified world that bestows social worth based on racial 
or ethnic membership (Diemer et al,, 2015). Ethnoracial critical motivation underscores 
the political efficacy, commitment, or agency that one possesses to dismantle the 
injustices and inequalities that occur on the basis of race and ethnicity (Diemer et al,, 
2015). Lastly, ethnoracial critical action considers the specific actions that can counter, 
amend, or change conditions of ethnoracial injustice in a liberatory manner (Diemer et 
al,, 2015). Power-awareness presents marginalized and oppressed ethnoracial groups with 
a symbolic resource—in the form of human agency—that could be used to oppose, resist, 
and overcome the structural constrains that face them. Nevertheless, structural changes 
happen with the selection of the most appropriate and contextual measures (Freire, 2002; 
Watts, Griffith, & Abdul-Adil,1999).  
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Multiculturalism directly contrasts color-evasion racial-blindness (see Neville et 
al., 2013). Multiculturalism appreciates ethnic, cultural, and racial pluralism and finds 
that the rich histories and customs of groups can contribute to societies with problematic 
racial histories (Gullett & West, 2016; Neville et al., 2013; Rosenthal & Levy, 2012). 
One benefit of multiculturalism is its ability to encourage inter-cultural competence 
(Müller, 2009; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010), which in turn, fosters understandings about the 
racialized and ethnicitized realities of various others. Multiculturalism can also have 
prosocial effects such as tolerance toward ethnoracial minority groups. Multiculturalism 
preserves ethnic, cultural, and racial identities of all groups, which means that ethnoracial 
minorities are not pressured to assimilate into norm of the dominant culture. Unlike 
color-evasion racial-blindness, color-aware racial consciousness—defined through 
multiculturalism—values the contributions of race and ethnicity in defining the self. 
 
COLOR-BLIND OR -CONSCIOUS: WHERE DO MILLENNIALS STAND? 
Millennials account for 30% of the U.S. population and are the most ethnoracially 
diverse age generation to date (Doherty, Kiley, & Jameson, 2015a; Taylor, Doherty, 
Parker, & Krishnamurthy, 2014). Millennials are almost equally divided, if dichotomized, 
between an ethnoracial majority (51%) and minority (49%), whereas older generations 
are at least two-thirds White (Duherhy, Kiley, Tyson, & Jameson, 2015b). This 
pronounced ethnoracial diversity in Millennials is what fuels the popular narrative of 
them being appreciative and tolerant of human difference. Indeed, about 70% of 
Millennials say they do not see ethnoracial minorities any differently from Whites (MTV, 
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2014). Generally, about half of Millennials are likely to see themselves as tolerant of 
other races and groups (49%) – a statistic that is higher than older age cohorts (19%) 
(Taylor & Keeter, 2009). Yet, recent statistics say that it is about one-third of Millennials 
that see themselves as somewhat tolerant (Duherhy et al., 2015a). Other generational 
traits contradict their caring disposition and openness, as more than half described their 
generation as self-absorbed  (59%) (Duherhy et al., 2015a) and about a fifth say that 
others can be trusted (19%) (Taylor et al., 2014). Still, a great majority says that fairness 
is an aspiration for them (91%) (MTV, 2014).  
Market research seems to stress Millennials’ colorblindness. One widely cited 
MTV report (2014) found that most Millennials (90%), aged 14 to 24, felt that all should 
be treated equally regardless of their race, and that any racial preferences are unfair 
(88%). More support for colorblind attitudes come from Millennials’ view that social 
progress can happen if race is not considered (71%). Naturally, about two-thirds feel that 
a colorblind society cannot happen if it stresses race (68%). Older research found that 
less than half of Millennials (45%) agreed that some preferential treatment should be 
given to ethnic and racial minorities to improve their position (Taylor & Keeter, 2009). 
One strong conclusion is that Millennials are fluent in colorblindness and diversity; yet, 
as will become apparent in the next paragraph, illiterate in the language of anti-racism. 
Millennials tend to define racism as interpersonal acts of hatred and intolerance, 
or said differently, as personal bigotry (Apollon, 2011; Gallagher, 2003; Smith, 2015). 
Racists and racism are reduced to micro-level and overt occurrences; committed by those 
who discriminate on the basis of skin color and/or the negative cultural stereotypes they 
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have come to internalize and believe. In fact, more adults see individual racism (66%) as 
the bigger problem against Blacks than institutional racism (23%). The sentiment that 
individual racism is most important seems to carry with both Whites (70%) and Blacks 
(48%), but Blacks (40%) are more likely to say discrimination is built into laws and 
institutions than Whites (19%) (Pew Research Center, 2016). The logic of racism as 
personal acts of ethnoracial prejudice encourages the belief that minorities are racists too 
and social agents of reverse racism (Bonilla-Silva, 2013). 
Ethnoracial membership is key to who tends to endorse colorblind attitudes and 
an interpersonal definition of racism. The results of a qualitative study with 16 focus 
groups comprised of Millennials between the ages 18 to 25 found that ethnoracial 
minorities tended to see US social systems as racist and engaging in systematic racial 
biases than White participants (Apollon, 2011). Both ethnoracial groups, were likely to 
agree that racism existed in the criminal and housing systems yet minorities still noticed 
more racism in the educational and immigration systems than Whites. In general, 
Millennials who possessed direct experience with community organizations and/or the 
knowledge from college courses about race and ethnicity typically defined racism beyond 
personal prejudice.  
Ethnoracial differences also emerge based on belief in how people are threated 
due to race. Compared to ethnoracial minority Millennials (27%, 21%), White 
Millennials are more likely to think that discrimination against White people is as big of a 
problem today as those committed against ethnoracial minority groups (48%) or that the 
government pays too much attention to the problems of ethnoracial minorities (41%) 
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(MTV, 2014). Similar sentiments were expressed in other research, where over half of 
White Millennials (58%) say discrimination affects White people as much as it does 
ethnoracial minorities (Smith, 2015). Only 39% of Latin@ or 24% of Black Millennials 
tended to agree. Among adults, Blacks (70%) are about twice more likely to cite racial 
discrimination as a major reason why they have a harder time getting ahead than Whites 
(36%) (Pew Research Center, 2016). Even ethnoracial minority youth (65%) tend to 
agree that Whites have more opportunities of getting ahead than White Millennials (39%) 
(MTV, 2014).  
 There is a strong inclination and empirical support to label Millennials the poster 
children of colorblindness. However, this generation does not feel comfortable talking 
about racial bias (20%) in spite of believing that we should openly talk about it (79%) 
(MTV, 2014). On top of this contradiction, there is intra-group disagreement on whether 
the government should censor offensive speech directed at ethnoracial minorities, where 
over half believe does not want to (58%) – opinions primarily held by Whites and men 
(Poushter, 2015). Still, Millennials remain optimistic racism about eradicating racism in 
the future, with 58% of them agreeing it will lessen (MTV, 2014). Clearly, Millennials 
are not a monolithic age cohort and are ambivalent on the state of race and/or ethnicity in 
society. Even if most share a belief in equality and neutrality, they also lack a common 
dialogue about structural and new forms of subtle racism. What is certain is that 
Millennials are placed under a magnifying glass and expected to solve the muddled 
legacy of race(ism) they inherited from previous age generations. How they see color is 
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therefore crucial in them finding that language will enable more productive conversations 
about race and racism.   
 
MILLENNIALS, TELEVISION, AND POST-RACIALITY   
Comparatively, Millennials watch less television than other age cohorts. Market 
research has found that about 75% of those aged 31 and younger watch television; the 
number increases to 89% and higher for those older than 49 (Verizon, n.d.). Even the 
mean time spent on television is lower for Millennials (18.4 hours) than non-Millennials 
(25.6 hours) (Verizon, 2014). Such statistics seem to suggest that television is 
unimportant for Millennials (currently those born after 1980; Duherhy et al., 2015a, 
2015b); yet, the fact is that television is their top entertainment medium. Millennials are 
first interested in watching a television show they like before turning to music or even 
social media (Verizon, 2014).  
Indeed, about 81% of Millennials watch television – a number higher than 
statistics for Facebook (73%) and other social media (Buzz MG, 2016). The television 
practices of Millennials are selective and active too. For instance, when they watch 
television, they tend to know what they want (54%), as opposed to browsing for 
something to watch (46%). The inverse can be found with non-Millennials, where they 
are more likely to browse television (59%) rather than going right into something (41%) 
(Verizon, 2014). The importance of television among Millennials is evident; therefore, 
what television offers Millennials needs some examination, particular its offerings about 
people of color – the topic of interest here.  
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Color inclusion, the involvement of more people of color—both in front and 
behind the camera—is rising on television and film. The increment, however, is not 
monumental but is on a sluggish but steady clime. For instance, from 2011 to 2013, 
scripted television content with ethnoracial minority leads did not grow more than 4% for 
either broadcast or cable shows (Hunt et al., 2015). Specifically, broadcast programming 
where ethnoracial minorities comprised 0-20% of leads rose slightly from 58.5% to 
58.9% (a 0.4 increase). It again rose from 39.5% to 41.1% (a 0.6% increase) in 
programming featuring 21-50% ethnoracial minority casts; while the numbers declined 
for shows where ethnoracial minorities made-up more than 51% of the leading characters 
from 2.0% to 0% (a 2% decrease). The numbers were more optimistic for scripted 
programming on cable television: 0-20% ethnoracial minority casts (62.3% to 63.4%; a 
1.1% increase), 21-50% (29.3% to 25.8%; a 3.5% decrease), and 51%+ (8.4% to 10.8%; 
a 2.4% increase).  
On top of this splash of color on television, it seems that the programming with 
more people of color is well viewed among audiences, and in some cases higher among 
viewers who do not share the same ethnoracial membership of the main characters. 
According to the Nielsen ratings, Black-ish (79%), Scandal (68%), and How to Get Away 
with Murder (69%) and other popular TV shows with Black characters average at least a 
50% non-Black viewership (Schneider, 2017). Other Nielsen data finds that the 
viewership of television shows with predominantly Asian characters such as Dr. Ken 
(ABC) and Fresh Off the Boat (ABC) were about the same for Asian and the general 
population if not higher the former (Nielsen, 2017). Millennials even reported Orange is 
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the New Black (Netflix, 2013—) as a top-watched television program in 2015 (Barna, 
2015). The conclusion is: Diversity sells (at least today), and color appears to be a driving 
force behind its success (Hunt et al., 2015, 2016). 
Color is arguably noticeable onscreen and features many hues and mixtures. This 
symbolic inclusion is enough for social and cultural commentators (Squires, 2014; Vega, 
2013) to read and proclaim contemporary television as post-racial and colorblind – a 
sentiment is that intensified by television programs with multicultural casts that 
communicate inter-color unity (Nilsen & Turner, 2014). Still, the fact is that television is 
White-heavy (Tukachinsky et al., 2015), with ethnoracial minorities under-represented 
nearly 6-to-1 in leads on scripted, broadcast shows and nearly 2-to-1 as leads on cable 
(Hunt et al., 2015). Moreover, color seems to be pushed to certain television genres 
(Signorelli, 2009) and networks (this has been the case for ABC for open-network 
television and BET or MTV tr3s for cable television). This color seclusion in turn 
decreases audiences’ opportunities of seeing non-White characters onscreen and 
dependent on their media diets. Undeniably, television is filled with contradictions about 
color and what it means in larger society, from what its televisuality signifies to its 
quality onscreen.   
The mixed-inclusion of color onscreen—given its numeric incongruences and the 
clashing one- and three-dimensional portrayals—may add cognitive and emotional 
dissonance to an already ambivalent reaction that Millennials experience with seeing 
color. It seems that media creators and marketers will not stop from commodifying their 
supposed taste for television content that is socially conscious (Nededog, 2016) – a belief 
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that is shaped by Millennials’ perceived upbringing in equality and neutrality. Color on 
television is apparently moving in post-racial directions, following (or perhaps setting) 
Millennials’ taste for color-inclusive television. The question still remains: How are 
Millennials sorting out color onscreen?  
This dissertation project focuses on two competing ideologies of seeing color—
color-blindness and color-consciousness—in reception practices related to the current 
vogue of color inclusion on television. Both exist in Millennials, and the literature 
expects for one attitude to be higher than the other, with ethnoracial minorities gearing 
for color-consciousness. If television celebrates and disfranchises ethnoracial minorities 
onscreen, then Millennials’ readings of color will swing in the direction of the color 
pendulum. In other words, they will tend to agree and endorse the color ideology that 
television content makes salient. So, colorblind content leads to colorblind thinking and 
the onscreen marginality of ethnoracial groups cultivates a color-conscious attitude. 
These assumptions are explored in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively. The contribution of this 
dissertation is in identifying the television content and portrayals of ethnoracial groups 
that Millennials’ find noteworthy while seeing color according to dominant cultural 
frameworks. Only then can we start discussing television as contributing to post-raciality 
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CHAPTER 2. Color-blind TV content: Does it contribute to color-blindness?  
 
Media audiences are generally dichotomized and polarized into active or passive 
audiences, based on their commitment (or lack thereof) to critically dissect and politicize 
the cultural texts they consume (Baker, 2006; Morley, 2006). Early audience theories 
(e.g., hypodermic needle theory) posited that mass media had direct and strong effects on 
its consumers, given the perception that audiences were one-grand homogeneous and 
uncritical mass. More recently, media audiences are recognized as heterogeneous 
subgroups who actively negotiate and contextualize their meaning of media texts 
according to what standpoints and identity politics, taste and interests, values and 
attitudes, or backgrounds (e.g., family histories, education, cultural, political) they bring 
into their media experience (Bobo, 1995; Baker, 2006; Hall, 2001b; Morley, 1992; 
Radway, 1991). The debate continues, however, whether the media is an omnipotent 
persuasive force on its audiences or not, and empirical work and cultural criticism of 
media often discusses the degree of symbolic influence it has and whether audience 
member accepts, rejects, or negotiates the ideologies embedded in media content.     
The turn to what has been described as post-racial media reflects a recent move in 
reproducing the current perceived state of ethnoracial relations in America – one that is 
color-blind (Bonilla-Silva & Ashe, 2014; Squires, 2014; Warner, 2015). A colorblind 
screen relies on visual signifiers of racial diversity and inclusion. For instance, the use of 
raceless aesthetics—which includes the preference for ethnoracially ambiguous or mixed-
race characters in narratives (Beltrán, 2005, 2013; Beltrán & Fojas, 2008; Molina-
Guzmán, 2013)—or by simply showcasing an egalitarian, color rainbow (Brook, 2009). 
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Other representation strategies include assimilating ethnoracial minorities into White, 
middle class sensibilities (Avila-Saavedra, 2009; Campbell, 2016; Jhally & Lewis, 1992; 
Gray, 2004; Ono & Pham, 2009). Clearly, color exists onscreen, and qualitative studies of 
media audiences find that people are driven to racialized narratives and characters 
because of their perceived universality and/or symbolism of meritocratic social mobility 
(Inniss & Feagin, 1995; Jhally & Lewis, 1992; Kretsedemas, 2014; Molina-Guzmán, 
2010; Rockler, 2002; Squires, 2014). It is evident that media audiences bring color-blind 
discourses to their media experiences, but is the relationship reciprocal – meaning, could 
media influence their thoughts in color-blind ways?  
This chapter asks what the role of post-racial TV content is in cultivating color-
blind attitudes. Exploring this relationship showcases the tensions, negotiations, and 
oppositions that Millennials may experience with racial ideologies that encourage seeing 
color, only if it is to de-politicize ethnicity and race (Hollinger, 2011; Nayak, 2006). 
Specifically, it centers on television and the socialization of race, since popular culture 
(re)produces dominant and contemporary frames of racial thought (Bounds Littlefield, 
2008; Gorham, 1999; Bandura, 2001). Specifically, this study examines two layers of 
post-racial TV content: (1) offerings of entertainment, colorblind programming and (2) 
exceptional television representations of ethnoracial groups. In doing so, the results of 
this study will identity what about the colorblind screen “works” and merits further 
attention within a coveted multicultural TV audience – Millennials.  
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MILLENNIALS AND TELEVISION: CONSUMPTION PATTERNS 
Millennials are deeply immersed with electronic media (Perrin, 2015; Steel & 
Marsh, 2015), with television content still outperforming Internet entertainment like 
social media when it comes to time allocation (Valentine & Powers, 2013;Verizon, 
2014). But what are Millennials watching on television? Online studies conducted by 
Barna (2014, 2015) report that dramas and sitcoms generally typify the genre preference 
for adults aged 18 to 49, yet Millennials display higher preferences for each (56% and. 
48% respectively) than Xers (43%, 48%) (see Barna, 2015). Given this content taste, it is 
not surprising that adults consistently watched The Big Bang Theory (CBS), Criminal 
Minds (CBS), and The Walking Dead (AMC) during 2014 and 2015 (Barna, 2014, 2015). 
Millennials, however, included Game of Thrones (HBO) or Orange is the New Black 
(Netflix) into their top three watched shows in 2014 and 2015 respectively, while Xers 
favored Duck Dynasty (A&E) or NCIS (CBS) during these years into their rosters of 
regularly watched shows. 
Some media reports go on to suggest that the ethnic/racial diversity of shows’ 
casts can impact the preference, satisfaction, and/or success of films and television 
programs among audiences (Hunt et al., 2015; Hunt, Ramón, & Tran, 2016). Among the 
top 200 grossing films during 2013 and 2014, films that had 41 to 50% ethnoracial 
diverse casts (e.g., Big Hero 6, Rio 2, Lucy, Annie) earned the most money globally ($122 
million), while films with less than 10% minority characters did the poorest in ticket sales 
($52.6 million) (Hunt et al., 2015). Top audience ratings are also observed with TV 
content that employ heterogeneous ethnic/racial characters. Over-the-air TV shows that 
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featured at least 51% of minority characters (for example, Brooklyn Nine-Nine, Gang 
Related, Law & Order: Special Victims Unit, Hawaii Five-O) enjoyed the highest 
audience ratings across ethnic groups and the overall age group (ages 18 to 49) during the 
2013-14 TV season. Comparatively, broadcast TV programming with casts that were no 
more than 10% minority had the lowest audience ratings (Hunt et al., 2015). On cable, 
the TV audience ratings of ethnic groups were more sporadic during the same 2013-2014 
season. Black viewers (2.33), and the overall 18-40 age group (.27 ratings), watched 
cable entertainment TV content with more than half minority characters (examples 
include Devious Maids, Black Jesus, Loiter Squad; Being Mary Jane). Latin@s preferred 
content with 31-40% minority characters (.41 ratings) (i.e., Thundermans, Wolfblood, 
Suits), Whites preferred 21-30% diverse casts (.49 ratings) (i.e., The Walking Dead, 
Major Crimes, The Last Ship, Covert Affairs), and Asians favored content with the least 
amount of diversity (.31 ratings) – less than 10% (i.e., Person of Interest, The Strain, The 
Americans, Psych).  
 
MILLENNIALS AND TELEVISION: COLOR-BLIND READINGS  
The existing literature about media audiences and racial-blindness is limited and 
mostly come from studies based on qualitative methodologies (Hughey, 2014; 
Kretsedemas, 2014; Ibrahim, 2014; Rockler, 2002; Squires, 2014). This research corpus  
tends to agree that young audiences perform color-blind readings of media texts that 
featured color difference. Kretsedemas (2014) noted that racially and ethnically mixed 
focus groups that watched segments of Ugly Betty spoke about them mostly through a 
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perceptual lens of culture-blindness. He argued that in similar ways racialized bodies are 
ignored through racial-blindness, the racialization of culture is dismissed too. Culture-
blindness, according to Kretsedemas (2014), was observed in at least two audience 
responses to Ugly Betty: (1) the ways in which Betty Suarez was deemed American, a 
Brooklyn girl, or someone who is incidentally Mexican, and (2) the perceived 
universality of family values of the Suarez family despite them being an immigrant 
Mexican family whose patriarch faced deportation. For focus group participants, 
transcending the particularities of Latin@ culture, in an effort to look beyond race and 
ethnicity, enabled culture-blindness.  
Squires (2014) offers another interpretation of colorblindness among media 
audiences of post-racial texts. She contends that viewers of Parenthood are cognizant of 
racial difference within the TV program, but their racial thinking was not linked to 
stereotypes or racism. She found that on Facebook, White viewers of Parenthood largely 
wrote about Jasmine’s (Black) unfit motherhood. To them, she was manipulative and 
controlling, therefore not deserving of Crosby – her White romantic partner. Their 
biracial child (Jabbar) was also subjected to discussion, mostly if he was Crosby’s son 
because his skin tone did not show the proper racial blend. The persistence of black 
matriarch stereotypes and the assumptions of race as biology suggest the ways in which 
post-racial media texts compliment traditional racial thinking as opposed to contesting it. 
Watching media that is racially colorblind may cultivate negative attitudes toward 
ethnoracial minorities instead of alleviating the social, cultural, and political outcomes of 
race(ism). Such has been the case with The Cosby Show (see Jhally & Lewis, 1992), 
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where White audiences cultivated a sense of what they termed enlightened racism from 
watching the TV show  – a meritocratic disposition that blames Black themselves for not 
making it in America; if the Huxtables made it, so could the others. One main reason 
people welcomed the Huxtables into their homes was due to how well they recreated a 
middle-class family onscreen; such perception encouraged people to de-racialize them 
and believe that color should not be an issue to engage with an affluent, well-adjusted 
Black family.   
Unquestionably, media/television audiences can and often do decode media texts 
in color-blind ways. The question should now be: Who is more likely to do so? It is very 
likely that ethnoracial minorities come into their media experience with experiences of 
marginalization and oppression, and therefore are more vigilant than Whites about 
noticing what ways media devalues their ethnoracial groups. In fact, only about a third of 
ethnoracial minority Millennials (33%) stated that their race was well represented in the 
media compared to almost two-third of the White majority (64%) (MTV, 2014).   
Rockler (2002) found that Black and Whites audiences employed different 
terministic screens—perceptual lenses that determine meaning—in order to make sense 
of the racial and political tones of two African-American comic-strips: The Boondocks 
and Jump Start. Because White audiences tended to see the comics as funny, they 
described the racial contexts and meanings as “light,” or that they were not racist 
comparatively to true essentialist racists, they employed a “terministic screen of 
Whiteness” that disabled and deflected any acknowledgment of how race informs 
privilege, oppression, and the dominance of Whiteness as a cultural standard. Black 
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viewers, in contrast, largely employed a terministic screen of racial cognizance as they 
acknowledged the racially explicit and “dark” political criticism of the comics 
(particularly that of The Boondocks), plus they recognized that comedic texts may not be 
the best medium or genre to talk about racial issues. Since Blacks experience racial 
oppression and inequalities in their lives, they evoked the “terministic screen of racial 
cognizance” as a means of talking about the realities that are relevant and meaningful to 
them. This is why The Boondocks was a closer text to their experiences as this comic 
strip featured Black culture (e.g., rap music and related entertainment) and subjectivities, 
unlike Jump Start that tended to downplay its Blackness, which was therefore more liked 
by White readers.  
Similarly, audiences in Squires’s (2014) study of Facebook groups were more 
critical depending on ethnic group status. Fans of Jasmine on Parenthood, which 
happened to be mostly women of color, tended to defend her against the negative Black 
matriarch stereotypes that White viewers had, often filling in the gaps when enough 
context is given in the show or questioned the knowledge of show writers in portraying a 
single black mother who is romantically involved with a White man. By not accepting the 
realities presented to them on screen, ethnoracial minority audiences express that race 
and ethnicity are meaningful not only in making sense of media texts, but also how these 
markers of difference define characters status in the narratives that they are consuming. 
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DEFINING COLOR-BLIND TELEVISION CONTENT: PROGRAMS AND 
REPRESENTATIONS  
The media inclusion of difference is sometimes the result of demographic shifts 
and/or the activism of cultural and political organizations (Brook, 2009; Dávila, 2012; 
Ono & Pham, 2009). Millennials are the most ethnoracially diverse generation to date, 
and this multiculturalism prevents media creators from producing television content that 
is exclusively White or mono-ethnoracial. Onscreen diversity has become the all-
inclusive solution to matters of difference, whether is ethnic/racial or not.  
This study examines three types of television shows that feature ethnic/racial 
difference and ultimately offer color onscreen: (1) multicultural, (2) minority-leading, 
and (3) White-dominant programming. Each is differentiated by who the main characters 
are and the cast’s overall ethnoracial homogeneity (Chidester, 2008; Hunt et al., 2015, 
2016). Multicultural TV programs are the least ethnoracially homogenous, because the 
goal is to showcase ethnic and racial pluralism (Brook, 2009). Minority-leading TV 
programs feature protagonists and supporting characters of predominantly one 
ethnoracial minority group. Color is determined through the cast and not necessarily by 
the storylines (Market, 2007; Warner, 2015). Lastly, White-dominant TV programs 
include ethnoracial minorities but are outnumbered by White characters, in addition to a 
narrative whose focus is Whiteness (Molina-Guzmán, 2012). The connecting theme 
across these cultural texts is the narrative inclusion and visuality of inter-ethnic/racial 
relationships, which renders its universe as culturally open, tolerant, and conflict-free 
(Beltrán, 2013; Turner, 2014).  
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How the above TV shows present ethnic difference further reveals what is 
colorblind about seeing color. Color-blindness is not just about showing and adding color 
to television; it is about assigning no meaning to color, positioning all ethnoracial groups 
in the same playing field. It neutralizes their socio-cultural worth, in other words. Brook 
(2009) helps us understand the convergence of difference according to how ethnoracial 
minorities are interwoven into major story arcs, consequently creating a textual 
interdependence for all characters. This inter-character dependence is only heightened by 
their presumed egalitarian position, making characters up to par with each other (e.g., 
screen time, morality, social status). Lastly, interracial romances are boldly highlighted. 
Collectively, these three elements communicate the idea that characters—regardless of 
their ethnic/racial background—are narratively similar, therefore possessing similar 
symbolic value.   
When portrayals of ethnoracial minorities diverge from negative stereotypes, 
these are taken as optimistic signs of ethnic/racial progression onscreen (Inniss & Feagin, 
1995; Jhally & Lewis, 1992; Mora & Kang, 2016; Merskin, 2011). So, what images 
count as racially progressive for ethnoracial minorities? Media audience studies point to 
the middle-class hero or those with pronounced cultural capital (Jhally & Lewis, 1992; 
Rojas & Piñon, 2016). The ideal character is rich, self-supporting, educated, and 
familistic –characteristics common in mainstream (White) characters (Chidester, 2008; 
Hughey, 2014; Mastro & Kopacz, 2006; Ortega & Feagin, 2016; Ramírez Berg, 2002). It 
seems that ethnoracial minorities who embody, reproduce, and circulate this 
(mainstream) characterization are those who have assimilated into or approximate 
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Whiteness – the cultural and symbolic norm (Campbell, 2016; Gray, 2004; Ono & Pham, 
2009).  These characters are depicted as exceptional and worthy of honorary Whiteness 
for not recreating the old, deviant, and non-idealized cultural deficiencies (e.g., lazy, bad 
parenthood, terrible work ethic) that are believed to define the larger ethnoracial group 
(Bonilla-Silva & Ashe, 2014). While optimistic and positive, there is a fear attached to 
the depictions of ethnoracial exceptionalism onscreen. For minority audiences, the 
concern is that these television images render racial inequalities as non-existent, or that 
social opportunities are no longer structured by race (Innis & Feagin, 1995). Ultimately, 




Color—code for ethnoracial minorities—has been part of television almost since 
its inception but was strategically incorporated and visible (Gray, 2004; Merskin, 2011; 
Valdivia, 2010). Including color has been dependent (partly) on the need to commodify 
the multiculturalism found in the demographics shifts of audiences (Brook, 2009; Dávila, 
2012). In recreating post-raciality on television, the colorblind screen has increased its 
offering of cultural texts and images with content that feature various modes of ethnic 
and racial diversity (Nielsen & Turner, 2014). This study is interested in how post-racial 
television content relates to color-blind attitudes. Research on this topic has mainly been 
textual analyses of television programming or film and post-raciality (Beltrán, 2013; 
Brook, 2009; Esposito, 2010; Joseph, 2009; Turner, 2014), and the few studies on 
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audiences have found that people enact post-racial thinking when making-sense of texts 
(Kretsedemas, 2014; Squires, 2014). This study continues their conversations and extends 
post-racial media research first by studying two shades of colorblindness (Doane, 2014), 
and secondly, by contrasting numerous types of television and entertainment 
programming plus the dignified representations of four ethnoracial groups. Previous 
media research tends to study the ideological implications of one program in-depth (e.g., 
Esposito, 2009; Joseph, 2009), or examines the numeric presence of various ethnic 
groups through the methodology of content analysis (e.g., Tukachinsky et al., 2015). The 
research here examines three types of entertainment programming and one positive 
depiction of color that are expected to be in agreement with colorblind thinking. While 
specific hypotheses could be made in relationship to the reviewed literature, research 
questions fit this study more, since it is differencing colorblind between attitudes when 
previous research has not done so. Therefore the research questions of this study are:       
RQ1: How are multicultural, minority-leading, White-dominant TV programs 
related to the two dimensions of color-blindness: color-evasion and power-
evasion? Meaning, what colorblind television content leads to colorblind-blind 
orientations?   
 
RQ2: How is respectable ethnoracial prototypicality related to the two dimensions 
of color-blindness: color-evasion and power-evasion? Meaning, whose depiction 
leads to colorblind-blind orientations?   
 
 




METHODOLOGICAL RATIONALE  
Since this dissertation is interested in relating Millennials’ attitudes toward seeing 
color to their television practices (both in terms of consumption and reception), a 
quantitative audience approach is useful here. Historically, quantitative audience research 
(e.g., surveys, experiments) in media studies has been instrumental in investigating 
behaviors and attitudes and how these correlate to audiences’ socio-demographic 
attributes – all to establish casual inferences and replicable findings. When research calls 
for rich and contextualized stories, perceptions, and/or desires, such understandings often 
fell under the purview of qualitative audience research. However, while the methodology 
of this dissertation is quantitative, the interpretation of its data is critical. It follows what 
Ang (2001) calls the politics of interpretation, where the researcher is no longer neutral 
and becomes a political and moral subject in its production of knowledge. What is found 
about audiences is therefore contextualized and historicized in order to discuss the 
cultural struggles between institutions and individuals over meanings and desires.  
This dissertation has no formal theory to test but relies on post-raciality to frame 
and contextualize its findings. Its optimal objective is to tease/clear out ideological and 
discursive assumptions made about an audience segment. Quantitative methodology is 
helpful in this regard, as it offers a means of exploring the topic of seeing color and 
television holistically through (strength of) associations. Said differently, it helps answer: 
who does it reach, what does it say to them, and with what force? Results of this study 
also have the possibility of being replicated and generalized outside its context, although 
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it is not with a random sample, which makes that more difficult. This dissertation is 
careful in not reducing its audience to a collection of individuals, and instead treats 
participants as part of an interpretative community. In so doing, the focus shifts from 
representativeness of study findings to typicality (Barker, 2006), thus recognizing that not 
all audiences are equal and draw on various discursive resources to read media texts. 
Furthermore, through a language of likelihood and probabilities, this dissertation 
recognizes that its findings are provisional, contextual, and open to more interpretations 
(Ang, 2001).       
There are methodological limitations that are noteworthy to consider in 
understanding audiences through a quantitative approach. Firstly, there is a risk of 
singularizing its sample into one audience, when there is no such thing as “the audience” 
but diverse audiences (Barker, 2006). Secondly, research tends to be passive and one-
way. Meaning, the researcher(s) has an objective, detached role in its data collection. 
This lack of researcher-audience interaction hinders the listening that is gathered from 
informants (Schiappa, 2008). Lastly but not necessarily the last limitation, study findings 
could become the standard for an audience, when the hope is to create and continue 
discussions about post-raciality.    
Setting the methodological limitations aside, this dissertation used a survey 
instrument to help answer its research inquiries. Most research on colorblind attitudes 
also utilized questionnaires on their research projects, which facilitates comparisons. The 
difference is that this study’s focus is on television audiences. On top of this, it 
additionally stands out from other studies about color-blindness, audiences, and television 
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because it is not qualitative (Cooper, 2001; Kretsedemas, 2014). This deviation is 
intentional in order to diversify the topic through an assortment of methodological 
approaches.    
 
DATA COLLECTION 
Data for this study came from a convenience sample of university/college 
students. There are concerns over using student subjects in research. Among these are 
issues involving generalizability for relying on such a specific (non-representative) 
sample, as well as uncertainty given issues of internal consistency and external validity 
(Drukman & Kam, 2009; Peterson & Merunka, 2014). Even if undergraduate students are 
not generally the ideal research subjects, they happen to be for this dissertation project. 
Millennials are young (between the ages of 18 to 34) and are likely to attend/graduate 
post-secondary schools (Krogstad, 2016; White House Council of Economic Advisers, 
2014).2 In fact, about a third are college-educated (Doherty et al., 2015b). These 
characteristics are emblematic of college/university students today, thus validating the 
choice to use them for this research project.        
Students who were enrolled in introductory media-oriented courses in a large 
southwestern university were recruited to answer a 25-40 minute online survey about 
their television use and the topic of race/ethnicity. Students received extra credit in the 
course for their research participation, which was approved by the Institutional Review 
                                                
2 The high school graduation rate of Millennials stood at 72% in 2011 – the highest completion rate in more 
than two decades (Editorial Projects in Education Research Center, 2011). In 2013, 47% of young adults 
(25 to 34 year-olds) completed postsecondary education (e.g., associate, bachelor’s, graduate degree) 
compared to 30% in 1992 (White House Council of Economic Advisers, 2014).   
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Board of the university. Students were sent an e-mail with the survey link in early 
November 2016. Students were reminded about the extra credit opportunity each week 
until the end of the semester.  
Table 1 contains a demographic profile of the Millennials in the sample surveyed. 
Study participants were on average 19 years old (SD = 2), mostly women, a freshmen or a 
sophomore, self-identified as middle-class, leaned Democrat, and Texas born. Regarding 
their ethnoracial composition, participants were almost equally distributed in being either 
a member of the White majority or non-White minority. Of those belonging to an 
ethnoracial minority group, they were predominantly Asian or Latin@. This demographic 
profile is similar to that of the student population at large who was a registered student 
for Fall 2016 at the university: women (54.2%), White (39%), Hispanic (24%), Asian 
(24%), or majority Texas residents (90%).  
 
Table 1. Demographics  (N = 535) 
  n % of N 
Gender Men 227 42.4 
 Women 306 57.1 
 Other 2 4.0 
Ethnorace White 252 47.0 
 Latin@ 109 20.3 
 Asian 122 22.8 
 Black 23 4.3 
 Other  27 5.0 
Texas Born No 208 38.8 
 Yes 328 61.2 
Austin is hometown  No 468 87.3 
 Yes 68 12.7 
Political Identification Strong Democrat 117 21.8 
 Weak Democrat 79 14.7 
 Lean Democrat 99 18.5 
 Independent 105 19.6 









Unless otherwise noted, all items were randomized and used 7-point Likert-scales of 
agreement (1 = Strongly Agree, 7 = Strongly Disagree) or frequency (1 = Never, 7 = 
Always). Complete measures can be found in the Appendix.  
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Color-blindness. Color-blindness is chiefly defined as a color-evasion or power-
evasion attitude of seeing race and ethnicity (Awad & Jackson, 2015; Nevielle et al., 
2013). When race and ethnicity are not important in defining oneself or others, one 
internalizes color-evasion racial-blindness. Ignoring race and ethnicity is meant to 
emphasize similarity and reject racial superiority, which can be seen as being tied to 
some of the Millennial attitudes discussed above. Rosenthal and Levy’s (2012) 5-item 
measure of colorblindness assesses the importance of ethnicity and race in deriving 
identity meaning. Items such as, “At our core, all human beings are really all the same, so 
racial and ethnic categories do not matter,” and “All human beings are individuals, and 
therefore race and ethnicity are not important,” capture color-evasion racial-blindness 
 Lean Republican 62 11.6 
 Weak Republican 34 6.3 
 Strong Republican 34 6.3 
Social Class Lower Class 16 3.0 
 Lower-Middle Class 68 12.7 
 Middle Class 186 34.7 
 Upper-Middle Class 222 41.4 
 Upper Class 44 8.2 
Student Classification Freshmen 169 31.5 
 Sophomore 180 33.6 
 Junior  109 20.3 
 Senior 77 14.4 
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nicely. An index was created by averaging the five items together (M = 4.23, SD = 1.32), 
which were found to be reliable measure (α = 0.87). Appendix A has the five items.  
When race and ethnicity are dismissed as power-defining traits in social and 
political relations, one endorses power-evasion racial-blindness. The Color-Blind Racial 
Attitudes Scale (CoBRAS) currently stand as the most robust measure of power-evasion 
racial-blindness (Awad & Jackson, 2016). Neville et al. (2000) constructed and validated 
(CoBRAS). Its 20 items render three related factors: unawareness of racial privilege (i.e., 
denying the existence of White privilege; seven items), denying the existence of 
institutional discrimination (i.e., awareness of institutional forms of racism; seven items), 
and blatant racial issues (i.e., unawareness of prevalent racial discriminations; six items). 
Example items include: “White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the 
color of their skin” (Racial Privilege subscale); “Social policies, such as affirmative 
action, discriminate unfairly against White people” (Institutional Discrimination 
subscale); and “Ethnic and racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations” 
(Blatant Racial Issues subscale). Each component was individually reliable and correlated 
strongly, so a composite measure of power-evasion racial blindness was created by 
averaging these three dimensions (M = 4.81, SD = 0.88). Appendix B has all items.  
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Colorblind television programming. The colorblind television screen welcomes 
and embraces increased numbers of characters of color in an attempt to recreate the 
sentiments of a post-racial era – one that does not factor in the intergroup conflict still 
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associated with race/ethnicity (Nielsen & Turner, 2014). On this note, television 
programs that include, feature, and direct attention to ethnoracial difference are strong 
candidates to characterize, endorse, and promote colorblindness. It can be as simple as 
featuring ethnoracial pluralism in its main characters or dedicating a TV show to 
members of an ethnoracial minority group (Beltrán, 2010a, 2013; Brook, 2009; Jhally & 
Lewis, 1992). This chapter examines three types of entertainment programs based on the 
ethnoracial diversity of their cast of main characters (Brook, 2009; Hunt et al., 2015, 
2016): (a) multicultural programming: protagonists are dispersed across an assorted 
milieu of ethnoracial communities; (b) minority-leading programming: main characters 
skew to one-clearly defined ethnoracial minority group; (c) White-dominant 
programming: the ethnoracial group ratio of protagonists favor Whites with few main 
characters belonging to ethnoracial minority groups.  
Seven television shows were chosen to represent each of the three types of 
colorblind programming highlighted above. These were selected upon reviewing Nielsen 
consumption and other open media reports that identified the top-ten television programs 
among youth (Nielsen, 2014, 2015, 2016; Hunt et al., 2015; Barna, 2015). Careful 
attention was paid in choosing TV shows across three entertainment genres of television 
that have been identified to include ethnoracial minorities: comedies, dramas, and reality 
television (Hunt et al., 2015, 2016; Signorelli, 2009). The Internet Movie Database 
(imdb.com) was consulted in order to determine the genre programs belonged to. Some 
entertainment programs had a hybrid genre known as dramedy; consequently, this genre 
was also included into the search. Only television shows airing during or after 2012 were 
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deemed appropriate and current for this study; the reason being that President Barack 
Obama—a canonical figure of post-racial America (Squires, 2014)—was re-elected, seen 
by many as an endorsement of a post-racial society, and continued his presidency for a 
second term. Lastly, part of the selection criteria was to include at least one television 
program that represented the three largest ethnoracial groups in the United States 
(Census, 2010): (a) Latin@, (b) Black, (c) Asian (both East and South Asians were 
considered in this study). The research rendered two comedies, two dramas, two 
dramedies, and one reality television show per category. Table 2 through 4 contains the 
relevant statistical (e.g., means, standard deviations, index reliability), demographical 
(e.g., the ethnoracial designation of main characters), and genre information of the each 
television show.   
Television programs were assessed in two ways to ensure a note-worthy level of 
audience involvement with them. First, participants were asked to specify how many 
episodes of each television show they have watched (1 = none, 7 = all aired episodes). 
Secondly, participants were asked to disclose their level of familiarity with the narratives, 
themes, and characters of each television program. Two separate Principal Component 
Analyses3 were performed on the 21 television shows: one for programming viewership 
and the other for participants’ familiarity with them. Neither statistical test rendered a 
satisfactory three-factor solution that coincided with the three anticipated categories. For 
this reason, the television programs were categorized according to conceptual and 
theoretical assumptions over statistical ones.  What this meant was that two separate 
                                                
3 A Principal Component Analysis is a statistical procedure meant to simplify a dataset as it identifies 
strong patterns (or underlying structures) based on the shared variation of items.        
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measures were created for each category of colorblind television content (i.e., 
multicultural, minority-leading, White-dominant) by separately averaging how much of a 
given program participants watched, or how familiar participants’ were with each 
program. None of the two measures had statistically acceptable levels of reliabilities (.80 
or better) but were close to that, with the Cronbach’s alphas ranging from 0.58 to .70. 
 Television programs whose main characters belonged to different ethnoracial 
backgrounds were grouped under the multicultural programs. These were America’s Next 
Top Model (CW, 2003—2015; VH1, 2016—), Glee (FOX, 2009—2015), Grey’s 
Anatomy (ABC, 2005—), Orange is the New Black (Netflix, 2013—), Parks & 
Recreation (NBC, 2009—2015), Superstore (NBC, 2015—), and The Walking Dead 
(AMC, 2010—). Within this cohort, Parks & Recreation—a mockumentary type show 
that follows public officials as they make their town (Pawnee, Indiana) a better place— 
and Orange is the New Black—a drama-based show that portrays life at a federal 
women’s prison—were the top two viewed and/or familiar television shows.  Overall, 
based on the mean statistics and compared to the other types of colorblind television 
content, multicultural programs were the most viewed or familiar to participants.  
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Table 2. Multicultural television programming  
 Genre Viewership Familiarity 
  M SD M SD 
1. Parks & Recreation Comedy 3.72 2.54 3.99 2.55 
2. Orange is the New Black Dramedy 3.06 2.39 3.50 2.38 
3. Grey’s Anatomy Drama 2.83 2.33 3.26 2.33 
4. Glee Dramedy 2.75 2.04 3.20 2.18 
5. The Walking Dead Drama 2.61 2.02 3.05 2.24 
6. America’s Next Top Model Reality TV 2.53 1.88 2.99 2.13 
7. Superstore Comedy 1.44 1.27 1.59 1.46 
Overall  2.71 1.13 3.08 1.32 
       Cronbach’s alpha (α)  0.58 0.70 
Note. Sample of main characters’ ethnoracial background: 
1. Leslie Knope (White), April Ludgate (Latin@), Tom Haverford (South Asian), Donna 
Meagle (Black) 
2. Piper Chapman (White), Suzanne Warren (Black), Lorna Morello (Latin@) 
3. Meredith Gray (White), Callie Torres (Latin@), Cristina Yang (Asian) 
4. Rachel Berry (White/Jew), Finn Hudson (White), Mercedes Jones (Black), Santana Lopez 
(Latin@), Tina Chang  (Asian) 
5. Rick Grimes (White), Michonne (Black), Glen Rhee (Asian), Rosita Espinosa (Latin@) 
6. Winners: Keith Carlos (Cycle 21, Black), Lisa D’Amato (Cycle 17, Italian), Krista White 
(Cycle 14, Black), Jaslene Gonzalez (Cycle 8, Latin@) 
7. Amy Dubanowski (née Sosa; Latin@), Johnah Simms (White), Garret McNeill (Black), 
Mateo Liwanag (Asian) 
      
 
Television programs whose main characters belonged to one ethnoracial minority 
group were indexed as the minority-leading category. These were Black-ish (ABC, 
2014—), Devious Maids (Lifetime, 2013—2016), Empire (FOX, 2015—), Jane the 
Virgin (CW, 2014—), Masters of None (Netflix, 2015—), Narcos (Netflix, 2015—), and 
Real Housewives of Atlanta (Bravo, 2008—). Programming with arguably brown casts 
were the top watched or most familiar for the current sample of Millennials. 
Comparatively and in general, minority-leading television programs were the least 
viewed or familiar to participants.    
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Table 3. Minority-leading television programming  
 Genre Viewership Familiarity 
  M SD M SD 
1. Jane the Virgin Comedy 2.47 2.22 2.73 2.31 
2. Narcos Drama 2.22 2.13 2.50 2.17 
3. Masters of None Dramedy 2.19 2.14 2.29 2.12 
4. Empire Drama 1.87 1.52 2.31 1.85 
5. Black-ish Comedy 1.84 1.58 2.17 1.83 
6. The Real Housewives – Atlanta Reality TV 1.51 1.26 1.79 1.52 
7. Devious Maids Dramedy 1.38 1.17 1.52 1.33 
Overall  1.92 1.02 2.18 1.12 
Cronbach’s alpha (α)  0.66 0.67 
Note: Ethnoracial background of main characters:  
1. Latin@: Jane Villanueva (Gina Rodriguez), Rogelio de la Vela (Jaime Camil), Rafael 
Solano (Justin Baldoni) 
2. Latin@: Pablo Escobar (Wagner Moura). Javier Peña (Pedro Pascal), Tata Escobar 
(Paulna Gaitan) 
3. South Asian: Dev Shah (Aziz Ansari), Brian Yang (Kelvin Yu) 
4. Black:  Loretha “Cookie” Lyon (Taraj P. Henson), Jamal Lyon (Jussie Smolett), Lucious 
Lyon (Terrence Howard) 
5. Black: Dre Johnson (Anthony Anderson), Raibow Johnson (Tracee Ellis Ross) 
6. Black: Nene Leakes, DeShawn Snow, Shereé Whitfield,  
7. Latin@: Marisol Suarez (Ana Ortiz), Carmen Luna (Roselyn Sánchez), Zoila Diaz (Judy 
Reyes), Rosie Falta (Dania Ramiez) 
 
Television programs with mostly White characters but that still featured a few 
ethnoracial minority actors in starring roles were grouped together as the White-dominant 
category. These included Breaking Bad (AMC, 2008—2013), Dance Moms (Lifetime, 
2011—), Desperate Housewives (ABC, 2004—2012), Modern Family, Parenthood 
(ABC, 2009—), Scandal (ABC, 2012—), and The Big Bang Theory (CBS, 2007—). Only 
three TV shows averaged a moderate level of viewership or familiarity of three or higher: 
Breaking Bad, The Big Bang Theory, and Modern Family. 
 
 
   
 56 
Table 4. White-dominant television programming 
 Genre Viewership Familiarity 
  M SD M SD 
1. Breaking Bad Drama 3.18 2.46 3.41 2.41 
2. The Big Bang Theory Comedy 3.05 1.93 3.58 2.20 
3. Modern Family Comedy 3.05 1.93 3.57 2.18 
4. Scandal Drama 2.33 2.15 2.56 2.17 
5. Dance Moms Reality TV 2.15 1.73 2.42 1.96 
6. Desperate Housewives Dramedy  1.86 1.69 2.03 1.73 
7. Parenthood Dramedy 1.64 1.51 1.74 1.59 
Overall  2.46 1.06 2.74 1.19 
Cronbach’s alpha (α)  0.61 0.67 
Note: Sample of main characters that are prominent ethnoracial minorities:  
1. Gus Fring (Black)  
2. Raj Koothrappali (South Asian) 
3. Gloria Pritchett (Latin@) 
4. Olivia Pope (Black) 
5. Camille & Camryn (Black) 
6. Gabrielle Solis (Latin@) 
7. Jasmine Trussell-Braverman (Black) 
 
 As can be expected, viewership and familiarity of television programming 
correlated with another, and these were high correlations for each television category: 
multicultural programming (r = .75, p < .001), minority leading programming (r = .81, p 
< .001), and White-dominant programming (r = .83, p < .001). So, participants’ 
knowledge of what these shows entail (e.g., who the main characters are, how their 
storylines play out, etc.), and their viewership of them, depend on each other. Due to this 
high correlation between the two measures, both were averaged together to create an 
index of program involvement for each separate category: multicultural programming (M  
= 2.90, SD = 1.14), minority leading programming (M  = 2.05, SD = 1.00), and White-
dominant programming (M  = 2.61, SD = 1.08).  
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Exceptional television prototypicality. Exceptional depictions of ethnoracial 
groups are those that approximate the middle-class milieu of Whites (Doane, 2014; 
Griffin, 2015; Hughey, 2014; Ramírez Berg, 2002). Having said this, the Mainstream 
Values Scale (Mastro & Kopacz, 2006) is likely to capture the typical and attractive 
qualities associated with the social standing of the dominant White group. Participants 
were asked, “Think of the ‘typical’ depiction of an ethnoracial group on entertainment 
television, and then select the frequency to which they are depicted with these attributes: 
(a) educated, (b) intelligent, (c) rich, (d) self-supporting, (e) family-oriented, and (f) 
trustworthy.” These adjectives were highly reliable across the four ethnoracial groups 
examined: Whites (α = 0.95; M = 5.06, SD = 1.01), Latin@s (α = 0.80; M = 3.58, SD = 




Demographics. This study controlled for ethnorace, as it has been found to 
correlate to (power-evasive) color-blindness (Coleman, Chapman, & Wang, 2013; 
Nevielle et al., 2000, 2013). The reason being that ethnoracial minorities have been found 
to endorse colorblindness less than a White ethnoracial majority (Apollon, 2011; Ryan et 
al., 2007), given its dangerous ability to impact their racial identity 
development/maintenance or because of their own explicit/implicit experiences with 
racism.  
   
 58 
Gender (1 = women, 0 = men) was also included as a control variable. Some 
studies found that gender correlated with color-blindness before other predictors of 
interest were added into the regression model (e.g., Coleman et al., 2013). Women may 
endorse colorblindness more so than men perhaps for its equality connotation, because 
racial equality means gender equality (Eddo-Lodge, 2014). 
Subjective social position could influence Millennials’ internalization of color-
blind racial ideologies, since its acceptance may be dependent upon where one stands in 
society. It is likely that Millennials who feel comfortable in society—meaning, they see 
themselves on top, may be more likely to endorse mainstream attitudes. Respondents 
rated their subjective social status using the Scale of Subjective Status (Shaked, Williams, 
Evans, & Zonderman, 2016). Participants were instructed: 
Think of a ladder with 10 steps representing where people stand in the United 
States. At step 10 are people who are the best off – those who have the most 
money, the most education, and the most respected jobs. At step 1 are the people 
who are worst off – those who have the least money, least education, and the least 
respected jobs or no job. Where would you place yourself on this ladder? 
 
The sample, on average, placed themselves above the mid-point (M = 6.54, SD = 
1.63). As they are all students at a prestigious public university, that is not surprising. 
Lastly, political identification has had a history of being linked to 
progressive/liberal ideologies and race is no exception. One study in particular (i.e., 
Burke, 2017) found no association between political location on ideology and colorblind 
attitudes. However, to continue the conversation about the discursive construction of the 
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liberal and culturally-open Millennial, political identification was added into the study’s 
list of control variables. Participants were asked to identify their political party in one of 
the following categories: (1) Strong Democrat, (2) Weak Democrat, (3) Lean Democrat, 
(4) Independent, (5) Lean Republican, (6) Weak Republican, (7) Strong Republican.  
Ethnoracial identity. Besides demographics, it is important to consider the role of 
one’s identification and level of involvement with their ethnoracial identity. If 
colorblindness determines the relevance of ethnicity and/or race in post-racial society, 
then it should reflect in how people feel about their ethnoracial identities. Furthermore, 
colorblind attitudes have psychological implications on ethnoracial minorities such as 
discrediting their ethnoracial stress, what life satisfaction they could expect from their 
ethnic/racial membership, and if there is worth in community building (Apollon, 2011; 
Bell, 2016; Coleman et al., 2013). Two domains of ethnic identity are examined here: (1) 
importance to self-concept and (2) public self-esteem. Both measures were obtained from 
the Race-specific Collective Self-esteem Scale (or CSES-R, Crocker, Luhtanen, Blaine, 
& Broadnax, 1994), which evaluates the socio-psychological importance of one’s 
ethnoracial identity to them. The importance to self-concept dimension examines how 
much does an ethnoracial identity means to them as an identity category (e.g., “The 
ethnic or racial group I belong to is an important reflection of who I am.”). The private 
self-esteem dimension considers the extent to which others evaluate their ethnoracial 
group (e.g., “In general, others respect the ethnic or racial group that I am a member of”). 
Both four-item measures were reliable here: importance to self-concept (α = 0.84; M = 
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4.13, SD = 1.42) and public self-esteem (α = 0.86; M = 4.70, SD = 1.36). Appendix C has 
all items 
Watching television. One other television construct that can influence 
colorblindness is television consumption. If television is shifting toward a color-inclusive 
medium (Nilsen & Turner, 2014), and if television affects ethnoracial attitudes (Gorham, 
1999), then it is possible that the mere act of watching television may be enough to 
impact perceptions about colorblindness. On a five-point Likert scale (1 = about once a 
day; 5 = never), participants were instructed to report their television viewership across 
several genres (Lee, Bichard, Irey, Wal, & Carlson, 2009): (a) entertainment (e.g., 
comedies. Music television, movies on television, late night talk shows), (b) dramas (e.g., 
drama, emergency drama, crime drama), (c) informational (e.g., local and national news), 
(d) educational (e.g., PBS, nature programs, game shows such as Jeopardy and Wheel of 
Fortune), (e) reality (e.g., reality shows and news magazines), (f) melodrama/soap opera 
(e.g., daytime programs), (g) sports (e.g., sports coverage). Two additional genres were 
added based on their popularity among Americans and young adults: (g) 
anime/cartoons/animation (Kissell, 2015) and (i) action adventure (Nielsen, 2013). All 
items formed a reliable index of television viewership (α = 0.75; M = 3.28, SD = 0.69). 
 
  




It is important to first examine what television practices the current sample of 
Millennials did have with colorblind content. Generally, their viewership and familiarity 
with either multicultural, minority-leading, or White-dominant television programming 
was rather low to moderate. These consumption patterns can be expected, since 
Millennials report watching television less than other, older age generations (Verizon, 
2014). However, the TV shows that stood out in this study matched those that previous 
media reports identified as popular among Millennials (Barna, 2015). These were Orange 
is the New Black, Parks & Recreation, Breaking Bad, and The Big Bang Theory. No 
demographic group differences existed in regards to subjective social class, but 
ethnoracial minority Millennials tended to watch more of minority-leading TV programs 
(r = -.16, p < .001) than the White ethnoracial majority. Moreover, men tended to watch 
more of multicultural TV programming (r = .29, p < .001) than women. In terms of 
respectable television representations of ethnoracial groups, those perceived about Whites 
were the highest and the lowest were found for Blacks. Ethnoracial group membership 
(higher for Whites; r = .11, p < .05) and gender (higher for men; r = -.10, p < .05) were 
important in noticing respectable portrayals of Latin@. Gender was also a pertinent factor 
in observing the respectable prototypicality of Whites (higher for women; r = .10, p < 
.05). Overall, Millennials were fairly homogenous on their colorblind content. However, 
the aforementioned group differences may impact the linear regression models because 
these rest on the assumption that scores have similar fluctuation patterns, and if scores are 
uneven and widely dispersed, then no linear correlation can be estimated.  
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Zero-order bivariate correlations were conducted to first examine the general 
associations between control, independent, and dependent variables. Results are 
presented in Table 5. The dignified television prototypicality of all four ethnoracial 
groups was associated to both dimensions of color-blindness. However, the 
prototypicality of Latin@s and Blacks correlated negatively to color-blindness and the 
one pertaining to Whites and Asians had a positive correlation to either dimension. Color-
blind programming had no statistical correlations to color-evasion racial-blindness, and 
only two types of shows—multicultural and minority-leading television—were positively 
related to power-evasion racial blindness. Participant demographics and their ethnoracial 
identity also demonstrated statistically significant correlations with color-blindness, 
particularly its power-evasion dimension. Based on these associations, it is evident that 
most variables in this study are significant contributors of color-evasion and power-
evasion racial-blindness, and in order to examine which one best explains and predicts 
them, two hierarchical linear regressions were carried out. 
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Table 5. Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations between Study 1 Main Variables  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
(1) Ethnoracial Group (1 = White) —       
(2) Gender (1 = Women) .04 —      
(3) Subjective Social Status .34*** .02 —     
(4) Political Identification .22*** -.10* .13** —    
(5) Importance to Self-concept  -.42*** .15*** -.16*** -.09* —   
(6) Public Self-esteem .31*** .00 .16*** .07 -.16*** —  
(7) Television Viewership  .01 .13** -.03 -.05 .02 .09* — 
(8) W Exceptional Prototypicality -.06 .10* .03 -.12** .11* .00 .10* 
(9) L Exceptional Prototypicality  .11* -.10* -.01 .10* -.11* .12** -.05 
(10) B Exceptional Prototypicality .06 -.07 -.06 .04 -.02 .07 -.04 
(11) A Exceptional Prototypicality -.07 .02 -.03 -.07 .12*** .07b -.01 
(12) Multicultural .03 .29*** -.04 -.21*** -.02 -.10* -.09* 
(13) Minority-learning -.16*** .09b -.07 -.16** .07 -.19*** -.23*** 
(14) White-dominant .07 .08 .03 .00 -.04 -.04 -.25*** 
(15) Color-Evasion -.17*** .18*** -.04 -.15** .29*** -.05 .13** 
(16) Power-Evasion -.16*** .18*** -.09* -.57*** .19*** -.11* .09* 
α — — — —    
M — — 6.54 3.29 4.13 4.70 3.28 
SD — — 1.63 1.80 1.42 1.36 0.69 









Table 5. Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations between Study 1 Main Variables (Cont’d) 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
(1) Ethnoracial Group (1= White)          
(2) Gender (1 = Women)          
(3) Subjective Social Status          
(4) Political Identification          
(5) Importance to Self-concept           
(6) Public self-esteem          
(7) Television Viewership           
(8) W Exceptional Prototypicality —         
(9) L Exceptional Prototypicality  -.02 —        
(10) B Exceptional Prototypicality .53*** .60*** —       
(11) A Exceptional Prototypicality .06 .17*** .09b —      
(12) Multicultural -.19*** -.02 .04 .10* —     
(13) Minority-learning -.05 .00 -.06 .07 .58*** —    
(14) White-dominant -.09a .01 .04 -.04 .56*** .55*** —   
(15) Color-Evasion .18*** -.13** -.11* .14** .05 .02 -.04 —  
(16) Power-Evasion .32*** -.13** -.16*** .21*** .26*** .15** -.02 .33 — 
α          
M 5.06 3.59 3.44 4.82 2.90 2.06 2.61 4.23 4.81 
SD 1.01 0.71 0.85 1.03 1.14 1.00 1.08 1.32 0.88 
Note: W = White, L = Latin@, B = Black, A = Asian; ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, ap ≤ .06, bp ≤ .10 
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Table 6 and 7 contain the results for the two hierarchical regressions on color-
blindness. Participants’ demographics were entered in block 1 (step 1), followed by their 
ethnic identity affinity (step 2), then by television viewership (step 3), proceeded by 
dignified television prototypicality (step 4), and lastly by color-blind television 
engagement (step 5).   
 
 
RQ1: COLOR-BLIND TELEVISION PROGRAMMING ON COLOR-
BLINDNESS 
 
To answer the first research question, color-blind television programming appears 
to be more relevant in power-evasion than on color-evasion racial-blindness. Yet, out of 
all the examined color-blind television shows, only involvement with multicultural 
programming (β = .15, p < .01) was statistically significant on power-evasion racial 
blindness. So, watching and being familiar with TV programs that feature heteronomous 
ethnoracial characters are likely to be associated with higher (colorblind) attitudes about 
ethnicity/race not defining opportunities for people. None of the color-blind TV programs 
predicted color-evasion racial-blindness, however. Based on these results, there is some 
indication to infer that colorblind television programming, particularly that with 
multicultural casts, has a deeper ideological function in dismissing race/ethnicity in 
structural/institutional/societal terms (“no bias exists for ethnoracial groups”) over 
colorblind forms emphasize sameness (“we are all human”).  
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Table 6. Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Predictor Variables of Color-Evasion Racial 
Blindness (N = 421) 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
Block 1: Demographics       
Ethnoracial Group -.15** -.06 -.06 -.05 -.06 
Gender .15** .13** .11* .11* .09b 
Subjective Social Status .04 .02 .03 .01 .02 
Political Identification .04 -.05 -.05 -.04 -.02 
Block 2: Ethnic Identity       
Importance to Self-concept   .21*** .21*** .19*** .20*** 
Public self-esteem  .00 -.01 -.02 -.02 
Block 3: Television Viewership      
General   .13** .12* .11* 
Block 4: Exceptional TV Prototypicality      
White    .05 .04 
Latin@    -.04 -.03 
Black    -.06 -.07 
Asian    .11a .10b 
Block 5: Color-blind TV Programming      
Multicultural     .09 
Minority-learning     -.06 
White-dominant     -.03 
ΔR2 4.8%*** 3.6%*** 1.7%** 2.2%* 0.4% 
R2 4.8% 8.4% 10.1% 12.3% 12.7% 
df (4, 417) (6, 415) (7, 414) (11, 410) (14, 407) 
F 5.28*** 6.37*** 6.63*** 5.22*** 4.24*** 
Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, ap ≤ .06, bp ≤ .10 
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RQ2: RESPECTABLE TELEVISION PROTOTYPICALITY ON COLOR-
BLINDNESS 
Regarding the second research question, the dignified prototypicality of 
ethnoracial groups on television only statistically contributed to power-evasion racial 
blindness but not on its companion dimension. Specifically, the more Whites (β = .15, p < 
.001) or Asians (β = .09, p = .05) were perceived to embody respectable and mainstream 
character qualities (e.g., trustworthy, educated, intelligent) on television, the higher their 
attitudes about denying racism were. The opposite can be expected with the dignified 
televisuality of Blacks (β = -.17, p < .001). The positive prototypicality of Latin@s (β = 
.05, p > .05) did not predict power-evasion racial-blindness, even if both were negatively 
related (r = -.13, p < .01). It is probable that the dignified Latin@ prototypicality failed to 
predict power-evasion racial-blindness because there were ethnoracial and gender 
differences in this characterization among Millennials, when the perception of other 
ethnoracial groups was rather homogenous. What can be gathered from these statistics is 
that the dignified televisual prototypicality of ethnoracial groups has a similar predictive 
pattern on color-blind attitudes like that observed with color-blind television 
programming: an association with power-evasive over color-evasive forms of race(ism).  
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Table 7. Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Predictor Variables of Power-Evasion Racial 
Blindness (N = 415) 
 Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
Block 1: Demographics       
Ethnoracial Group -.02 .04 .04 .06 .06 
Gender .12** .11* .09* .09* .05 
Subjective Social Status -.02 -.01 -.01 -.04 -.03 
Political Identification -.55*** -.55*** -.55*** -.53*** -.49*** 
Block 2: Ethnic Identity       
Importance to Self-concept   .13** .13** .12** .13** 
Public self-esteem  -.03 -.04 -.05 -.04 
Block 3: Television Viewership      
General   .09* .06 .05 
Block 4: Exceptional TV Prototypicality      
White    .15** .15*** 
Latin@    .05 .05 
Black    -.16*** -.17*** 
Asian    .11* .09 p =.05 
Block 5: Color-blind TV Programming     .15** 
Multicultural     .02 
Minority-learning     -.08 
White-dominant      
ΔR2 33.2%*** 1.5%* 0.7%* 6.9%*** 2.5%* 
R2 33.2% 34.7% 35.4% 42.3% 43.6% 
df (4, 411) (6, 409) (7, 408) (11, 404) (14, 401) 
F 50.98*** 36.13*** 31.89*** 26.91*** 22.16*** 
Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, ap ≤ .06, bp ≤ .10 
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The results of this study suggest that color-blind television content contributes to 
their color-blind attitudes of Millennials. However, we should be cautions not to over-
extend the study findings, since the statistical impact of colorblind-content did not 
overshadow that of other predictors. All included predictors explained a combined 12.7% 
of the observed variance on color-evasion racial-blindness, with dignified prototypicality 
only contributing 2.2% (ΔR2) and colorblind programming another 0.4% (ΔR2) of the 
total variance. Both of their contributions were non-significant in the regression model. 
Regarding power-evasion racial-blindness, its final regression model had an observed 
variance of 43.6%, with demographics significantly explaining most it (33.2%). Dignified 
prototypicality and colorblind programming each statistically contributed an additional 
percentage of the total variance on power-evasion racial-blindness: 6.9% and 2.5% 
respectively. Such observations direct our attention to other factors such as audience 
demographics or call attention to television depictions that typify (or not) ethnoracial 
groups that can better explain the relationship.  
 
OTHER RELEVANT FACTORS ON COLOR-BLINDNESS 
Out of the examined media-related variables in this study, watching television 
was the only significant predictor of color-evasive racial-blindness. The association was 
positive (β = .11, p < .05), which meant that participants who watched less television 
across several genres were more likely to endorse ethnoracial attitudes of sameness. This 
statistic (as well as the rest in this regression model) points to factors outside television 
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that are more helpful for Millennials to believe in humanism. Consequently, the value of 
television in matters of colorblindness is not at the interpersonal level but at the structural 
one, since its (colorblind) content was likely to predict power-evasive color-blindness.  
One constant and positive predictor of color-blindness was the importance of 
participants’ ethnic identity on their self-concept. With colorblindness de-emphasizing 
the significance or race(ism), it would seem that those who hold their ethnic identities in 
high-esteem would be cautious about internalizing ideologies that threaten and lessen the 
socio-cultural worth of ethnicity and/or race. This study found the opposite. Statistical 
results suggest that Millennials’ who considered their ethnoracial important to who they 
are were more likely to internalize color-evasive (β = .20, p < .001) or power evasive 
racial-blindness (β = .13, p < .01). What participants’ felt others thought of their 
ethnoracial identity had no effect on their color-blind attitudes (color-evasion, β = -.02, p 
> .05; power-evasion, β = -.04, p > .05).  
Political identification only predicted power-evasive racial-blindness. 
Specifically, Millennials who skew Democratic in their political identification (β = -.49, p 
< .001) tended to dismiss how ethnicity and/or race inform social and cultural 
(dis)advantages. This finding is particularly contradictory to expectations of who is 
colorblind, especially on matters about structural and institutional inequalities. Results 
like this and the aforementioned one about ethnic identity identify the current sample of 
Millennials as atypical, or perhaps as ideological complacent to colorblindness. 
  
 




This study has examined how colorblind television (statistically) related to 
colorblindness among a sample of Millennials. It found a complimentary association; 
meaning that color inclusion onscreen can translate into post-racial attitudes. However, 
the contribution of this study to post-raciality was in clarifying what programming and 
whose portrayals facilitate the socialization process. It finds that color has significance 
even in its absence or dismissal in mediated contexts (Chidester, 2008; Nayak, 2006; 
Pinder, 2015). Specifically, for this young audience, the colorblind screen is of particular 
relevance in cultivating a power-evasive colorblind stance, and multicultural 
programming and the respectable portrayals of Whites as well as those of Asians are 
instrumental in carrying it out. So, not only do cultural texts match the societal contexts 
in which these are produced and circulated (Gray, 2004; Hughey, 2014), but there are 
also contradictions in them—in this case, a violation of color neutrality—that sets a 
dominant social frame that still differentiates against color and its racial meaning. The 
preceding discussion attempts to parse out the conflicted and successful state of post-
raciality/color-blindness in one of its prime demographics: Millennials.   
 Interestingly, Millennials here did not exemplify the characteristics of people who 
are believed to consider race(ism) insignificant. (1) Ethnoracial majority (Apollon, 
2011): ethnic membership was not significant in both regression models. (2) Low-
identifying ethnoracial individuals: contrarily, those who hold their ethnoracial identities 
in higher regards to their self-concept were more likely to be colorblind across its two 
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dimensions. (3) Liberal (Pew Research Center, 2016): political identification was non-
significant only for color-evasion colorblindness (Burke, 2017) but relevant in its power-
evasion dimension (those leaning Democratic). Such demographic patterns contradict 
general assumptions of who is likely to reject colorblindness (Bell, 2006; Coleman et al., 
2013; Neville et al., 2013), yet are in accordance with market research that renders 
Millennials colorblind (MTV, 2014). This (a)typicality nicely captures the ambivalence 
that youth in the U.S. experience under a prevailing ethic or expectation of post-raciality: 
a desire to look beyond race(ism) but still hold on to their ethnoracial identities. Now, it 
is possible that these observances are due to the region and school of where data was 
collected. As will be further elaborated in Chapter 4, the sample comes from a generally 
progressive city (Austin, Texas), and students attended a premiere-public university. This 
combination of factors makes it likely that participants are privileged not only in terms of 
class but also for residing in a tolerant and politically progressive space.  
   
WATCHING TELEVISION, ONSCREEN DIVERSITY, AND COLOR-
BLINDNESS  
 Multicultural television programming functions as a type of entertaining anti-
racism for Millennials. The reason being, as Müller (2009) argues, the presence of color 
on screen is meant to foster pro-social attitudes for ethnic/racial Others, thanks to the 
positive intercultural relations evident in these TV shows. In multicultural programming, 
like most TV shows featuring ethnic/racial diversity, color is meant to affirm cross-
ethnic/racial universality and cooperation, minimizing the competition for cultural power 
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and resources (Bonilla-Silva & Ashe, 2014; Hughey, 2014). The absence of racism 
means things are fine; that racial indignities are a thing of the past (Jhally & Lewis, 1992; 
Innis & Feagin, 1995). By erasing the cultural disadvantage of ethnic/racial minorities, 
the focus can now be shifted to the realm of the personal and sameness. The apolitical 
inclusion of color in multicultural TV shows thus facilitates the convergence of 
difference (Brook, 2009), ensuring the harmonious congregation of distinct ethnoracial 
groups and the perception that all characters are allocated proper and meaningful space in 
the narratives. These cultural texts are also cultivating culture-blindness (Kretsedemas, 
2014), where we transcend the peculiarities of cultural and ethnic identities of characters 
to privilege the universal. At the end of the day, the positive relationship between 
multicultural programing and power-evasion color-blindness is indicative that ethnoracial 
relations in these cultural texts shy away from discussing and cultivating a perception 
about the structural and institutional factors that enable unequal distributions of symbolic 
and cultural resources. 
 It appears multicultural programming is creating a new standard of what can 
count as colorblind progression on television (Beltrán, 2010a; Molina-Guzmán, 2013; 
Ryan, 2016; Vega, 2013). The previous titleholders were TV shows with exclusive or 
casts mostly comprised of ethnoracial minorities given their breakthrough presence in a 
White television era (Gray, 2004; Jhally & Lewis, 1992). Since minority-leading or 
white-dominant TV shows did not predict color-blindness, these findings illustrate the 
shifting taste for media content that is in tune with the demographic changes of its young 
audience. Or, the realization that the social world is not black and white anymore but 
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multi-ethnic/racial, thus encouraging the visibility of several groups that capture 
ethnoracial difference. The take-away is: Minority-leading and White-dominant 
programming are possibly becoming too commonplace on television, hence forcing 
content producers to innovate in how ethnic/racial difference is (re)presented onscreen.   
 It could also be that minority-leading programming is not ethnic enough, 
racially inauthentic, or too assimilated to produce a vantage point that sufficiently 
contrasts dominant culture (Gray, 2004; Innis & Feagin, 1995; Markert, 2007). Similarly, 
this essence of experiencing color is lacking from White-dominant TV shows. The 
possibility exists that the ethnoracial minority characters in these cultural texts are un-
raced, meaning their actions are taken outside an ethnic/racial context to that of 
universality (Hughey, 2014; Kretsedemas, 2014; Molina-Guzmán, 2013). Alternatively, 
the insignificant correlation between both programming to color-blindness may indicate 
that these are fostering a color-conscious attitude. Color clearly stands out in them, thus 
bringing ethnoracial difference to the forefront (Molina-Guzmán, 2012).  
 
EXCEPTIONAL COLOR AND COLOR-BLINDNESS 
 Exceptional portrayals of Whites or Asians on television were likely to (positively) 
predict power-evasion color-blindness. The ethnoracial group attached to these 
respectable/mainstream depictions can explain the associations. Whiteness, unlike other 
ethnoracial groups, escapes its color and can remain colorless across multiple contexts 
(Chidester, 2008; Hughey, 2014; Pinder, 2015; Shome, 2000), and as a typically un-
marked ethnoracial group, those associated with it are not necessarily constrained to the 
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social meanings of its color. That is to say, White media figures are just people, 
individuals, and defined by personality or character instead of how they measure up to 
the rest of their ethnoracial group (Dyer, 1997; Hughey, 2014; Ortega & Feagin, 2016). 
The exceptional characterization of White people is therefore individualized and 
illustrates that color has nothing to do with success. This racialized meaning toward 
individual effort matches the power-evasion color-blind attitude that disavows societal 
bias and favors meritocracy. Asians enter this thinking thanks to their model minority 
status, which grants them honorary Whiteness (Ono & Pham, 2009). Even if Asians have 
color, their actions resemble or are prototypical of Whiteness, thus helping them 
transcend the peculiarities of color. In fact, the portrayals of exceptional Whites were 
only and strongly correlated to that of Asians (r = .53, p < .001), further attesting to some 
similarity.   
 Exceptional blackness—in this study, the televisuality of blacks according to how 
they embody mainstream values—appears not to resonate with color-blindness as it did 
before (Jhally & Lewis, 1992). Multiple explanations exist for this divergent finding. 
First, images of Black people in the media have been consistently met with ambivalence 
and suspicion, more so from ingroup members (Innis & Feagin, 1995; Moody, 2014). 
Secondly, it is likely that these images are still raced, thus priming cognitions and 
emotions that make its color apparent. Thirdly, this exceptional image continues is still 
unrepresentative of the oppressive reality that Black people face today. It is likely that 
this black image, if anything, inspires color-consciousness.  
   
 76 
 Noticing the televisibility of exceptional Latin@s was not enough to predict color-
blindness, even though both negatively correlated. It is possible that this finding was due 
to the sample of Millennials not having similar perceptions of Latin@s as they did for the 
other ethnoracial groups. The regression model therefore did not estimate a prediction 
line, given the amount of dispersion. Or, the result was due to the typicality of other 
ethnoracial groups statistically outweighing that of Latin@s. Looking at their, it is 
evident that respectable Latinidad has a strong and shared correlations with exceptional 
Blackness (r = .60, p < .001), a with one with exceptional Asianness (r = .17, p < .001), 
and none with respectable Whiteness. From these statistical associations, it is evident that 
noticing exceptional Latin@s relies on how other ethnoracial minority groups embody 
this characterization on television too and vise-versa. But when it comes to color-
blindness, in these results, exceptional Latin@s take an in-between state similar to its 
construction in the social imaginary (Beltrán, 2009; Goin, 2016; Dávila, 2012; Molina-
Guzmán, 2010): neither light enough to be absolved from racism like Whites, or dark 
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CHAPTER 3. Color-consciousness and symbolic color differences:  
Seeing onscreen marginality 
 
 
Competing myths about ethnoracial groups exist in the images that television 
circulates, and at times, even within the same cultural text. This is the result of the 
inconsistent symbolic treatment mostly observed with ethnoracial minorities across 
media, where we have exceptional ethnoracial group members (e.g., doctors, lawyers, 
business owners, etc.), alongside less respectable ingroup fellows (e.g., drug dealers, 
clowns, welfare dependents, etc.). For media audiences, these contradictory images create 
ambivalence regarding what acceptability these ethnoracial groups have in mainstream 
culture (Iniss & Feagin, 1995; Mok, 1998; Rojas, 2004; Vargas, 2009). The tension in 
these polarized and conflicted depictions directs attention to color, whether it is to 
acknowledge or ignore it (Cooper, 1998; Hughey, 2014; Moody, 2014). The argument 
here is that the increased production of colorblind content muddles people’s ethnoracial 
meanings into de-centralizing race/ethnicity from their media practices. However, the 
long historical and marginal treatment of ethnoracial minorities as the cultural Other—
those who are not part of the norm—makes it likely that color remains part of how people 
derive pleasure from media (hooks, 1992; Valdivia, 1998). They may resist the post-
racial mystique, which encourages racial amnesia (Squires, 2014), through a color-
conscious approach to race(ism). So, in a social world striving for color-blindness, it 
leads to the question: Have audiences forgotten about color and its symbolic place in 
television?  
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 This study is interested in the relationship between onscreen ethnoracial 
marginality and color-consciousness. It holds that the decade-long and negative 
stereotypes of ethnoracial groups on television are difficult to forget and destabilize 
(Alsultany, 2012; Molina-Guzmán, 2010), and that an awareness of race(ism) can 
translate into noticing and assigning meaning to the televisibility of color. Such a claim 
contrasts with post-racial thinking, as discussed above, since color is still a source of 
stigma and stress for disenfranchised groups (Coleman et al., 2013; Loury, 2005). Similar 
to Chapter 2, this chapter examines the relationship between ethnoracial televisibility and 
color-consciousness. Of interest is onscreen marginality and what negative 
prototypicality and whose is able to encourage critical assessments of color.   
 
TELEVISION PRESENCE OF ETHNORACIAL GROUPS: A GLANCE 
Out of all ethnoracial groups, Whites have had a relatively stable presence on 
television for decades, in proportions surpassing their US census figures. Recent content 
analytic research showed that across 12 television seasons broadcasted between 1987 to 
2009, White characters had at least 80% of visibility during this time span (Tukachinsky, 
Mastro, & Yarchi, 2015).  This prominent televisibility translates into representation 
diversity for Whites onscreen; meaning, they are not restricted to certain emotions, 
occupations, or genres. This is not to say that Whites are free from typification. Some 
tropes remain constant, such as the hero-savior complex (Griffin, 2015; Hughey, 2014; 
Ortega & Feagin, 2016; Ramirez-Berg, 2002). Not only are White characters empathetic 
and relatable compared to non-White characters, but these characters are also the most 
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sympathetic and identifiable to audiences for being noble, attractive, affluent, capable, 
rational, intelligent, educated, and career-oriented among other respectable traits 
(Chidester, 2008; Dyer, 1997). The only exception is arguably White trash – a marginal 
form of Whiteness (Merskin, 2011). The conclusion still is: Whites have a symbolic 
advantage in terms of quantity and quality of television portrayals over ethnoracial 
minorities.  
The media presence of ethnoracial minorities is less encouraging than those of 
Whites. Based on content analytic media research, ethnoracial minorities, mostly Blacks 
and Latin@s, are expected in sitcoms and criminal dramas on television (Signorielli, 
2009). Other reports have found that ethnic minorities are more likely to lead/star in 
reality television than scripted programming (Hunt et al., 2015). Within entertainment 
television, Blacks are typically fools, ghetto queens, and drug dealers among others 
(Bounds Littlefield, 2008; Entman & Rojecki, 2001; Gray, 2004), while Latin@s are 
often seen as maids/gardeners, lawbreakers, and immigrants to name few (Frances-
Negron et al., 2014; Valdivia, 2010). Non-fictional media even relies on these depictions 
to tell stories about ethnoracial minorities. The news oftentimes focuses on, and over-
represents, Black criminality (Campbell, 2016; Entman & Rojecki, 2001), the Latin@ 
immigrant threat (Chavez, 2008), or frames ethnoracial minorities under the themes of 
drugs, violence, poverty, government dependence, big families, and linguistic or 
intellectual incompetence (Larson, 2006).  
Even with the recent slight increase of television series and films that feature 
ethnoracial minorities actors/characters as protagonist (GLAAD, 2015; Hunt et al., 2015; 
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Santhanam & Crigger, 2015), these are not enough to offset the historical tropes, traits, 
and portrayals that still accompany ethnoracial minorities. On the contrary, these 
optimistic images run the risk of verifying previously held stereotypes, as these favorable 
portrayals may not be seen as representative of the social group(s). Content analytic 
work, for instance, has found that sensuality is a common trait for Latin@s in mainstream 
television (Mastro & Behm-Morawitz, 2005) – a characteristic that has been increasing 
since the late 80s (Tukachinski et al., 2015). Today, Latin@ characters not adhering to 
this image could be casted as inauthentic for lacking the group’s presumed flavor and 
sexuality. The takeaway is, despite new television content gradually including more 
ethnoracial diversity in counter-stereotypical roles, the old stereotypes still persist in 
viewers’ minds (Entman & Rojecki, 2001; Mastro 2009; Merskin, 2011).  
 
DEFINING ONSCREEN ETHNORACIAL MARGINALITY 
The incongruous presence and essence of ethnoracial groups on televisual suggest 
that symbolic inequalities exist. Consequently, Chapter 3 is interested in the association 
between television and ethnic/racial Otherness as they relate to seeing color. Their 
relationship is best examined through onscreen marginality – a concept meant to capture 
the less significant, (hyper)visible, and inauspicious televisual presence of ethnoracial 
minorities. The assumption comes from ethnoracial minorities being the carriers of 
Otherness, typically defined outside Whiteness, and casted to peripheries in the media 
(Alsultany, 2012; Campbell, 2016; Goin, 2016; Gorham, 1999; Hall, 2001b; Merskin, 
2011). Onscreen marginality consequently identifies and makes-sense of the historical 
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and popular ethnic/racial stereotypes—one-dimensional, concretized signs of Otherness 
(Goin, 2016; Merskin, 2011)— that represses and disadvantages ethnoracial minorities on 
television.   
Onscreen marginality is an important concept to explore and develop further, 
because it has the potential of encapsulating the fears, anxieties, and threats imposed on 
ethnic/racial groups. Onscreen marginality therefore functions as a subtle and mediated 
form of cultural racism (Bounds Littlefield, 2008; Bonilla-Silva, 2014) that do nothing 
but harm the public image and social imagination of ethnoracial groups. The myths—or 
the ideologies behind narratives, characterizations, and dialogue (Campbell, 2016)—are 
the primary culprits in symbolically colonizing ethnoracial groups into Otherness 
(Molina-Guzmán, 2010). Undeniably, onscreen marginality is a loaded, ideological 
construct about the televisuality of ethnic/racial difference. Yet, these visualizations of 
color start with the image, or the negative televisibility of ethnoracial groups. Group 
prototypicality can be a good start in operationalizing the television presence of onscreen 
marginality,   
    
WHAT IS PROTOTYPICALITY, AND WHY DOES IT MATTER ON MEDIA 
AUDIENCES?  
Self-categorization theory (SCT) describes the cognitive processes that inform 
social identities over personal identities (Turner, 1985, 1987). Both identities are 
antagonistic to each other on a continuum, separated by levels of abstraction (Oaks, 
2003). While idiosyncratic characteristics drive personal identities, social identities are 
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established through self-perceived group features that encompass a given category (i.e., 
ingroup prototypes – a set of characteristics that are emblematic of a category; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986; Turner, 1985; Hogg & McGarty, 1990). Once a social identity becomes 
salient, this self-identification dilutes one’s unique features so a collective self-concept 
takes precedence. Group categorization is essentially based on the degree to which one 
assimilates to ingroup prototypes, which in turn, simultaneously serve to differentiate 
one’s group against others (Hogg, 1992). This group differentiation process enables the 
opportunity to bolster one’s self-concept and self-esteem. Groups, thus, strive to adopt 
favorable and advantageous ingroup prototypes in order to inferiorly assess outgroups on 
these attributes (Hogg & McGarty, 1990). Nevertheless, prototypes must be widely 
shared concepts in order to work as comparative social benchmarks (Hogg & William, 
2000). Just as prototypes are descriptive, they too are prescriptive, dictating attitudes, 
emotions, perceptions, and actions (Hogg & Hains, 1996). Social perceptions are 
therefore depersonalized through self-categorization and others are not processed 
according to their unique attributes but rather on their embodiment of a group prototype  
(Hogg, 1992; Hogg & Hains, 1996).  
Evaluating group prototypes among audiences has been useful in media research. 
Such work suggests that outgroup celebrities who closely embody ingroup prototypes are 
socially attractive (Mastro, Tamborini, & Hullett, 2005), ingroup prototypicality of media 
characterizations predicts race-based policy reasoning (Mastro & Kopacz, 2006), 
favorable outgroup prototypicality congruently renders positive outgroup perceptions 
(Mastro & Tukachinsky, 2011), and ingroup prototypes have been associated with 
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individual and collective self-esteem among ingroups (Mora & Kang, 2016). Ultimately, 
the research links media prototypicality of groups with racial judgments, outgroup 
affinity, and identity needs such as self-esteem. The next question is what prototypicality 
are ethnoracial groups framed under in their media depictions. 
 
THE MEDIA PROTOTYPICALITY OF ETHNORACIAL GROUPS 
Defining media prototypes of ethnoracial groups requires a careful examination of 
the characterizations that have personified them across mediated contexts. Mainstream 
values prototypicality and criminality prototypicality are two widely used measures that 
conceptualize group traits that typify ethnoracial minorities and a White majority social 
group on television and film (Mastro & Kopacz, 2006; Tan, Fujioka, & Tan, 2000). The 
criminality measure is emblematic of the behaviors that depict Latin@s and Blacks as 
lawbreakers and criminal deviants: (a) violence, crime, dealing drugs, and using drugs. 
Conversely, the mainstream value measure represents those characteristics that are often 
associated with mainstream (White) characters: (a) educated, (b) intelligent, (c) rich, (d) 
self-supporting, (e) family oriented, and (f) trustworthy. Media research has used these 
scales to understand Latin@s’ ingroup media perceptions (Mora & Kang, 2016) or the 
perceptions of White audiences of ethnoracial minorities (Ramasubramanian, 2010). 
There is room to amplify the prototypicality of ethnoracial groups in the media. 
Ethnoracial minorities are continuously depicted with historical tropes and roles that both 
essentialize and homogenize these groups (Gray, 2004; Ono & Pham, 2009; Valdivia, 
2010). Given the presumed sexiness that is found in dark-skin and voluptuous bodies 
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(Allisson, 2016; Manatu, 2003), sexuality is one fruitful avenue to analyze the 
prototypicality of ethnoracial minorities. The under-representation of ethnoracial 
minorities in general media has been thoroughly documented (Monk-Turner, Helserman, 
Johnson, Cotton, & Jackson, 2010; Tukachinski et al., 2015). Such work also suggests 
that when visible, ethnoracial minorities are not typically leading characters, but if they 
are, they often are the antagonists or troublemakers of the narrative. Consequently, 
another crucial domain in which investigate the media representation of ethnoracial 
groups is role prototypicality. Both sexuality prototypicality and role prototypically of 
ethnoracial groups in the media are further discussed below.   
Scholars interested in media images of women have extensively focused on their 
sexual objectification and sexuality (Allison, 2016; Molina-Guzmán, 2010; Parreñas 
Schimizu, 2007). Content analytic research–whether it be in the form of tallying 
depictions or rhetorical criticism of media texts–concludes that images of women are 
submissively sexualized in more social contexts and manners than men (Collins, 2011; 
Coltrane & Messineo, 2000), corroborating the notion that women are the objects (not the 
processors) of a sexual gaze (see Mulvey, 1975). Other work takes a more specific 
approach, comparing the appearance, attraction, clothing, and corporal depictions of 
women across ethnic groups in American media. It has been found that Black women in 
music videos are more likely than White women to wear provocative clothing (Turner, 
2011), but no statistical differences existed in character weight differences between Black 
and White women onscreen (Zhang, Dixon, & Conrad, 2010). In magazine advertising 
during a ten-year span (1885-1994), Black women wore the majority of animal prints and 
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body exposure of White women rose significantly (Plous & Nepture, 1997). Even if 
women in general are sexualized, it appears that ethnoracial minority women are 
particularly sexualized in the media, often wearing clothing that accentuate their 
sexuality. hooks (1992) has argued that since the days of slavery, Whites have projected a 
repressed sexuality into Black bodies, but the Black female body in particular has granted 
(White) audiences access to forbidden or taboo forms of sexual expression. Common 
media stereotypes of ethnoracial minority women further attest the imbalance in 
portrayals among women. Compared to virginal White women, ethnoracial minority 
women are presented as sexual objects not as romantic partners. That is to say, Latinas 
are seen in the media as harlots, spicy, and hot sexpots (Molina-Guzmán, 2010; Ramirez-
Berg, 2002; Valdivia, 2010). Black women are alluring and seductive jezebels or asexual 
mammies (Allison, 2016; Boogle, 2002). East Asian women are subservient and exotic 
geishas or sexually active China dolls (Ong & Pham, 2009; Parreñas Schimizu, 2007). 
Conclusively, in the content analysis literature, popular culture commodifies the bodies 
of ethnoracial minority women and presents them as over-sexed objects available for 
consumption (Brooks & Hébert, 2006; Molina-Guzmán, 2010).  
Narratives need characters and conflict to more effectively execute meaning.  
Narrative theory (see Bal, 2009) identifies the hero as the chief character in a story – the 
agent who sets all actions in motion. As a protagonist, the hero has endowed qualities or a 
set of extraordinary characteristics that assist in overcoming adversity and tribulations 
usually inflicted by the antagonist. Media utilizes this narrative structure, but it does 
through gendered, racialized, and classed ways. Unquestionably, media representations of 
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social groups at this time are skewed in favor of White, educated, heterosexual, 
middle/upper class, Protestant, abled-bodied, and/or men (Brooks & Hébert, 2006; 
GLAAD, 2015; Santhanam & Crigger, 2015).  
This majoritarian presence establishes who the heroes can be in mainstream 
media. Minority social groups–as counterparts to the majority–occupy a minor, 
decorative, and supporting role to the White hero. Such has been the case with 
ethnoracial minority groups—chiefly Blacks and Latin@s—who are often seen as 
lawbreakers, blue-collar workers, and buffoons when included in mainstream media, 
either as protagonists or secondary characters (Negrón-Muntaner et al., 2014; Mastro & 
Behm-Morawitz, 2005; Tukachinsky et al., 2015). It could be argued that Asians’ media 
typicality is more favorable for characterizing model minorities, but they suffer from a 
considerable underrepresentation in the media when compared to other ethnoracial 
groups – in 2014, about 6.6% of main cast actors on network TV shows (Fitzpatrick, 




This chapter builds on the previous one but focuses in the literature above. It 
continues the conversation about the worth given to color when society encourages its 
insignificance yet remains a contributing factor in marginalizing ethnic and racial groups 
on television. The current study therefore explores how seeing color as a source of 
difference—that is, being color-conscious—may encourage audiences not to dismiss the 
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negative televisibility of ethnoracial groups, and in so doing, a colored televisuality gets 
formed or maintained.  
In matters regarding media, seeing and talking about color may very be the 
product of one’s ethnoracial membership, particularly if one belongs to a stigmatized, 
marginalized, or oppressed group (Bobo, 1995; Mok, 1998; Rockler, 2002). While it is 
common for audiences to talk about ethnicity and race in their discussions of media, these 
conversations are intensified if media portrayals directly implicate the ingroup (Cooper, 
1998; Moody, 2014; Rojas & Piñon, 2016). Before addressing the role of ethnoracial 
attitudes, we must first ask the question:  
RQ1: Is the onscreen marginality of (a) Whites, (b) Blacks, (c) Latin@s, and (d) 
Asians the product of ethnoracial membership?  
 
Color-consciousness has two dimensions: color-awareness, which is based on 
multiculturalism (Neville et al., 2013); and (2) power-awareness, which is the reflection, 
motivation, and action to act upon racial inequalities (Diemer et al., 2015). It can be 
expected that ethnoracial minorities are more likely than the majority in expressing these 
ethnic/racial attitudes, but are these good predictors for observing ethnoracial marginality 
on television? If so, whose and what type? It is typical for media studies about audiences 
to focus how an ethnoracial group reacts to the images of their ingroup (for instance, 
Latin@s on Latin@s) or one outgroup (for instance, Whites on Blacks). It is less 
common for research to include several ethnic groups in their analysis, thus it would 
difficult to hypothesize patterns. For this reason, another research question is asked:   
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RQ2: How does color-consciousness—specifically, (a) color-awareness and (b) 
power-awareness—relate to the onscreen/television marginality of (1) whites, (2) 





The same data set was used as in Study 1 (see Methods section). Table 1 has 
pertinent demographic information of the current sample of Millennials, but to re-cap, 
most were women, born in Texas, some variation of a Democrat, middle-class, and were 
almost equally distributed into a White or non-White ethnoracial minority.  
 
MEASURES 
Unless otherwise stated, all items were randomized and used 7-point Likert-scales 
of agreement (1 = Strongly Agree, 7 = Strongly Disagree) or frequency (1 = Never, 7 = 
Always). Measures were meant to capture respondents’ perception on various forms of 
ethnoracial prototypicality on television, why they watch television, and their attitudes 
about recognizing color. Complete measures can be found in the Appendix.  
 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Here, onscreen marginality is believed to be the product of three typical 
characterizations enveloping ethnoracial minorities in the media: criminality, decorative 
roles, or sexuality (Gray, 2004; Larson, 2006; Ono & Pham, 2009; Valdivia, 2010). 
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Participants were instructed to consider both women/men in their assessment of how 
certain adjectives that typify four ethnoracial groups in entertainment television: (1) 
Whites, (2) Latin@s, (3) Blacks, and (4) East/South Asians. Before given a list of 
adjectives, respondents were asked “Think of the ‘typical’ depiction of an ethnoracial 
group on entertainment television, and then select the frequency to which they are 
depicted with these attributes: _____.”  
Criminal prototypicality. Mastro and Kopacz’s (2006) Criminality Scale assesses 
perceptions of media criminality through four adjectives: (a) violent, (b) criminal, (c) 
dealing drugs, and (d) using drugs. 
Decorative role prototypicality. Media has historically included ethnoracial 
minorities in peripheral roles (Larson, 2006; Merskin, 2011). They are non-essential 
characters, or at best, secondary characters in narratives or major storylines. Their 
narrative space is that of filler or un-realized characters according to narrative theory 
(Bal, 2009). With this said, these five adjectives encapsulate the perceived decorative 
narrative state of ethnoracial groups on television: (a) occasional character, (b) one-
dimensional, (c) supporting character, (d) background character, and (e) stock character. 
Sexuality prototypicality. Content analytic work has found that sexy attire (e.g., 
skin-tight or revealing clothing), nudity (either partial or complete), and physicality 
contribute to the sexualization of (wo)men in the media, with women more likely 
sexualized than men on television and film (Smith, Choueiti, & Pieper, 2014, 2016). 
Moreover, scholars have argued that the masculinities and femininities of ethnoracial 
minority (wo)men are particularly racialized, accentuating their bodies as lustful, 
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desirable, and seductive (Bounds Littlefield, 2008; hooks, 1992; Ramirez-Berg, 2002). 
Borrowing from this literature on the media images of (wo)men and ethnorace, four 
gender-neutral traits attempted to encapsulate the perceived sexuality prototypicality of 
ethnoracial groups: (a) sexy body (desirable physique), (b) sexual, (c) seductive, and (d) 
skin-tight clothing. 
Four separate principal component analyses (with a Varimax rotation) were 
conducted to ensure the selected adjectives encompassed three separate types of onscreen 
marginality for each ethnoracial group. The individual statistical tests all yielded a three-
factor solution, hence validating three distinct forms of onscreen marginality. This meant 
that all items loaded into their expected category and were coherent across ethnoracial 
groups, including the ones designed for this study. Sexuality or decorative role 
prototypicality demonstrated high levels of internal reliability too. The Cronbach’s alpha 
for sexuality prototypicality across ethnoracial groups ranged from 0.93 to 0.95, while 
those for decorative role prototypicality were between 0.82 and 0.89. Tables 8 through 11 
contain these statistical results as well as any pertinent information: means, standard 
deviations, and Cronbach’s alpha. 
The onscreen marginality of each ethnoracial group varied in what explained the 
most/least factor variability. While criminal prototypicality explained the most variance 
for Blacks on television, it was the least for Whites and Asians. Sexuality prototypicality 
was the top factor solution for all ethnoracial groups except for Blacks. Decorative role 
prototypicality explained the least variance for Latin@s and Blacks.  
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Table 8. Principal Component Analysis of Onscreen Marginality for Whites 
 Sexuality Decorative Criminality M SD 
Sexual .93   4.44 1.13 
Seductive .93   4.38 1.12 
Sexy body .86   4.64 1.16 
Skin-tight clothing .84   4.37 1.12 
Occasional character  .82  3.92 1.39 
Background character  .79  3.83 1.35 
Supporting character  .75  4.28 1.25 
Stock character  .72  4.04 1.41 
One-dimensional  .70  3.71 1.28 
Criminal   .86 3.40 0.98 
Dealing drugs   .84 3.13 0.99 
Using drugs   .78 3.53 1.04 
Violent   .74 3.57 1.01 
Eigen value 4.95 2.35 1.79   
Variance explained 38.09% 18.09% 13.80%   
Cronbach’s alpha (α) 0.93 0.83 0.85   
M 4.46 3.95 3.41   
SD 1.03 1.03 0.83   
 
Table 9. Principal Component Analysis of Onscreen Marginality for Latin@s 
 Sexuality Criminality Decorative M SD 
Seductive .90   4.62 1.23 
Sexual .90   4.68 1.23 
Sexy body .90   4.69 1.24 
Skin-tight clothing .83   4.51 1.23 
Dealing drugs  .90  4.79 1.13 
Criminal  .87  4.74 1.08 
Using drugs  .85  4.65 1.15 
Violent  .83  4.61 1.10 
Background character   .78 4.42 1.15 
Occasional character   .76 4.25 1.14 
Supporting character   .71 4.14 1.12 
Stock character   .70 4.11 1.19 
One-dimensional    .65 4.34 1.19 
Eigen value 6.56 1.73 1.55   
Variance explained 50.48% 13.33% 11.88%   
Cronbach’s alpha (α) 0.95 0.94 0.82   
M 4.63 4.70 4.25   
SD 1.15 1.02 0.88   
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Table 10. Principal Component Analysis of Onscreen Marginality for Blacks 
 Criminality Sexuality Decorative M SD 
Dealing drugs .91   4.83 1.14 
Criminal .91   4.95 1.11 
Using drugs .90   4.80 1.17 
Violent .86   4.95 1.08 
Seductive  .93  3.90 1.14 
Sexual  .91  3.96 1.13 
Sexy body  .89  4.00 1.15 
Skin-tight clothing  .83  3.84 1.18 
Background character   .83 4.43 1.15 
Stock character   .79 4.10 1.15 
Occasional character   .77 4.25 1.06 
Supporting character   .76 4.35 1.16 
One-dimensional   .66 4.22 1.16 
Eigen value 5.91 2.33 1.75   
Variance explained 45.48% 17.92% 13.43%   
Cronbach’s alpha (α) 0.95 0.93 0.85   
M 4.88 3.92 4.28   
SD 1.05 1.05 0.90   
 
Table 11. Principal Component Analysis of Onscreen Marginality for Asians 
 Sexuality Decorative Criminality M SD 
Seductive .94   2.98 1.19 
Sexual .92   2.99 1.21 
Sexy body .91   3.01 1.25 
Skin-tight clothing .85   3.02 1.20 
Background character  .88  4.10 1.33 
Occasional character  .85  3.97 1.29 
Supporting character  .85  3.94 1.31 
Stock character  .80  3.87 1.32 
One-dimensional  .77  4.09 1.37 
Criminal   .89 2.88 1.19 
Dealing drugs   .88 2.64 1.16 
Using drugs   .84 2.59 1.14 
Violent   .81 2.88 1.20 
Eigen value 5.27 3.24 1.68   
Variance explained 40.50% 24.95% 12.91%   
Cronbach’s alpha (α) 0.95 0.89 0.91   
M 3.74 4.00 2.75   
SD 1.42 1.10 1.04   
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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Ethnoracial group membership. Not enough ethnoracial minorities participated in 
the study for proper intergroup comparisons. To ensure that ethnorace had enough 
statistical power, ethnoracial groups were dichotomized and dummy coded into members 
of the White majority (1) or the non- minority White (0). See Table 1 for ethnoracial 
group composition.   
Color-consciousness. Color-consciousness stands in direct contrast to color 
blindness and is speculated to possess two opposite dimensions (see Figure 1): color 
awareness and power-awareness. Operating at the interpersonal level, color awareness 
recognizes color as an important means of intergroup distinction and recognizes that 
one’s ethnic/racial group exists and has its own entity (see Chapter 1). For this reason, 
multiculturalism best captures this notion and stands as alternative perspective to color-
evasion colorblindness (Nevielle et al., 2013). Rosenthal and Levy’s (2012) 5-item 
measure of multiculturalism was used in this study to stand in for color awareness racial 
consciousness. Sample items include: “All cultures have their own distinct traditions and 
perspectives,” and “Each racial and ethnic group has important distinguishing features.” 
The measure was highly reliable (α = 0.90; M = 2.56, SD = 1.07). Appendix D has the 
five items.  
Power-awareness racial-consciousness could be treated as a critical cognizance 
about how race and ethnicity inform social status and opportunity, biasing socio-cultural 
attitudes and benefits to certain ethnoracial groups (Bell, 2016; Jones, 2016; Neville et 
al., 2013; Squires, 2014; Suzette et al., 2016). Diemer et al. (2015) find that critical 
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consciousness has three interrelated domains: critical reflection, critical motivation, and 
critical action or activism – all which are concerned with marginality and oppression. 
This dissertation adapted the Critical Consciousness Scale (Diemer et al., 2015) and 
specified it to race and ethnicity so a measure of color consciousness could be 
established. The critical reflection subscale (8 items) establishes how people read and see 
their experienced in an ethnoracially stratified social world. The critical motivation (7 
items) assesses the agency one feels possess in changing injustices and inequalities due to 
race and ethnicity. Lastly, critical action (9 items) is a behavioral measure that considers 
the commitment that people have in changing ethnoracial inequalities and injustices. 
Sample items include: “Certain racial or ethnic groups have fewer chances to get good 
jobs” (Critical Ethnoracial Reflection Subscale) (α = 0.79); “I am motivated to try to end 
racism and discrimination” (Critical Ethnoracial Motivation Subscale) (α = 0.93); “I 
contacted a public official by phone, mail, or email to tell him or her how you felt about a 
ethnic or racial issue” (Critical Ethnoracial Action Subscale) (α = 0.85). The 24 items 
worked as one-single measure of power awareness racial consciousness (α = 0.87; M = 
5.18, SD = 0.67). Appendix E has all items 
 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Demographics. The television/media depictions of ethnoracial groups are also 
gendered (Molina-Guzmán, 2010), and as such, gender is a factor in how these portrayals 
are interpreted (Bobo, 1995; Rojas, 2004; Press, 1991). Social position can capture 
marginality, particularly if people feel outside the mainstream for not possessing the 
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resources needed to be part of it. Millennials who see themselves in the fringes of 
society—whether it is at the expense of gender, social class, and/or ethnicity/race—may 
be more cognizant about negative ethnoracial portrayals on television (Rockler, 2002; 
hooks, 1992; Press, 1991). 
Television experience. The television experience of Millennials was evaluated in 
three ways: (1) television consumption; (2) ethnoracial-oriented gratifications satisfied 
through television; and (3) knowledge of television practices and media in general.  
Television viewership. Watching more television may increase audiences’ 
opportunities of noticing the manners in which social groups are portrayed (Rivadeneyra, 
2006), and as such, television consumption should be added as a control variable.  
Ethnoracial television gratifications. Scholars (hooks, 1992; Valdivia, 1998) have 
theorized about what pleasure is derived from media texts through an audience 
positionality of gender and/or ethnic/racial; the assumption is that marginalized people 
strategize, negotiate, or reimage those images that are psychologically and ideologically 
destructive to their sense of self. Some audience studies have examined how ethnoracial 
minority group skip/select television content based on its satisfaction of ethnic/racial 
identity needs and/or cultural maintenance (Abrams Giles, 2007, 2009; Rios & Gaines, 
1998). If television satisfies social identity gratifications based on ethnorace, then it is 
likely that Millennials feel comfortable with what television offers them and perhaps 
ignore those negative portrayals that exist of ethnoracial groups. To test this assumption, 
participants completed an amended 8-item Social Identity Gratifications Scale (Harwood, 
1999) that centered ethnic and racial gratifications. Specifically, they were asked whether 
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they liked to watch television “to see people of my own ethnic and racial background 
with whom I can identify” or “to learn more about people from my own ethnic and racial 
background.” The composite measure was reliable here (α = 0.95; M = 4.51, SD = 1.47).   
Appendix F has all eight items 
Media/television literacy. Knowing how media operates could foster a 
consciousness about what narratives, images, or myths sustain it and the social 
hierarchies the medium supports (Scharrer & Ramasubramanian, 2015; Vargas, 2009). 
Media literacy is therefore an important component in seeing the onscreen marginality of 
certain or most ethnoracial groups. Besides, since data was collected from media-oriented 
courses, taking television/media literacy into account controls for the potential 
knowledge participants gained from discussing media critically, including media images 
of ethnoracial groups. Participants completed the 13-item, Media and Television Literacy 
Levels Scale (Korkmaz & Yesil, 2011). Sample items include: (1) “I think media works 
for the benefit of some people and excludes some others;” (2) “I know the characteristics 
of TV channels in our country and the factors determining their broadcasting policies;” 
and (3) “I question who benefits from the media and who is excluded and why.” Scores 
were averaged together and were found to be a reliable measure of media/television 
literacy (α = 0.91; M = 5.00, SD = 0.85). Appendix G has all 13 items 
 
RESULTS 
Prior to any former analyses, the general associations among main variables were 
examined through Pearson correlations. Table 12 has the correlations. It is important to 
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first discuss the associations that onscreen marginality had across its forms. The positive 
correlations between forms and within ethnoracial groups suggests that onscreen 
marginality is deeply inter-connected, and noticing one type leads to perceiving the rest 
regardless of who these portrayals belongs to.   
Because the first research question of this study is interested in the ethnoracial 
group membership of Millennials and the perceived onscreen marginality of ethnoracial 
groups, most of the group differences were observed with perceived criminality. 
Specifically, White Millennials are associated with high scores of perceived White (r = 
.09, p < .05) or Asian criminality (r = .09, p < .05), while non-White Millennials are more 
likely to observe that of Latin@s (r = -.16, p < .001) or Blacks (r = -.16, p < .001). One 
other group difference among surveyed Millennials was observed, which was with 
sexuality of Whites on television where non-Whites had higher perceptions of it (r = -.09, 
p < .05). Other than this Millennials had a homogenous perception regarding perceived 
onscreen marginality regardless of ethnoracial group.  
The second research question was interested in color-consciousness and its 
relationship to perceived onscreen marginality. What can be observed from the 
correlation analysis is that these relationships tend to be negative between color-
awareness and onscreen marginality and negative for power-awareness and onscreen 
marginality. These relationships are mostly weak though. Furthermore, no demographic 
differences were observed, which only tells us that the sample of Millennials was 
homogenous in their color-conscious orientations regardless of their ethnoracial 
membership, gender, or social standing.      
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Table 12. Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations between Study 2 Main Variables  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
(1) Ethnorace ( 1 = White) —          
(2) Gender (1 = Woman) .04 —         
(3) Subjective social status .34*** -.02 —        
(4) TV viewership .01 .13** -.03 —       
(5) Ethnoracial identity 
gratification  
-.32*** .16** -.12** -.18*** —      
(6) Media/TV literacy  .01 -.07 -.05 .10* -.09* —     
(7) W criminality  .09* -.08b -.09* .02 -.15** .07 —    
(8) L criminality  -.16*** .10* -.06 .00 .09* .28 *** .20*** —   
(9) B criminality  -.16*** .09* -.08a .03 .08a .33*** .09* .68*** —  
(10) A criminality  .09* -.06 -.07 .07 -.02 -.06 .35*** .04 -.08a — 
(11) W sexuality  -.09* .04 -.03 .02 -.00 .22*** .31*** .44*** .41*** .09* 
(12) L sexuality  -.03 .12** -.01 .02 -.04 .33*** .12** .49*** .47*** .03 
(13) B sexuality  -.08b .14** -.11* .06 .01 .23*** .19*** .34*** .36*** .17*** 
(14) A sexuality  .06 -.10* -.15*** -.02 -.03 .07b .30*** .07 -.03 .49*** 
(15) W decorative role .05 -.08b .04 .00 -.12* .11* .37*** .17*** .07b .15*** 
(16) L decorative role -.01 .10* -.03 .08b .00 .29*** .12** .50*** .49*** .07 
(17) B decorative role -.03 .08b -.09* .07 .01 .31*** .09* .36*** .47*** .07 
(18) A decorative role .05 .05 -.03 .11** .00 .27*** .05 .26*** .28*** .17*** 
(19) Color awareness  .07b -.07b -.04 -.04 -.09* -.22*** .13** -.16*** -.18*** .18*** 
(20) Power awareness -.03 .02 .07 .12** -.04 .41*** -.10* .25*** .27*** -.16*** 
Note: W = White Prototypicality, L = Latin@ Prototypicality, B = Black Prototypicality, A = Asian Prototypicality 








Table 12. Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations between Study 2 Main Variables (Cont’d) 
 (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
(1) Ethnorace ( 1 = White)           
(2) Gender (1 = Woman)           
(3) Subjective social status           
(4) TV viewership           
(5) Ethnoracial identity gratification            
(6) Media/TV literacy            
(7) W criminality            
(8) L criminality            
(9) B criminality            
(10) A criminality            
(11) W sexuality  —          
(12) L sexuality  .35*** —         
(13) B sexuality  .30*** .43*** —        
(14) A sexuality  .18*** .15*** .28*** —       
(15) W decorative role .27*** .14** .14** .17*** —      
(16) L decorative role .29*** .49*** .30*** .05 .03 —     
(17) B decorative role .28*** .37*** .31*** .02 .13** .64*** —    
(18) A decorative role .19*** .34*** .24*** .12*** .02 .58*** .63*** —   
(19) Color awareness  -.16*** -.15** -.00 .10* -.04 -.09* -.13** -.05 —  
(20) Power awareness .17*** .23*** .17*** -.04 .10* .18*** .27*** .21*** -.31*** — 
Note: W = White Prototypicality, L = Latin@ Prototypicality, B = Black Prototypicality, A = Asian Prototypicality 
***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, ap ≤ .06, bp ≤ .10 
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The statistical relevance of each predictor on onscreen marginality was examined 
through individual hierarchical linear regressions. Demographic information was entered 
in block 1 (step 1), followed by media experience (step 2), and lastly by color-
consciousness (step 3). Table 13 summarizes the four separate regression models for 
criminality televisual prototypicality; one for each ethnoracial group. Table 14 and Table 
15 also summarize the regression results for sexuality and decorative prototypicality 
respectively.    
 
Table 13. Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Predictor Variables of Criminal 
Prototypicality (N = 495) 
 Criminality Prototypicality 
 White Latin@ Black Asian 
 β β Β β 
Block 1: Demographics     
Ethnorace .09b -.14** -.12* .11* 
Gender -.04 .13** .12** -.05 
Subjective Social Position -.13** -.00 -.04 -.08b 
ΔR2 3.5%*** 3.5%** 3.1%** 2.2%* 
Block 2: Media Experience      
Television Viewership -.01 -.06 -.02 -.03 
Ethnoracial Identity Gratification -.14** .03 .03 -.01 
Media Literacy .11* .23*** .27*** -.01 
ΔR2 2.1%* 8.7%*** 11.3%*** 0.8% 
Block 3: Color Consciousness      
Color Awareness .10* -.04 -.05 .15** 
Power Awareness -.10* .14** .13** -.10* 
ΔR2 2.1%** 2.0%** 2.1%** 3.3%*** 
R2 7.7% 14.2% 15.0% 6.3% 
df (8, 487) (8, 486) (8, 487) (8, 491) 
Final F 5.07*** 10.02*** 11.92*** 4.15*** 









Table 14. Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Predictor Variables of Sexuality 
Prototypicality (N = 497) 
 Sexuality Prototypicality  
 White Latin@ Black Asian 
 β β β β 
Block 1: Demographics     
Ethnorace (1 = White) -.09a -.06 -.04 .13** 
Gender (1 = women) .08a .15** .17*** -.10** 
Subjective Social Position -.02 .00 -.11* .17*** 
ΔR2 1.1% 1.5%a 3.7%*** 4.4%*** 
Block 2: Media Experience      
Television Viewership -.01 -.05 -.00 .00 
Ethnoracial Identity Gratification -.07 -.06 -.01 .01 
Media Literacy .17** .30*** .21*** .06 
ΔR2 1.5%* 1.2%* 1.2%* 0.7% 
Block 3: Color Consciousness      
Color Awareness -.09* -.05 .08b .08 
Power Awareness .08 .10* .11* -.02 
ΔR2 5.2%*** 12.5%*** 5.6%*** 0.1% 
R2 7.8% 15.2% 10.5% 5.2% 
df (8, 489) (8, 488) (8, 489) (8, 488) 
Final F 5.16*** 10.91*** 7.18*** 3.36** 
Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p ≤ .05 
 
  







Table 15. Hierarchical Regression Analysis Summary for Predictor Variables of 
Decorative Role Prototypicality (N = 491) 
 Decorative Prototypicality 
 White Latin@ Black Asian 
 β Β β β 
Block 1: Demographics     
Ethnorace .04 -.04 -.01 .05 
Gender -.08b .10* -08b .02 
Subjective Social Position -.01 .02 -.09* -.01 
ΔR2 1.3%b 0.9% 1.5%b 0.2% 
Block 2: Media Experience      
Television Viewership -.04 .04 .02 .09* 
Ethnoracial Identity Gratification -.09b .01 .03 .07 
Media Literacy .10* .26*** .24*** .21*** 
ΔR2 2.2%* 8.9%*** 9.9%*** 8.0%*** 
Block 3: Color Consciousness      
Color Awareness -.02 -.01 -.03 .03 
Power Awareness .06 .08b .17** .14** 
ΔR2 0.4% 0.6% 2.5%*** 1.6%* 
R2 3.9% 10.3% 13.8% 9.8% 
df (8, 483) (8, 482) (8, 479) (8, 479) 
Final F 2.42* 6.93*** 9.62*** 6.48*** 
Note: ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p ≤ .05 
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RQ1: ETHNORACIAL MEMBERSHIP AND ONSCREEN MARGINALITY  
The first research question asked if ethnoracial groups would differ in noticing 
onscreen marginality. Ethnorace was still a significant predictor of criminality and 
sexuality prototypicality but not of decorative role prototypicality, and these relationships 
existed after entering other relevant predictors into the regression models. The White 
ethnoracial majority was more likely to notice the perceived criminal (β = .11, p < .05) or 
sexuality prototypicality of Asians (β = .13, p < .01) than were Millennials who self-
identified as ethnoracial minorities. Post-hoc independent sample t-tests only support the 
latter observation, with White Millennials (M = 2.85, SD = 0.99) scoring higher than non-
Whites (M = 2.65, SD = 1.08) in their observations of Asian criminality, t(530) = 2.16, p 
= .03. Conversely, ethnoracial minority Millennials were more likely to notice the 
perceived criminal prototypicality of Blacks (β = -.12, p < .05) or Latin@s (β = -.14, p < 
.01) than were members of the White ethnoracial majority. Post-hoc independent t-tests 
provide further support this assumption. One t-test revealed that White Millennials (M = 
4.53, SD = 0.95) scored lower in perceiving criminal portrayals of Latin@s than non-
White Millennials (M = 4.86, SD = 1.06), t(524) = -3.72 p < .001. Similar patters were 
observed with the perceived criminal portrayals of Blacks, t(516.87) = -3.64 p < .001, 
with White Millennials (M = 4.71 , SD = 0.90)  scoring lower than non-Whites (M = 5.03, 
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RQ2: COLOR-CONSCIOUSNESS ON ONSCREEN MARGINALITY 
The second research question was interested in understanding the statistical 
associations between color-consciousness and onscreen marginality. Across the 
regression models, either color-awareness or power-awareness tended to exclusively 
predict a given type of onscreen marginality for a particular ethnoracial group. There 
were two occasions in which both dimensions of color-consciousness predicted the same 
television prototypicality but in opposite directions. This was the case with the criminal 
prototypicality of Asians and Whites, where the association was positive for color-
awareness but negative for power-awareness. So, Millennials who tended to emphasize 
ethnoracial group differences—in the spirit of multiculturalism—are more likely to 
observe Whites (β = .10, p < .05) or Asians being criminal-like on television (β = .15, p < 
.01). In contrast, Millennials who are analytical about ethnic/race in society are least 
likely to notice these same portrayals. No other double predictions of onscreen 
marginality were observed. The next two paragraphs will center on results of each 
dimension of color-consciousness on screen marginality, starting with power-aware 
racial-consciousness as it had the most predictions.     
Ethnoracial attitudes relating to power-awareness predicted onscreen marginality 
in more occasions than did color-awareness. Power-aware racial-consciousness is about 
being reflective, critical, and action-oriented on matters of structures and institutional 
ethnic/racial inequalities, and the more Millennials here adopted this orientation, the 
more likely they were to notice onscreen marginality. This was the case for perceiving 
criminality of Latin@s (β = .14, p < .01) or Blacks (β = .13, p < .01), or the perceiving 
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Asians (β = .14, p < .01) or Blacks (β = .17, p < .01) in decorative roles, and even the 
perceived sexuality of Latin@s (β = .10, p < .05) or Blacks (β = .11, p < .05). Based on 
these patterns, it was observed that power-aware color-consciousness consistently 
predicted the onscreen marginality of Blacks across its three negative portrayals and was 
the least likely to predict that of Asians.  
Color awareness was just significantly associated with one sexuality 
prototypicality, that of Whites. Millennials who tended to stress ethnoracial distinctions 
were least likely to notice sultry White characters on television (β = -.09, p ≤ .05). This 
relationship is important in at least two ways. First, it was the only negative association 
that existed through color awareness with onscreen marginality, and secondly, its 
association to Whiteness also merits attention. Their implications on color onscreen will 
be elaborated in the upcoming discussion section.    
 
PREDICTIVE POWER OF COLOR-CONSCIOUSNESS ON ONSCREEN 
MARGINALITY  
The statistical correlations between color-consciousness and onscreen marginality 
suggest a shared connection. However, we should be careful from exaggerating their 
relationship. Even if the reviewed literature and data here suggest a casual link, we 
cannot establish any causal link given the cross-sectional nature of the data. In addition, 
upon closer examination of the 12 hierarchical regression models, the total variance of all 
predictors ranged from 3.9% to 15.2%. The individual contribution of color-
consciousness was as low as 0.1% to as high as 12.5%. These results restrict the 
   
 106 
inferences and generalizations that can be made about the significance of color-
consciousness in seeing color on television.     
 
TELEVISION EXPERIENCE ON ONSCREEN MARGINALITY 
Out of the television experience variables controlled in this study, 
media/television literacy was the most successful, significant predictor of onscreen 
marginality. It positively predicted all forms of onscreen marginality for Whites, 
Latin@s, and Blacks, but was only statistically significant for perceptions of Asians in 
decorative roles (β = .21, p < .001). Such patterns suggest that participants’ knowledge 
about how media/television works (e.g., framings of issues, biased medium, rating 
systems) enables them to notice when ethnoracial groups embody qualities that are 
arguably detrimental to their social image. The fact that media/television literacy was less 
consistent in predicting the perceived onscreen marginality of Asians than its fellow 
ethnoracial groups invites further question that can only be speculated here: Is it because 
their symbolic marginality is often not included in media discussions? Does their 
onscreen marginality not measure up to that of other ethnoracial minorities?  
The other two television-oriented control variables had one statistically significant 
prediction each. Watching less television (across several genres) lead to perceiving 
Asians in more decorative roles (β = .09, p < .05). Those watched television to gratify 
identity needs relating to one’s ethnorace (for instance, seeing people similar to them 
ethnically/racially) tended to perceiving Whites being criminal-like the least (β = -.14, p 
< .01). No other statistically significant associations were observed for television 
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consumption and ethnoracial gratifications on onscreen marginality across the regression 
models, which seems to suggest that other predictors drove the statistical relationships.    
 
DEMOGRAPHICS ON ONSCREEN MARGINALITY 
Participants’ gender and subjective social position were also statistically 
significant in seeing onscreen marginality. It appears that women pay attention to (or 
seem to remember) the marginal televisual characterizations of ethnoracial minorities, 
since they were more likely to notice Latin@ (β = .15, p < .01) or Black sexuality (β = 
.17, p < .001), as well as the criminal prototypicality of Latin@s (β = .13, p < .01) or 
Blacks (β = .12, p < .01), and the decorative roles of Asians (β = .10, p < .05) than men. 
Men, nevertheless, were more likely than women to notice Asian sexuality on television 
(β = -.10, p < .01). Those who tended to see themselves as better off in society were least 
likely to notice Black sexuality (β = -.11, p < .05) or their decorative roles (β = -.09, p < 
.05), or even White criminality (β = -.13, p < .01) yet were the most likely to see Asian 
sexuality  (β = .10, p < .05) compared to other Millennials who ranked themselves lower 
or less well off in society.  
 
DISCUSSION 
This study explored the possibility of young Millennials being an active audience 
of color by examining how their color-conscious attitudes (statistically) related to 
common negative portrayals of ethnoracial groups on television. The argument was that 
the symbolic and marginal treatment of ethnoracial minorities in the media is difficult to 
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forget and evade. So, the recognition that ethnicity/race mattered in society and inter-
personal relationship (that is, being color-conscious) would help television audiences 
notice the onscreen marginality of ethnoracial groups. The statistical results and findings 
from the current study offer support for this argument. Generally, the more young 
(educated) Millennials tended to perceive the onscreen marginality of ethnoracial groups 
(mostly that of minorities), the more they endorsed a power-awareness orientation to 
color. That is to say, the more participants were critical, motivated, or acted upon 
structural and social inequalities at the expense of ethnorace, they were also likely to 
notice how ethnoracial groups are marginalized in symbolic contexts like television. An 
awareness of onscreen marginality was not only dependent on color attitudes but also on 
demographic factors like participants’ gender or ethnoracial membership. What was 
found in this study thus contradicts post-raciality, or at least tells us to reconsider what 
the “post-“ means.  The following section will discuss these points. 
 
COLOR-CONSCIOUSNESS AND ONSCREEN MARGINALITY          
Seeing color (or being ethnoracially conscious) may encourage audiences to 
notice the marginal representations that envelop ethnoracial groups on television but not 
in similar ways. Perceived White marginality tended to correlate negatively with color-
consciousness, when this relationship was mostly positive for the prototypicality of 
ethnoracial minorities. Such opposite patterns suggest that negative mediated Whiteness 
(or its televisuality) is ambivalent for Millennials, while those of ethnoracial minorities 
tends to be strictly marginal. Specifically, color awareness and power predicted perceived 
   
 109 
White criminality in opposite directions. This disagreement is perhaps due to audiences 
not knowing how to interpret the criminality of Whites. With White anti-hero 
programming entering popular and mainstream culture, the narratives humanize and 
individualize the criminality of Whites (Wayne, 2014a, 2014b), whereas that of 
ethnoracial minorities is cultural and harder to conceive as self-less.  
It was also found the perceived sexuality of Whites was negatively related with 
color awareness. This observation could be due to the asexuality of Whites, whose bodies 
are not possessors of carnal desires unlike non-White (typically dark) bodies (Bounds 
Littlefield, 2008; hooks, 1992; Parreñas Schimizu, 2007). Therefore, those who tended to 
endorse multiculturalism were less likely to perceive the sexuality of White television 
characters, because it goes unnoticed with the recognition of more bodies.   
Millennials potentially hold negative mediated Blackness as the epitome of 
onscreen marginality. Power awareness was consistently and positively related to 
perceptions of Black sexuality, criminality, and role/decorative prototypicality, while 
such relationships were non- or only sporadically significant for White representations 
and other ethnoracial minorities. We must keep in mind that on television, Blacks are the 
only ethnoracial minority group that is arguably represented on television according to 
their US Census numbers (Hunt et al., 2015, 2016; Negrón-Muntaner et al., 2014; 
Signorielli, 2009; Tukachinsky et al., 2015). This televisibility, whether positive or 
negative, increases their probability of being present in viewers’ minds and media 
experience. Does this mean that the marginal representations of other ethnoracial groups 
do not measure up against those of Blacks? Such questions cannot be answered here. It 
   
 110 
does, however, call attention to the cultural production (and media construction) of 
marginality, and what ethnoracial identities and experiences are marked and marketed as 
authentic embodiments of oppression (Dávila, 2012; Gray, 2004; Molina-Guzmán, 
2010). The televisibility of Blacks is of concern to audiences, as evident in the findings in 
this chapter, but we should also pay attention to why the marginality of Latin@s and 
Asians did not predicted in a similar fashion across regression models.  
Even if (East & South) Asians are usually considered grossly underrepresented on 
television (Fitzpatrick, 2015; Tukachinsky et al., 2015), Millennials appear to notice 
them. Yet, this chapter found that watching less television lead to more awareness of 
Asians in decorative roles. On top of this already conflicted finding, color-awareness and 
power-evasion orientations predicted the perceived criminality of Asians in opposite 
directions. Socio-demographic factors, not Millennials’ color attitudes or their television 
experience, were most pertinent in predicting Asians’ perceived sexuality. What, then, 
can be made of these patterns about the perceived onscreen marginality of Asians? The 
inconsistency in audience patterns demonstrates the symbolic ambivalence that Asian 
have. Should we regard them as honorary Whites given their strong possession of cultural 
capital and achievements of social mobility (Ono & Pham, 2009), or are they like 
Latin@s or Blacks who typically suffer cultural racisms like being seen as lazy and 
generally incompetent (Valdivia, 2010)? It appears that audiences are still sorting out 
their symbolic affiliation to either mainstream or marginal culture. Statistical findings 
from this study are still helpful in pointing us what is important to look at when we study 
the images of Asians on television.  
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The television perceptions of Latin@s (like those of Blacks) were more consistent 
than those Asians or Whites. This tells us that the social imagination (or televisuality) of 
Latin@s in regards to marginality is grounded, visible, and definable. However, even if 
the images/myths about Latin@s are discernable, these may not overshadow those of 
Blacks. The criminal or sexuality prototypicality of Latin@s and Blacks had similar 
statistics (including directions of predictions), but this congruence was not observed on 
decorative role prototypicality. Because power-awareness or subjective social status 
predicted the perception of Blacks as narratively peripheral but not for Latin@s, it 
suggests that Blacks have the upper-hand in this marginality and perhaps on others as 
well.          
 
DEMOGRAPHICS AND ONSCREEN MARGINALITY  
There were gender differences in perceiving the televisual sexuality of Latin@s 
and Blacks, with women more likely in reporting this mediated marginality than men. 
Dark bodies are often sexualized and fetishized given their supposedly corporal richness 
(e.g., well-endowed physiques, exotic features), (uncontrollable) sexual appetites, as well 
as its physical aggression and endurance (Allison, 2016). Dark phenotypes thus become 
the objects of desire and fear both onscreen and offscreen (hooks, 1992). Observing that 
Latin@s and Blacks had a visible sexuality onscreen for study participants, it amplifies 
the socio-cultural significance placed on the conversations about how these bodies 
become commodities and the labor behind this cultural production (Molina-Guzmán, 
2010). Why would women notice their sexiness—one pertaining to ethnoracial 
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minorities—when compared to men? The answer perhaps lies in the objectification of 
women, and as a sexualized Other themselves, women are possibly performing like-me 
readings, thus being vigilant in issues regarding Otherized sexuality. Such an explanation 
still does not take into consideration the racialized readings of Latin@ and Black 
sexuality; in fact, it suggests that women in general set aside their ethnic and/or racial 
identity to identify with their sexuality. Scholars are thus encouraged to investigate this 
finding in an effort of clarifying the potential empathy and/or symbolic alliance.    
In most cases, one demographic factor—that is, gender, ethnicity, or subjective 
social class—tended to statistically outweigh the others in predicting onscreen 
marginality. There were, however, three instances in which gender and ethnicity—
although not combined4—predicted onscreen marginality. Non-whites tended to notice 
Latin@ and Black criminality onscreen more so than the White majority; women also had 
a similar pattern when compared to men. White Millennials, as well as men, tended to be 
aware of Asian sexuality on fictional television more than their counterparts.  
Such aforementioned patterns in turn reveal that: (1) audiences tend to shift 
between social (and personal) identities when interpreting/engaging with media; (2) 
salient social identities tend to correspond with the type of depiction examined. These 
patterns strongly align with the prepositions of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 
1986). Stereotype threat could too explain these findings. Ethnic or gender minorities 
perhaps saw Latin@ and Black criminality because they saw themselves implicated by 
                                                
4 The interaction effect of gender and ethnicity were tested by including the interaction term (gender x 
ethnicity) into the regression models of perceived Latin@ or Black criminal prototypicality as well as on 
Asian sexuality prototypicality. The three, post-hoc statistical tests observed no interaction effects between 
gender and ethnicity just their main effect.  
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these images. The same could be said about Whites and men with Asian sexuality, since  
Asians are the closest to White out of the ethnoracial minorities, therefore their deviance 
is threatening to the interests of the group. At the end of the day, whatever social image 
poses the most and immediate threat to media audiences, then that is the identity category 
that gets to be salient. Bringing forth this social identity (or identities) is done in effort of 
protecting or achieving a positive self-concept (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). 
Subjective social status—where one sees oneself in a social hierarchy—had few 
predictions compared to ethnicity or gender. Its rather large statistical insignificance 
across regression models might come from the demographic composition of the sample 
being university students. Media audience studies have documented the manners in which 
education served as a method of distinction and cultural taste (Moody, 2014; Morley, 
1992; Rojas, 2004; Wayne, 2016a, 2016b); yet, the current sample is in the midst of 
completing their post-secondary education, which is sure to boost their cultural and 
symbolic capital later. For those surveyed here, the modes of distinction are perhaps not 
in education (or cultural capital broadly), given their social status as students attending a 
top post-secondary institution in Texas. This is not to say that social class does not impact 
the self-perceptions of university students, as many face economic hardships, particularly 
ethnoracial minorities (Krogstad, 2016). Rather, the lack of statistical relationships 
between subjective social status and ethnoracial marginality on television may indicate a 
distorted perception of class among students in their immediate social world, 
consequently shifting their focus to other discriminatory social identities.   
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Self-perceptions of social status/class were still related to particular types of 
ethnoracial marginality on television. Millennials who tended to rate themselves as better 
off in society had lower awareness of White criminality or saw Black role prototypicality 
the least. Contemporary images of the White anti-hero and his/her spectacular criminality 
may encourage well off Millennials into discrediting this deviance as not a really 
criminality, for it is benevolent. The same Millennials also reported low decorative 
Blackness—a surface representation that just adds color onscreen through peripheral 
roles in narratives. White criminality and Black in decorate roles are racialized depictions 
that depict social inequalities onscreen without really challenging racial and class 
hierarchies. What these images provide for well off Millennials is a safe and consumable 
class-based difference that does not threaten their positionality. 
The televisibility of White criminality and Whites as decorative characters may 
help Millennials find pleasure in their media experience, since ethnoracial television 
gratifications was positively related to them. Perhaps, knowing that White marginality 
exists onscreen provided some optimism that egalitarian representations of ethnoracial 
groups are coming. More support for this interpretation comes from the positive 
correlation between ethnoracial television gratifications and television exposure (r = .18, 
p < .001), which remains predominantly White (Hunt et al., 2015; Negrón-Muntaner et 
al., 2014; Tukachinsky et al., 2015). However, even if the television landscape is 
ethnoracially disproportionate and relies on ethnoracial stereotypes, watching television 
was not sufficient for Millennials to notice ethnoracial depictions. We must therefore turn 
to the media (dis)pleasures and frustrations (Bobo, 1995; hooks, 1992; Valdivia, 1998) 
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that Millennials face in this televisual milieu of post-raciality. With White marginality 
related to ethnoracial gratifications for Millennials, we examine what charm Whiteness 
has as an Othered state, especially if its presence is acknowledged.   
 
MEDIA/TELEVISION LITERACY AND ONSCREEN MARGINALITY  
Media/television literacy was related to ethnoracial marginality and inauspicious 
images of ethnoracial groups on fictional television. The fact that media/television 
literacy was not correlated to one single ethnoracial group or depiction type testifies to its 
potential in creating critically aware, media audiences and citizens (Lewis & Jhally, 
1998; Scharrer & Ramasubramanian, 2015; Vargas, 2009). We do not know the extent, to 
which media literacy reduces ethnic/racial stereotyping and bias, or whether media-
oriented knowledge, attitudes, or criticism are a product of long-term media education 
efforts or the short-term learning outcome from taking a media-specific class, or the 
degree to which these images are offensive to the participants. The study did not take 
these into consideration when creating its data collection artifact, but the correlation does 
document an active television audience that cautiously takes into consideration media 
meanings and practices that (re)produce oppression and privilege. 
Having some understanding about how media operates could potentially help 
those watching television keep a vigilant eye into how media favors one ethnoracial 
group over another, and what cultural and social implications arise from this mediated 
and symbolic inequality. The positive correlation between media literacy and power 
awareness (r = .41, p < .001) is perhaps indicative of this active audience practice, yet 
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more research is needed to see if ethnoracial groups hold equal valance to media 
audiences.    
Color-awareness and power-awareness, being modalities/shades of seeing color 
(Doane, 2014), could be treated as terministic screens of racial cognizance5 (for 
discussion, see Rockler, 2002). The reason being that how one sees color also molds what 
significance is placed on color. By teasing out these shades of color, we can begin 
specifying what frame of ethnoracial reference are audiences using to make-sense, 
decode, or read the color that they are experiencing onscreen. It is thus likely that 
audiences developed a media-specific terministic screen o seeing color. Some support can 
be found with the moderate to strong correlations that exist among media/television 
literacy, power-awareness color-consciousness, and the various forms of onscreen 




                                                
5 Terministic screens are interpretative frames, and being perception systems, they limit and direct our 
attention to certain relevant matters over others. The terministic screen of racial cognizance is a system of 
meaning where media audiences make privilege discourses about race and marginality.     
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CHAPTER 4.  Bringing it all together 
 
This dissertation attempted to understand the role of television reception practices 
in an audience segment framed under public discourse as colorblind – young (educated) 
Millennials. One guiding question was therefore: What is post-racial about Millennials, 
and how does entertainment television fit into this contemporary ethnoracial thinking?  
Chapters 2 and 3 each examined one competing and opposite ideology about race and 
ethnicity: color-blindness and color-consciousness. Chapter 2 studied the potential effect 
of colorblind television content, in the form of positive ethnoracial representations and 
involvement with programming featuring various degrees of ethnoracial diversity, on 
colorblind attitudes. Chapter 3 focused on color-consciousness and its potential in helping 
audiences notice negative representations of ethnoracial groups. Both chapters reveal the 
tension that Millennials experience in confronting the conflicted ideologies about race 
and racism, as well as their own optimism about what the future should be: one where 
ethnicity/race is absent but present in issues of ethnoracial inequalities. What was found 
in this dissertation thus contributes to the following media studies domains: (a) active 
audiences and cultural readers (Ang, 2001; Bobo, 1995; Morley, 2006); (b) politics of 
signification (Campbell 2016; Hall, 1997, 2011); and (c) the socialization of race(ism) 
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MILLENNIALS: AN ACTIVE AUDIENCE OF COLOR ON TELEVISION? 
How Millennials reacted to color onscreen, either by consuming programming or 
noticing is perceived televisibility through representations, provides some indication 
about their effort in recognizing symbolic privilege and marginality. Such a statement is 
problematic in several ways: (1) it essentializes the viewing experiences of Millennials as 
“the Millennial audience” (Baker, 2006), when group differences of perception and 
opinion exist with certain types of representations; (2) it does not offer much specificity 
about what constituted a negotiated or oppositional reading, or how and why these were 
produced (Ang, 2001); (3) it assumes a critical interrogation of ethnicity and race, when 
not all active audiences are critical readers (Roscoe, Marshall, & Gleeson, 1995). If 
anything, the audience patterns observed in this dissertation offer an indication that 
Millennials are negotiating (at best) their own color meanings, as well as those provided 
by mainstream culture, and that these conflicted feelings and orientations trickle down to 
their television experiences of seeing/noticing color. Consequently, Millennials perform 
dominant, oppositional, and/or negotiated readings, as theorized by the 
encoding/decoding model (Hall, 2001b), that reflect the color orientations in hand. This is 
what was found in the two-individual studies carried in this dissertation.  
To summarize, Chapter 2 observed that watching multicultural television 
programming predicted an endorsement of power-evasive colorblindness, while 
exceptional portrayals of Blacks did too but in the opposite direction. Millennials’ 
arguably reinforce colorblind attitudes in their viewing television practices that reflects 
color neutrality and inclusion –  a dominant reading with color-blindness. Yet, they also 
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tend to reject it (therefore, an oppositional reading), when Blacks on television are 
perceived to embody the values of mainstream culture (e.g., intelligent, familistic, rich). 
The negative association was speculated to be a product of the widely communicated 
violence toward Black bodies (e.g., police brutality).   
 Chapter 3 found that color-consciousness typically leads to noticing the 
perceived onscreen marginality of ethnoracial groups, but not always in the expected 
direction. In this case, Millennials’ orientation of being aware of color as means of 
distinction and its presence in structural or institutional inequalities is in accordance of 
noticing the symbolic mistreatment of ethnoracial minorities – a dominant reading with 
color-consciousness. Since negative associations existed between color-consciousness 
and onscreen marginality, these can be generally regarded as negotiated or oppositional 
readings of televisual color depending on whose color (i.e., ethnoracial group) and what 
shade is being examined (e.g., criminality, sexuality, decorative roles).  
Perhaps is best to consider the audience sample of Millennials in this dissertation 
as “active within structures” (Cooper & Tang, 2009, p. 415). It recognizes that media 
audiences are not always active and that structural and power constraints exist, which 
limit their interpretation of cultural texts. Other interpretive constraints are also imposed 
by their social identities and their intersectionality (Bobo, 1995; Morley, 2006; Press, 
1991), which helps audiences determine the valence of content and what these mean to 
their self-concept. The primary interest of this study was to examine orientations of 
seeing color and how these pose as ideological constraints for Millennials in their 
interactions with television.  Based on the combined and individual findings of Chapters 
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2 and 3, Millennials are indeed (mostly) bounded to the cultural terrain that tells them to 
see and recognize color only if its an apolitical social identity (Bobo, 2011; Hollinger, 
2011; Nayak, 2006; Powell, 2008). However, they contradict it too, as it was discussed 
above. Discussing how the color orientations are associated with each other helps clarify 
the manners by which Millennials reproduce and oppose popular attitudes about 
ethnorace. Figure 2 summarizes the statistical correlations between color-blindness and 
color-consciousness and their sub-dimensions or shades.  
 
Figure 2. Correlations between color-blindness and color-
consciousness and their shades; ***p < .001  
 
As can be expected, color-evasion and power-evasion had a positive correlation, 
suggesting a uniform attitude toward dismissing color. The same positive correlation was 
expected from color-awareness and power-awareness in order to suggest a mutual 
agreement in recognizing color. These, however, had a negative association, when the 
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literature proposed otherwise (Bell, 2016; Neville et al., 2013). Moreover, color-
blindness and color-consciousness (alongside their respective domains) were expected to 
have a negative correlation. This was evident only between color-evasion and color-
awareness but not between power-evasion and power-awareness, which had a positive 
relationship. It is in these divergences about seeing color where the attitudes struggles of 
Millennials are most noticeable.  
The strong and positive correlation between the power shades of colorblindness 
and color-consciousness is the most contradictory, since it suggest that high attitudes of 
dismissing how ethnorace structure social inequalities and opportunities are associated to 
a high orientation of reflecting, being motivated, and acting upon ethnoracial social 
disparities. On top of this already contradictory finding, it is ethnoracial minorities who 
were likely to be color-blind in its two shades (for correlations, see Table). Ethnoracial 
group differences in seeing color were usually statistically insignificant when other 
predictors were included into the regression models, thus pointing the relevance of other 
factors in matters of interest. The contradictions should be interpreted as an active and 
continuous struggle about what color means in social and cultural contexts, and television 
viewing practices that its meaning is highly contextual.     
 
REVISITING POST-RACIALITY: DISCURSIVE CONTRIBUTIONS  
 This dissertation relied on post-raciality to examine color inclusion/diversity on 
television through an audience account of seeing color (that is, the attitudes that 
Millennials hold toward ethnorace in personal and social relationships). While post-race 
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is yet to be grounded as a theory, it has, however, amassed a considerable conceptual and 
methodological interest across educational, psychological, and media studies disciplines, 
which in turn has formalized post-raciality as a guiding and contemporary framework in 
making-sense of race and ethnicity (Nayak, 2006; Nevielle et al., 2001, 2013; Sanada, 
2012; Squires, 2014). Post-race assumes the absence or race and racism from social and 
cultural realms. This is why a post-racial society is often conceived as a socio-cultural 
environment, mood, or condition that minimizes ethnorace from structuring inter-
personal difference and institutional biases and opportunities (Gallagher, 2003; Hollinger, 
2011; Pinder, 2015). Moreover, through post-raciality, scholars examine the absence-
presence of ethnorace and the subtle and often implicit forms that race(ism) takes today. 
Since racism is not observable, or reduced to the actions of bigots instead of the cultural 
product of society, then race can be taken out of the inequality equation. Such thinking 
about post-raciality, which often materializes into colorblindness (Bobo, 2011; Cho, 
2009), has been discussed as a discourse and ideology of distraction (Ono, 2010), 
ethnoracial amnesia (Squires, 2014), and in some instances, strategic ignorance (Sullivan 
& Tuana, 2007). When post-raciality shifts from theory to ideology, post-racialism is a 
more appropriate term (Cho, 2009), given its attention to discourses and cultural and 
symbolic practices that mute color perceptions. The contributions of this dissertation is 
first to post-raciality for it tested some of its assumptions on young (educated) 
Millennials. However, the colored meanings found in the televisibility of ethnoracial 
speaks more to post-racialism, given its emphasizes on televisuality (or how people 
pieced meanings) (Kaszynski, 2016).    
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 Even in symbolic settings that endorse colorblindness, color is not without 
meaning, and therefore, it cannot be (or at least tends not to be) neutral in value. Chapter 
2 explored the exceptional prototypicality of four ethnoracial groups on television—those 
representations that embody the values of mainstream culture—and how these related to 
colorblindness (RQ2). Chapter 3 explored how color-consciousness related to perceiving 
the onscreen marginality—televisual representations regarding sexuality, criminality, and 
supporting/background roles—of the same ethnoracial groups (RQ2). Overall study 
findings offer evidence to suggest that perceptions of color (here, code for ethnoracial 
groups) cluster in such a way that aligns with the social imaginary of ethnorace, or how 
ethnic/racial groups are generally defined in discourse.  
The depictions of Whites and Asians tended to have similar reception patterns, 
and those of Blacks and Latin@s usually paralleled each other. This arguably “White” 
and non-White dichotomy reveals the manners how perceptions of ethnoracial groups fit 
and recreate familiar power tropes: oppressor/oppressed, privilege/marginality, or 
aggressor/victim. And seeing that racialized meanings, it is difficult to image that color 
has no essence (i.e., it does not define characters on television or their identity politics; 
Vega, 2013), or that colors have equal symbolic weights, when these are still associated 
with historical frameworks of color. The problem is how color divisions are being created 
in the subtext (that is, symbolically) and become implicit, producing new forms of 
racisms away from overt and physical manifestations (Bonilla-Silva, 2013). If 
multicultural programming is associated with power-evasion colorblindness (see Table 
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7), then rainbow manifestations of color on television—that is, seeing an assortment of 
ethnoracial groups at peace—are arguably widening color divides for not recreating the 
features of classical racism. With media reducing race(ism) to a matter of personal 
responsibility/morality and as something in the past (Bonilla-Silva & Ashe, 2014; Shome, 
2000; Squires, 2014), color hierarchies remain uncontested and subtle, plus harder to be 
credited as biased or structural since color does not exist in isolation or excluded from 
television (Griffin, 2015). Its hues, however, are symbolically charged according to their 
embodiment of Whiteness or Blackness, as is further discussed below.   
 Seeing color is not a uniform construct and has an assortment of modalities, or as 
Doane (2014) would argue, shades (see Chapter 1). This means that color orientations 
compliment, intertwine, and contradict each other, thus producing malleable, fluid, and 
inter-dependent ideologies about race and/or ethnicity (Bonilla-Silva, 2013; Doane, 
2014). These shades (re)articulate media viewing practices in response to political 
challenges and social contexts, and as such, should be regarded as shifting subjectivities 
in audience studies like those of gender, ethnorace, and/or class (Bobo, 1995; Morley, 
1992; Press, 1991). They should be studied in relationship to the cultural texts in hand 
and what myths these prime. Given the panoramic and correlational nature of the two 
studies in this dissertation, it can only offer a broad sense about the relationship between 
color orientations and noticing color on television. Still, they were able to capture 
contradictions within and between color orientations that are worth clarifying in future 
research. Perhaps the most conflicting is the positive correlation between the power 
dimensions of color (see Figure 2), where high agreements of dismissing blatant racism, 
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institutional racism, and White privilege were also associated with high agreements of 
being reflective of, motivated to, and acting upon ethnoracial inequalities in society. The 
second contradiction is the negative relationship between color-awareness and power-
awareness, which suggests that endorsements of multiculturalism are associated with low 
agreements of being critical about the role of ethnorace in society. Could these 
contradictions be the product of political correctness, the conception of an alternative 
post-racial society, or some other post-society all together? Meaning, are the conflicted 
attitudes the result of Millennials suppressing/masking their feelings and experiencing 
with racism to move forward and achieve the promises of colorblindness (e.g., 
meritocracy, egalitarianism)? Or, are we at the midst of what Hollinger (2012) identifies 
as a post-ethnic society.6 The fact is that statistical disagreements were observed in the 
sample of Millennials, and to dismiss these simply as colorblind is not really taking to 
account the exceptions, non-static, or “loose character” of dominant ethnoracial 
ideologies (Bonilla-Silva, 2013).    
 
                                                
6 The correlational disagreement between color-awareness and power-awareness possibly 
captured post-ethnicity sentiments among Millennials. For Hollinger (1995, 2012), post-
ethnicity describes a conceivable society where people are free to choose ethnoracial 
communities instead of being ascribed one. This is possible thanks to the wider 
celebration of multiculturalism and the advocacy of inter-ethnoracial alliances, and with 
no dominant ethnoracial group in cultural affairs, cultural and social institutions are 
discouraged from selecting or limiting their attention to a crop of ethnoracial groups. And 
because people are not pressured to claim an ethnoracial group, people devote as much 
effort as they see fit to their ethnoracial identities.  
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SYMBOLIC COLOR INEQUALITY: OTHERING ACROSS ETHNORACIAL 
GROUPS 
The colorblind (TV) screen, even in its mantra of sameness Nilsen & Turner, 
2014), (re)creates ethnoracial symbolic divides. Out of all ethnoracial groups, White and 
Black prototypicality on television, whether positive (i.e., exceptional 
Whiteness/Blackness) or negative (i.e., Black/White criminality, Black/White sexuality, 
decorative Whiteness/Blackness), had the most significant correlations to either color-
blindness or color-consciousness. What is noteworthy is that mediated Whiteness and 
Blackness have a salient audience presence in matters concerning ethnicity and/or race, 
perhaps a result of the strong polarization of the social world into a Black-White domain. 
The perceived televisibility of Whites was, however, inconsistent, whereas that of Blacks 
was more stable among Millennial participants and exclusive to the power orientations of 
either color-blindness or color-consciousness.  
These audience observations are not surprising, considering the historical and 
continued symbolic treatment of Whites and Blacks in the media (Dyer, 1997; Entman & 
Rojecki, 2001; Griffin, 2015; Ortega & Feagin, 2016). Media representations of Whites 
are often diverse or not confined to one profession/emotion, are universal, and often 
represent the virtuous hero(ine) (Dyer, 1997; Griffin, 2015; Hughey, 2014) or even 
benevolent anti-heroes (Wayne 2014a, 2014b). Conversely, the media images of 
ethnoracial minorities rely more on cultural racisms (for example, the lazy Black, the 
abusive welfare Queen), which in turn affect whether audiences desire to identify with 
their mediated representations (hooks, 1992; Mok, 1998; Rojas, 2004; Rojas & Piñon, 
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2016). While these images are not new (Entman & Rojecki, 2001; Iniss & Feagin, 1995; 
Jhally & Lewis, 1992), what is important to highlight is how these images work as a 
function of Othering Blackness and Whiteness in the presence of post-racialism. Put 
differently, what is the televisuality of post-race, or how do these images remain race-
coded (or raced) and what symbolic value do these contribute to race talk in the supposed 
invisibility and minimization of race(ism) (Bonilla-Silva, 2010; Myers, 2005)?  
Arguably, post-racialism makes Whiteness visible, and marginalizes it, in order to 
approximate the representations of those it Others and to make it seem symbolically 
egalitarian. Shome (2000) argues that any challenge to Whiteness results in its strategic 
exposure, often that of Othering itself. This means that Whiteness vilifies itself so it can 
appear in order to not call too much attention to its true form and goals. In the case of 
colorblindness, it showcases White racists and treats racism as an interpersonal problem 
rather than a structural/institutional one (Griffin, 2015).  
If multiculturalism legitimizes a post-racial society, then in this context, 
Whiteness is threatened by its forced decentralization of cultural and symbolic power, 
since it must be shared across the diversity spectrum. Colorblindness has become 
synonyms with a discourse of multiculturalism (Beltrán, 2005, 2013; Squires, 2014), and 
according to some scholars, color-blindness protects Whiteness by masking its cultural 
dominance under the rhetoric of meritocracy and personal responsibility (Cho, 2009; 
Gallagher, 2003; Pinder, 2015; Powell, 2008). Undeniably, the current sample noticed 
Whiteness in its mediated form. Trouble is that there was no uniformity among its 
predictors, which strongly suggests that for audiences, Whiteness is fluid. In other words, 
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it is not trapped under a set of restrictive racial meanings (Dyer, 1997; Hughey, 2014), Its 
fluidity facilities the inclusion of Whites into marginality, thus securing a comfortable, 
discernable, and dominant position within multiculturalism.  
Whereas the racial meanings of mediated Whiteness are flexible, those of 
ethnoracial minorities are definable, contained, disciplined, and policed (Entman & 
Rojecki, 2001; Molina-Guzmán, 2010; Pham & Ono, 2016). The racial meanings fixed 
on minorities have often been established vis-à-vis a (superior) White Other (Hughey, 
2014; Ramírez Berg, 2002; Ortega & Feagin, 2016); yet, we know little about how 
ethnoracial minorities acquire ethnoracial meaning in relationship to one another 
(Valdivia, 2010). Because the most correlations were observed between color orientations 
and the perceived prototypicality of Blacks than other ethnoracial minorities, usually in 
favor of calling out its marginal state, it suggests that mediated Blackness is emblematic 
of (symbolic) ethnoracial oppression: (1) its exceptional televisibility disagrees with 
colorblindness (Chapter 2), and awareness of ethnoracial inequalities predict its 
marginality across three dimensions onscreen: criminality, sexuality, and decorative roles 
(Chapter 3). This symbolic position enables mediated Blackness to become the master 
category of televisual marginality (Merskin, 2011), setting it as the norm from which to 
assess other ethnoracial minorities through intra-minority racial Othering. Even agenda 
setting theory seems to agree that ethnoracial groups with hyper-visibility (or those 
salient in people’s minds) dictate how audiences think about race and/or ethnicity, 
depending on the frames of course (Entman & Rojecki, 2001; Ortega & Feagin, 2016).  
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LIMITATIONS 
This dissertation is not without limitations, which must be addressed to properly 
contextualize its findings and any inferences from this study. The sample in hand needs 
to be discussed. Even if college-educated Millennials comprise about a third of its cohort 
(Doherty et al., 2015b), those surveyed were starting their post-secondary education. This 
has important implications to consider: (a) critical orientations are just taking shape 
through introductory classes; and (b) the self-concept of young adults is still in 
development. The university where data was collected is not just any institution of higher 
education; it is considered a premier public and state institution, whose admitted students 
were top ranking graduates from high school, usually in the top ten percent. The 
geographic location (Austin, Texas) also indicates that the sample is not like any other. 
The city and state are contradictions. The city, being the state capital, is known for its 
social inclusion and openness, while the state as a whole leans conservative. Lastly, the 
sample came from students who were taking a class about media literacy and took the 
survey at the end of the semester. Their responses could reflect what was learnt in class 
as opposed to a raw experience, or ongoing beliefs and viewing practices.    
The political climate in which the data was collected could have impacted 
perceptions of ethnoracial groups on television. Data collection started about two weeks 
following the presidential election results in 2016. Millennials were one of the socio-
cultural groups emotionally shaken, even devastated about Donald Trump becoming the 
45th president of the United States. The dissertation findings could reflect their immediate 
political sentiments. Political identification was a significant predictor of power evasion 
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color-blindness, highlighting the importance of the political event and how it affected 
perceptions for this study.   
Even though the demographic composition of the sample matched that of the 
institution, the sample was not diverse enough to conduct inter-ethnic/-racial 
comparisons. Specifically, there were not enough African-American students in the 
sample to enable a comparison of them with other minorities. So ethnoracial groups were 
collapsed into the traditional majority/minority binary. The dichotomy assumes a shared 
experience among minorities, when these are racialized with unique frames of cultural 
acceptance and national threats. Grouping ethnoracial groups also obscures any intra-
group differences that may exist. On this note, unlike other ethnoracial groupings, that of 
Asians is among the most problematic, because it merges three regions with linguistic 
and religious variability:  South, East, and South East Asia. And not all Asian students 
think of themselves as part of a minority in the same way that Black and Latino students 
might. 
We should be cautious not to treat gender and ethnicity as self-evident, static, and 
fixed social identities. While these are self-identifications, these socio-categorical 
variables do not explain why how group differences take form. Similarly, ethnic 
identification does not capture racialized social locations (for discussion, see Lewis, 
2004), and even subjective social position is only an approximation of how participants 
have internalized socioeconomic status in a classed society.  
The televisual prototypicality of ethnoracial groups has problems with erasing 
difference. The measure did not ask participants to separate the representations of women 
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and men in their examination of ethnoracial groups, which faces problems with 
intersectionality. The methodological choice was primarily to reduce any survey fatigue 
for asking to many questions. This decision assumes that gender is not a factor in how 
ethnoracial groups are portrayed on television, when intra-group and intergroup 
racialized femininity and masculinity exists (Bounds Littlefield, 2008; Entman & 
Rojecki, 2001; Merskin, 2011; Parreñas Shimizu, 2007; Valdivia & Guzmán, 2004).  
The next measure worth discussing is that of colorblind television programs. 
While many media reports and periodicals were consulted in the selection of 
entertainment programs, these acted more as a proxy than a true representation of the 
concept. The measures are still a good indication about which television programs 
resonate with Millennials in regards to ethnorace; however, it does not indicate how 
ethnorace is really implicated into the narratives and what ethnoracial ideologies really 
exist in them (Brooks, 2009). The findings of this dissertation, which considered 
entertainment television, also may not apply to other genres and narrative content such as 
film, Youtube, and web-series.  
This dissertation talked about post-raciality in relationship to television. How 
much of the variance television-related or color-orientation variables explained (ΔR2) was 
not radically big enough to claim these were indeed behind the observed relationships. 
They do, however, suggest that television has some relevance in the matter, which future 
studies should tease out and specify further.         
Lastly, the data itself should be discussed. No casual relationships can be claimed 
with cross-sectional data, and even less with simple regression models. The data relies on 
   
 132 
self-reported data, which means that survey participants could have over- or under-
estimated their experiences, thoughts, values, and attitudes – perhaps to appear more 
politically correct. The data mostly offers a panoramic view of the relationship among 
post-raciality, television, color-blindness, color-consciousness, and prototypicality among 




This dissertation project has unanswered questions that invite future research. One 
question particularly worth examining is: How does post-racial media content impact 
self-esteem among different ethnoracial groups? Media studies have observed and 
discussed the negative effects of idealized images on the self-concept of audiences. 
Media portrayals of ethnoracial minorities are synonymous with marginality, and ingroup 
audiences know it. One advantage of media content presenting a color rainbow is that its 
ethnoracial diversity could ideally render all characters equal and complex, therefore 
making it possible for marginalized ethnoracial groups feel properly represented. 
Exploring self-esteem and post-racial television would provide further clarity if all 
ethnoracial groups are given the same symbolic weight, regarding psychological media 
effects.    
What is the place of mixed-race or racially ambiguous media characters in the 
minds of audiences? Do they support post-raciality or claim a post-identity state? How is 
their difference established and through what identity? Exploring these questions would 
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help understand another shade in what Doane (2014) refers to as colorblind diversity. 
Moreover, fluid states of ethnoracial identity, with ties in multiple ethnic communities, 
could help us understand the silencing of race and ethnicity through inter-group relations 
(Bonilla-Silva & Ashe, 2014; Squires, 2014). 
 
FINAL THOUGHTS 
So, what is post-racial about Millennials? Post-raciality for Millennials is largely 
a discursive product, mainly shaped by their apparent demographic multiculturalism. 
Among the many socio-cultural institutions that legitimize post-race is the media (Griffin, 
2015; Squires, 2014; Wagner, 2015). Within media, entertainment television 
manufactures a colorblind screen (Nilsen & Turner, 2014), where various degrees of 
ethnic and racial diversity decorate programming – all to portray a cross-ethnoracial 
utopia. The presence of convergence ethnicity on television, as Brook (2009) theorizes, 
provides audiences with visual proof that race(ism) is a thing of past. In fact, many 
textual and ideological studies of television texts suggest the media’s compliance in 
perpetuating a colorblind myth (Brook, 2009; Esposito, 2009; Nielsen & Turner, 2014; 
Squires, 2014), but we know little about how audiences negotiate and/or reject post-
raciality. Qualitative audience research (Jhally & Lewis, 1992; Kretsedemas, 2014) finds 
that people see color on television yet prefer to focus on its meritocratic or universal 
appeals (Müller & Hermes, 2010). What happens, then, to the ever-present aversive 
images that ethnoracial groups embody in the media? How are these silenced through 
post-raciality, or are they?  
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This dissertation took a micro-level and quantitative approach in an effort to 
explore how the television practices of Millennials correlated with two racial ideologies: 
one in favor of post-raciality (namely, color-blindness) and one that counters it (that is, 
color-consciousness). The relationship is rather complex, and what this study finds was: 
(1) colorblind television content is likely to impact power-evasive over color-evasive 
colorblindness; (2) contrary to popular expectations, dignified representations of blacks 
contradict colorblind thinking; (3) ethnicity and race still accrue symbolic worth even 
when invisible; (4) there are shades of seeing/dismissing color, hence calling for robust 
and intricate conceptualizations. These observations tend to offer mixed support to the 
myth of a post-racial Millennial and foreground the role of television content in 
cultivating color cognizance. Moreover, this dissertation shows that even if content 
creators try to seduce Millennials with ethnoracial diversity, which paints a post-racial 
picture of a US society, historical and reductionist portrayals of ethnoracial minorities are 
hard to forget. Millennials arguably tend to resist, at least partially, the racial amnesia 
pushed by the post-racial mystique (see Squires, 2014).  
Assuming that Millennials and others remain ethnoracially cognizant and resistant 
undermines the hegemonic potential of post-racial television/media as a cultural form that 
is never complete and always fluid. It is a highly adaptive ideological structure that seems 
to disappear but hides behind the acceptability and respectability of ethnoracial groups 
(e.g., depictions of color-blindness, meritocracy, and egalitarianism) across social-
cultural domains, including popular and visual culture. The increased visibility of 
ethnoracial minorities (or of color) in the media appears to satisfy people’s desires for 
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diversity and inclusion, yet questions linger about the purpose of their visibility (Beltrán, 
2010b; Brooks, 2009; Bonilla-Silva & Ashe, 2014; Griffin, 2015). Is it a forced diversity? 
Are characters simplified complex representations, as Alsultany (2012) would argue? 
While textual analyses of media are useful in this endeavor, we must also examine the 
audience reactions to media in order to better grasp the impact of cultural production of 
difference. Unquestionably, they/we see color; its visibility is crucial to making points 
and support positionalities.  
At the end of the day, televisibility and/or representations matter, since these are 
the source of pleasure and frustration for cultural readers (Bobo, 1995; hooks, 1992; 
Valdivia, 1998). Media is a site of cultural struggle after all, and striving for post-raciality 
creates tensions over how ethnicity and race should be (re)presented, in addition to what 
personal and/or social identities these are best handled through (Joseph, 2009; Squires, 
2014). Millennials, like other social groups, must develop the cultural and symbolic 
literacy to make-sense of the increasing ambivalent media terrain that privileges the 
(White) individual over a (minority/political) collective. The development and 
maintenance of this cultural competence should be examined in the hopes of learning 
how people oppose, resist, and negotiate culture, whether mediated or not.   
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APPENDIX A:  Color-Evasive Racial Blindness 
 (1 = Strongly Agree; 7 = Strongly Disagree) 
 
1. Ethnic and cultural group categories are not very important for understanding or 
making decisions about people. 
2. It is really not necessary to pay attention to people's racial, ethnic, or cultural 
backgrounds because it doesn't tell much about who they are. 
3. At our core, all human beings are really all the same, so racial and ethnic 
categories do not matter. 
4. Racial and ethnic group memberships do not matter very much to who we are. 
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APPENDIX B:  Color-Evasive Racial Blindness 
 
Racial Privilege Subscale 
1. White people in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the color of their 
skin.* 
2. Ethnicity and race are very important in determining who is successful and who is 
not.* 
3. Ethnicity and race play an important role in who gets sent to prison.* 
4. Ethnicity and race play a major role in the type of social services (such as health 
care or day care) that people receive in the U.S.* 
5. Racial and ethnic minorities in the U.S. have certain advantages because of the 
color of their skin.* 
6. Everyone who works hard, no matter what ethnicity or race they are, has an equal 
chance to get rich. 
7. White people are more to blame for racial discrimination than racial and ethnic 
minorities.* 
 
Institutional Discrimination Subscale 
8. Social policies, such as affirmative action, discriminate unfairly against White 
people. 
9. White people in the U.S. are discriminated against because of the color of their 
skin. 
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10. English should be the official language of the U.S. 
11. Due to ethnic and racial discrimination, programs such as affirmative action are 
necessary to help create equality.* 
12. Racial and ethnic minorities do not have the same opportunities as white people in 
the U.S. 
13. It is important that people begin to think of themselves as American and not 
African American, Mexican American or Italian American. 
14. Immigrants should try to fit into the culture and values of the U.S. 
 
 
Blatant Racial Issues subscale 
15. Ethnic and racial problems in the U.S. are rare, isolated situations. 
16. Talking about ethnic or racial issues causes unnecessary issues. 
17. Racism is a major problem in the U.S.* 
18. It is important for public schools to teach about the history and contributions of 
racial and ethnic minorities.* 
19. It is important for political leaders to talk about racism to help work through or 
solve society’s problems.* 
20. Racism may have been a problem in the past, it is not an important problem 
today. 
 
*Items was reversed coded. 
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APPENDIX C: Ethnoracial Identity  
 (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree) 
 
Public Self-esteem 
1. Overall, my ethnic or racial group is considered good by others. 
2. Most people consider my ethnic or racial group, on the average, to be more 
ineffective than other social groups. 
3. In general, others respect the ethnic and racial group that I belong to. 
4. In general, others think that the ethnic and racial group I belong to is unworthy. 
 
Importance to Identity  
1. Overall, my ethnic or racial group has very little to do with how I feel about 
myself.* 
2. The ethnic or racial group I belong to is important reflection of who I am. 
3. The ethnic or racial group I belong to is unimportant to any sense of what kind of 
person I am.* 
4. In general, belonging to my ethnic or racial group is important to my self-image. 
 
* Item was reverse coded.  
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APPENDIX D: Color-Aware Racial-Consciousness 
 
 (1 = Strongly Agree; 7 = Strongly Disagree) 
 
1. All cultures have their own distinct traditions and perspectives. 
2. There are boundaries between different ethnic groups because of the differences 
between cultures. 
3. There are differences between racial and ethnic groups, which are important to 
recognize. 
4. Each ethnic group has its own strengths that can be identified. 
5. Each racial and ethnic group has important distinguishing characteristics. 
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APPENDIX E: Color-Aware Racial-Consciousness 
 
Critical Ethnoracial Reflection (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree) 
1. Certain racial or ethnic groups have fewer chances to get a good high school 
education. 
2. Certain racial or ethnic groups have fewer chances to get good jobs. 
3. Certain racial or ethnic groups have fewer chances to get ahead. 
4. It is a good thing that certain ethnic or racial groups are at the top and other 
groups are at the bottom. 
5. It would be good if ethnic and racial groups could be equal. 
6. Ethnic or racial equality should be our ideal. 
7. Ethnic and racial groups should be given an equal chance in life. 
8. We would have fewer problems if we treated ethnic and racial groups more 
equally. 
 
Critical Ethnoracial Motivation (1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree) 
1. There are ways that I can contribute to my ethnic and racial community. 
2. I am motivated to try to end racism and discrimination, 
3. It is important to fight against social and economic inequality due to race and/or 
ethnicity. 
4. I can make a difference in my ethnic and racial community. 
5. More effort is needed to end racism and discrimination. 
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6. It is important to me to contribute to my ethnic and racial community. 
7. In the future, I will participate in activities or groups that struggle against racism 
and discrimination. 
 
Critical Ethnoracial Action (1 = All the time; 7 = Never) 
1. Participated in a civil rights group or organization dealing with ethnic or racial 
issues.* 
2. Wrote a letter to a school, community newspaper, or publication about a racial or 
ethnic issue.* 
3. Participated in a political party, club or organization to help deal with ethnic or 
racial issues.* 
4. Contacted a public official by phone, mail, or email to tell him or her how you felt 
about a ethnic or racial issue.* 
5. Signed an email or written petition about a racial or ethnic issue.* 
6. Joined in a protest march, political demonstration, or political meeting about 
ethnic or racial issues.* 
7. Participated in ethnic or racial organization or group.* 
8. Worked on a political campaign because of ethnic or racial issues.* 
9. Participated in a discussion about a racial or ethnic issue.* 
 
*Item was reverse coded. 
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APPENDIX F:  Ethnoracial Identity Gratifications  
 
We would like you think about your overall television experience. Please answer these 
questions about the role of ethnicity and race in your engagement with television. 
 
(1 = Strongly Agree; 7 = Strongly Disagree) 
 
Do you like to watch television because _________. 
1. To see people from my ethnic and racial background in situations similar to 
mine.* 
2. To see people of my own ethnic and racial background with whom I identify.* 
3. It gives me factual information about my ethnicity and race.* 
4. I enjoy watching people who are like me ethnically and racially.* 
5. To learn about people from ethnic and cultural backgrounds different from my 
own.* 
6. To learn more about people from my own ethnic and racial background.* 
7. To find out what happens to people of my own ethnicity and race.* 
8. So I can feel proud about my ethnicity and race.* 
 
*Item was reverse coded. 
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Appendix G: Media and Television Literacy Levels Scale 
 
(1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree) 
 
1. I think media works for the benefit of some and exclude others. 
2. I know the intended and resultant effect of the techniques used in media for 
creating emotional influences. 
3. I know the characteristics of TV channels in our country and the factors 
determining their broadcasting policies. 
4. I think special techniques are used in media for creating emotional influences. 
5. I can distinguish TV shows by their objectives, functions, and characteristics. 
6. I question who benefits from the media and why. 
7. I think the opinions, information, and news in media are broadcasted from 
someone else’s point-of-view. 
8. I know the meanings of smart signs showing the suitability of TV programs for 
children and adults that are displayed just before programs. 
9. I examined and evaluated the TV programs by content, reality, fictiveness, 
consumption, targeting, and misinformation. 
10. I think television is an effective media in shaping individuals and society.  
11. I search for and use other information and amusement alternative to the media. 
12. I know my TV watching habits and I can control them. 
13. I define the potential problems of TV broadcasts and take measures to get 
protected from them.  
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